




The corporatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) began as
a self-initiated experiment by a group of small-scale state enterprises.
Later it became a limited experiment under the control of the govern-
ment, and finally was allowed to spread to the entire country. From
1984 when the first joint-stock company was established in Shanghai,
until 1993 when various provinces obtained quotas to openly issue
shares, China has gradually formed a corporate law framework. This
framework-which constrains company formation, financing, manage-
ment, and the mechanisms for issuing and trading shares-comprises
law (falii), regulations (fagui), rules (guizhang), customary practices
(guanli), and institutionalized state practices related to corporatizaton.
It is difficult to understand the current legal framework without
taking into consideration its context. From the beginning, the
transitional economy produced by China's economic reforms has been
characterized by a series of intense conflicts: between the divergent
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orientations of market and planned economies; between the disparate
interests of decentralization and re-centralization; between appeals for
contractual autonomy and the persistence of state control; and
between transplanted law and indigenous circumstances. Instead of
accommodating the diversity of interests and varieties of circumstanc-
es while maximizing individual and local autonomy, the current legal
framework aims to unify and normalize (guifanhua) by shaping this
unprecedented nation-wide experiment to a previously designed
system. The ambitious endeavor of legal normalization and unifica-
tion results in an omnipotent state that mandates artificial transforma-
tion of social structure and individual life according to an ideal model
designed by a select group of elites. This approach both replicates the
features of a planned economy and totally disregards the possibility
that the benefits will be substantially outweighed by the cost.
This Article is intended to elucidate a number of questions: Does
this legal framework comport with China's goal of developing a
"socialist" market economy? What influence has it and will it have
on corporatization? Until now, has China depended on legal reform
to form procedures and rules of behavior that differ from those during
the time of a planned economy? What sort of influence will the
Company Law, which took effect on July 1, 1994, have on the current
legal framework? Are there new directions that will help China
improve the current legal framework and resolve the problems
created as China goes through the process of trying to find its way
down the road from planned economy to privatization?
It is my firm belief that in exploring the above questions one
must thoroughly study promulgated written laws and the background
that produced them. But it is often unreliable to base one's descrip-
tion, analysis, and judgments solely on written law. In reality not all
efficacious rules ineluctably become written law. This circumstance
arises not simply because legislators cannot anticipate all the legal
questions that may arise, but also because of the gap between reality
and the written law. Written law that has taken effect is not in fact
always efficacious, and concrete legal problems often are resolved by
following rules that are outside the written law. Procedural questions
are frequently settled by force of inertia (an organization or an
organization's power). This sort of administrative influence will not
disappear simply because a law has been issued. Moreover, the
reliability of rules lies not in how they are expressed in legal
provisions, but rather in whether they are helpful to people in
resolving the actual problems that confront them. Therefore, this
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Article gives equal attention to the legal questions raised by disputes
among the participants in the corporatization experiment and to how
these legal questions may be resolved. The Article also attempts to
identify in the facts of the disputes, questions worth considering that
the participants themselves have not raised.
Part II of this Article examines the formation of the legal
framework in the course of the experiment in corporatization. Part
III addresses the classification of stocks and the market accessibility
of different kinds of stocks. Part IV considers the relationship
between the shareholding rights and the power to control. Part V
analyzes the litigation concerning Yuanye Industrial and Runtao,'
and thereby demonstrates how law becomes reality through adjudica-
tion. Part VI is an examination of the relationship between the
Company Law and the prior legal framework as well as the extent to
which the Company Law will change it. Part VII both concludes the
Article and provides several suggestions for addressing some of the
problems elucidated in this Article.
II. EXPERIMENTATION IN CORPORATIZATION AND
THE FORMATION OF A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Primitive Experiments and Local Legislation
In the mid 1980s the central government's decision to tighten the
money supply forced state enterprises to find ways to raise funds
other than through bank loans. One approach was through corporate
restructuring. Some SOEs first reorganized themselves into "joint
operations" (lianying) and then transformed themselves into "share-
holding system enterprises" (gufenzhi qiye) open to investment by
individuals. The earliest steps in this direction were taken during
1984 and 1985 by SOEs in southern China's Special Economic Zone
of Shenzhen, in Shanghai, and in the northeastern industrial city of
Shenyang.
2
1. In the English language press, Yuanye Industrial is also known as Champaign
Industrial, and Runtao is known as Panco. For a narrative account of the case, see, for example,
Christine Chan, Ousted Pancofights Champaign deal, South China Morning Post, Sept. 7,1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, ARCH File.
2. "Joint operation" (lianying) was established on the basis of two sets of rules issued by
the State Council: the Guanyu tuidong jingji lianhede zanxing guiding of 1980 [Temporary
Provisions Concerning the Advancement of Joint Economic Entities] and the Jinyibu tuidong
hengxiang jingji lianhe ruogan wenti of 1986 [Several Provisions on the Further Advancement
of Horizontal Economic Associations]. The "joint operation" stipulated in articles 51-53 of the
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Compared to the so-called "standardized" companies, that is,
companies listed in the 1990s under the Opinions on Standards for
Limited Liability Joint-stock Companies3 (the Standards Opinion),
these early experimental companies were distinguished by their
dispersed stock ownership and small scale. For example, Yanzhong,
Feile Audio, and Aishi-the three joint-stock companies incorporated
in Shanghai-had total capital of RMB 5 million, RMB 500 thousand,
and RMB 300 thousand respectively. The percentage of shares held
by individual investors was 94%, 70%, and 69%, respectively. There
are respectively 16,000, 500, and 300 individual shareholders of each
General Principles of the Civil Law (promulgated in 1987), in fact include corporate, partnership,
and contractual forms of cooperation. From 1980-84, 26,000 enterprises registered as "joint
operation." See Gongshang xingzheng guanli zazhi [Industrial and Commercial Administration]
1985, at 35. The very first enterprise in the country to issue shares to the public-Shanghai
Feiyue Acoustics-was originally established in August 1980 as a "joint operation."
The State Commission for Reform of the Economic System proposed that "among
horizontal joint operation and collective enterprise groups and newly established enterprises, the
share system should be promoted." See Fagui Huibian [Compilation of the new laws and
regulations of the People's Republic of China], 1988, vol. 1, at 272. We can see that "joint
operation" played an accelerating role in the development of the share system.
The favorite word of contemporary Chinese economics, share system (gufenzhi), is used as
a juxtaposition to state-owned (guoyou) and collectively-owned (id suoyou). Suited to the
reform of the state-owned economy, the share system is designed to carry out an ownership
reform of state enterprises. See generally CHINA'S ECONOMIC STRUCTURAL REFORM: CHINESE
LAW AND GOVERNMENT, Winter, 1989-1990; Han Zhiguo, LUN CAICHAN rUFENZHI [ON THE
PROPERTY SHARE SYSTEM], 1988.
In many legal documents, the term "share system" is used without additional definition.
The regulations of ministries and commissions under the State Council, for example, call both
joint-stock companies (gufen gonsi) and limited liability companies (youxian zeren gongso,
"share system enterprises" (gufenzhi qiye) and fall to make a distinction between the two.
The regulations of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) treat
"share system" as one of the nine forms of ownership. At the time of registration, a company
must indicate whether the form of ownership is state, collective, private, individual, joint
operation, share system, foreign invested, Hong Kong, Macao, or Taiwan compatriot invested,
or other. SAIC, Guanyu jingji leixing guafende zanxing guiding [Temporary regulations on
distinctions among economic forms], 1992.
At the end of 1994, China had a total of 7.92 million registered enterprises. Among them
were 25,800 share system enterprises: 15,100 joint-stock companies (gufen gongsi) and 10,700
limited liability companies. Of the 15,100 joint-stock companies, 801 had listed their individual
and B shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, Feb. 7,
1995.
3. Gufen youxian gongsi guifan yijian [Opinion on Standards for Companies Limited by
Shares] [hereinafter Standards Opinion], reprinted in CHINA'S NEW COMPANIES VOLUME I:
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK at 11 [text is in Chinese and English] [hereinafter CHINA'S NEW
COMPANIES].
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company. Each shareholder holds shares worth about RMB 250 (face
value) on average.4
Although few of the measures employed in the early local laws
and regulations to regulate and control joint-stock companies have
been retained in the current legal framework, these flexible practices
provided a relatively forgiving environment that helped to transform
struggling, small enterprises into joint-stock companies. To under-
score the later retreat from these more open rules, it is worth noting
the beneficial elements that distinguished them from the "standards"
implemented in the 1990s by the central government.5 Under the old
system:
4. See Shanghai jingjitizhi gaige shinian [Shanghai's Economic System: Ten Years of
Reform], Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1988, at 2336-42; Eight Listed Companies Report on Their
1990 Operations, SHANGHAI ZHENGQUANBAO [SHANGHAI SEcuRITIEs DAILY], June 10,1991,
at 1.
5. In this Article, "laws and regulations" (fagui) and "rules" (guizhang) have the same
meaning as similar terms in the 1979 Difang renmin daibiao dahui he difang renmin zhengfu
zuzhifa [Organic Law of Local People's Congresses and on Local People's Governments], the
1987 Xingzheng faguizhiding chengxu zanxing tiaoli [Temporary Rules for Procedures in
Enacting Laws and Regulations], and the 1990 Fagui, guizhang bei'an guiding [Regulations on
Laws and Regulations, Rules, and Registers]. Fagui refers to local laws and regulations enacted
by the State Council and to local laws and regulations enacted by the local people's congresses.
Guizhang refers to rules established by the commissions, committees and ministries under the
State Council and to the local rules established by local administrative agencies.
According to media reports, between 1979 and 1994 there were 260 laws enacted, i.e.,
written laws promulgated by the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, 1200
administrative regulations, more than 3000 local laws and regulations, and more than 20,000
central government ministry and commission rules. Because the boundaries between the
legislative and executive authority of the central and local governments are not clearly drawn,
the disruptions of conflict of laws has become a serious problem in China's legal system. Thus,
in 1994, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress enacted the Law on
Legislation to establish the validity of various types of law and draw clear lines of legislative
power. See Wang Wen, Legislative Law, Law over Law, ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO [CHINA
YOUTH DAILY], Feb. 21, 1995, at 5.
The Law on Legislation evidences the vicissitudes of China's legislative pow-
er-concentration, dispersion, reconcentration. The 1954, 1957, and 1978 constitutions all
concentrated legislative authority in the National People's Congress. Other than areas with
concentrations of national minorities, local governments had no legislative power. The 1982
Constitution, however, confirmed that provincial level people's congresses and their standing
committees possessed the authority to enact local rules and regulations. In 1986, the revised,
Organic Law on local people's congress and local level people's governments further enlarged
local government's legislative authority. This dispersion of authority reflects the thinking of
Deng Xiaoping, who, in a December 1978 speech, recognized, "some laws and regulations can
be enacted first at the local level and then after undergoing summarization and improvement
be enacted as national laws." See DENG XIAOPING WENXUAN [COLLECTED WORKS OF DENG
XiAOPING], Renmin chubanshe, 137 (1983). However, this expansion has continued to worry
the central government which is continually planning to reclaim some of the legislative authority.
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(1) There were no status limitations on who could promote
a company. Individuals, SOEs, collectively-owned enterpris-
es, and foreign investment companies and overseas compa-
nies were all allowed to become promoters of companies.6
(2) The company's articles of association, and not the law,
determined the maximum number of shares held by individ-
uals.7
(3) Minimum capital requirements could be as low as RMB
50 thousand to RMB 100 thousand. These amounts were
.05% to .10% of the paid in capital of companies listed in
1992.8
(4) Shares prescribed in a corporation's articles of associa-
tion need not be entirely subscribed and paid-in at the time
of corporate registration, but could be issued several times
after the incorporation.9
(5) State shares (that is, those held in the name of the state)
need not all be common shares, though, conversely, some
cities wanted to make the state's shares preferred.'0
(6) Capital retained by companies on the basis of law or
responsibility contracts (chengbao hetong) could be divided
6. Shenzhen jingji tequ guoying qiye gufenhua shidian zanxing guiding [Temporary
Provisions for the Experiment in Corporatization of State Enterprises in the Shenzhen Special
Economic Zone], arts. 8, 49, (1986), reprinted in GUFEN ZHI ZHINAN [GUIDE TO THE STOCK
SYSTEM] 133,138 (Economic Management Department of the State Commission for Reform of
the Economic System, ed., 1988) [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE STOCK SYSTEM]. Guangdongsheng
jingji tequ shewai gongsi tiaoli [Regulations of the Special Economic Zones of Guangdong
Province on Companies with Foreign Elements], arts. 46-48, (1986), reprinted in GUFEN JINOJI
YU TOUZI XIAOYI [STOCK ECONOMICS AND THE BENEFIT OF INVESTING] 360 (China Statistics
Publishers) (1986) [hereinafter STOCK ECONOMICS]
7. See GUIDE TO THE STOCK SYSTEM, supra note 6, art. 12.
8. See id. art. 9.
9. See id. art. 52.
10. "[W]ith regard to the state's shares in an ordinary share system enterprise, the state's
shares may be preferred ones which are not involved in operational decisions but receive only
a fixed amount of return on investment." Shanghai shi Gufenzhi qiye zanxing banfa [Shanghai
Municipal Temporary Measures for share system enterprises], art. 25 (1988), reprinted in
GUFENZHIDE LILUN YU SHUIAN [THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE SHARE SYSTEM, PART 1] 250-
55, 262-70 (Chen Jiagui ed. 1988) [hereinafter Municipal Temporary Measures]. "The state's
shares are preferred shares; other shares are ordinary shares." Sichuan sheng, Shehui zhuyi
gongyouzhi qiye gufen jingying zerenzhi shixing fang'an [Provisional Plan for Stock Management
Responsibility System in Socialist Publicly-Owned Enterprises] art. 9 (1986), reprinted in
GUFENZHIDE LILUN YU SHIJIAN [THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE SHARE SYSTEM, PART 1) 250-
55, 262-70 (Chen Jiagui ed. 1988) [hereinafter Provisional Plan].
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into "enterprise shares" (qiye gu). These were shares held
beneficially by the corporation for its employees."
(7) Public offerings were not controlled by a planned quota,
but could be made subject only to approval by the local
branch of the People's Bank of China, the central bank of
the PRC."2 Because a company could either directly issue
the shares itself or entrust to issue to the local bank, issuing
costs were one percent or less of those in 1993.
(8) After incorporation, at least on paper, the new company
was freed of its former subordinate relationship to adminis-
trative agencies in charge of that industry (hangye zhuguan
bumen)."
(9) Registration of the new company was subject only to the
consent of the supervisory agency and the approval of the
municipal government.'"
To be sure, some of the local rules from the period of experimen-
tation have been amended and accepted in the central government's
corporation scheme: for example, the separation of state, legal person,
and individual shares according to the identity of the holder."
However, as we shall show in the next section, the central government
11. Sichuan Province's method was this: capital formed by state enterprises before the 1983
policy of "profits converted into taxes" (li gai shui) reverted to the ownership of the state;
capital formed thereafter was separated into two parts: (1) capital formed by using state
allocated "floating capital" that enjoyed tax reduction or exemption became the state's; (2) other
capital reverted to the ownership of the enterprise.
12. See Municipal Temporary Measures, supra note 10, art. 10.
13. See Municipal Temporary Measures, supra note 10, art. 26; Provisional Plan, supra note
10, art 26. The planned economy in China formed this as yet substantially unchanged control
system. Above every state or collective enterprise, there is an administrative agency in charge
(xingzheng zhuguan bumen), which is the state's agent, wielding government power and serving
as a parent (literally, mother) company (mu gongsi) that participates in the enterprise's policy
making. The division of enterprise control authority between the national and local
governments was not arranged by law but has de facto evolved over the years. The central
government's enterprises are controlled by the relevant ministry or commission under the State
Council, while the relevant departments (ting) and bureaus (ju) of provincial and local
governments control their own enterprises. Mao Zedong once referred to this system as
"breaking things into pieces" (tiaokuai fen'ge).
14. Shenzhen tequ guoying qiye gufenhua shidian dengji zhuce zanxing banfa [Interim
Measures of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone for Registering State-Owned Corporatization
Experiment Enterprises, arts. 8, 49, (1986)], 1988; see Zhongguo fagui, guizhang huibian
[COLLECTION OF CHINESE SECURITIES LAWS AND REGULATIONS AND RULES] 141-44
(Shanghai Share System Enterprises Joint Committee ed.) (1981-1992) [hereinafter SECURrIES
LAWS].
15. Municipal Temporary Measures, supra note 10, arts. 3-7.
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found the absence of a universal matrix, negligible mandatory rules,
and predominance of optional clauses an unsettling consequence of
local regime control. It therefore set out to reign-in the experimen-
tation.
B. Legal Measures Enacted to Restrain the Spread of Experimen-
tation
1. Background for Restraints. For experiments in corporati-
zation of state enterprises to exist lawfully, they had to pass a two-
part ideological litmus test: First, did they take public ownership as
the base? Second, did they "preserve the leading role of public owner-
ship," or, as this phrase was often taken to mean, was the state the
majority shareholder? Accordingly, the State limited the experiment
in corporatization to certain sectors, and within these sectors made the
termination or growth of the experiments contingent on whether they
weakened or strengthened the leading role of public ownership.
Accordingly, between 1987 to 1992, the Central Government
adopted measures to ensure the leading role of public ownership and
thus limit legal experimentation in regard to incorporating SOEs. The
Central Government's actions manifested the sharp ideological
disputes engendered by corporatization as well as the Chinese's
economy's entry in 1989 into a period of "rectification and consolida-
tion" (zhili zhengdun). As an apparent cause of the dispersion of
financial resources and reduction of central government income, stock
issuing became one of the important foci for rectification and
consolidation.
2. Legal Structures Formed by Restrictive Measures.
a. Differential Treatment of Dissimilar Kinds of Companies.
One of the chief measures adopted to prevent undermining the
foundation of public ownership was to strictly limit the open issuance
of shares while appropriately developing employee shareholding by
employees and actively encouraging legal person shareholding.
In March, 1987, the State Council issued an administrative order
prohibiting SOEs from issuing shares to the public. The order
mandated that enterprises that had been approved as "experimental
units" should be inspected by local authorities. The order further
determined which branch of government would review the subsequent
issuance of shares by these SOEs. Issuance of more than RMB 30
million shares would be subject to approval by the Head Office of the
CHINA'S CORPORATIZATION EXPERIMENT
People's Bank; issuance of less than RMB 30 million shares would be
subject to approval by the local branch of the People's Bank.16
In May, 1990, the State Commission for Restructuring the
Economic System (SCRES) formally proposed guidelines for
differential treatment of dissimilar types of companies. These
guidelines provided for active experimentation where enterprises hold
each other's shares but limited experimentation in the issuance of
shares where internal employees held shares. The guidelines further
provided for systematic experimentation in Shanghai and Shenzen,
leaving experimentation elsewhere squarely under control of the
central government. 7
b. Appropriately Developing Employee Shareholding. SCRES
policy in regard to employee shareholding changed by the year. In
1989, employee and legal person shareholding were on par as the
main forms of experimentation in corporatizing SOEs.' In 1990 and
1991, SCRES stopped experimentation while concentrating on
improving existing experiments.' 9 However, in 1992, SCRES
determined that there should be a planned incremental expansion in
the scope of experiments in employee shareholding.2  In the
16. Guowuyuan guanyu jiaqiang gupiao, zhaiquan guanide tongzhi [State Council Notice
Concerning the Strengthening of the Management of Stock and Securities], (1987), reprinted in
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALO QUANSHU, ZENGBU BEN [COLLECTION OF THE LAWS
OFTHE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME] 350 (Jilin chubanshe) (1990)
[hereinafter COLLECTION OF LAws, SUPP. VOL]. Zhongguo remain yinhang guanyu guanqie
guofa [1987] 21 hao, 22 hao wenjiande tongzhi [Notice of the People's Bank of China
Concerning Thorough Implementation of State Council Documents 21 and 22], (1987), reprinted
in ZHONGGUO ZHENGFA FAGUI GUIZHANG HUIBIAN [COLLECTED CHINA SECURITIES LAWS
AND REGULATIONS] 41-43, 46 (Shanghai Joint Stock Enterprise Joint Committee ed.) (1981-
1992) [hereinafter COLLECTED SECURITIES LAWS].
17. Guojia tigaiwei, guanyu zai zhili zhengdunzhong shenhua qiye gaig4 qianghua qiye
guanlide yijian [Opinion of the State Commission on Reform of the Economic System Concerning
The Deepening of Reform and the Strengthening of Enterprise Management During the Correction
and Consolidation], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], June 13, 1990, at 2.
18. Guojia tigaiwei guanyu 1989 nian jingji tizhi gaige yaodiande tongzhi [Notice of the
State Commission on the Reform of the Economic System Concerning Important Points of
Economic Reform in 1989], reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XIN FAGUI
HUIBIAN [COMPILATION OF THE NEW LAwS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC
OF CHINA], 1989, no. 2, at 55 [hereinafter COMPILATION OF NEW LAWS].
19. Guojia tigaiwei guanyu 1991 nian jingji tizhi gaige yaodiande tongzhi [Notice of the
State Commission on the Reform of the Economic System Concerning Important Points of
Economic Reform in 1991], reprinted in id., 1991, no. 2, at 247.
20. Guojia tigaiwei guanyu 1992 nian jingii tizhi gaige yaodiande tongzhi [Notice of the
State Commission on the Reform of the Economic System Concerning Important Points of
Economic Reform in 1992], reprinted in id., 1992, no. 1, at 107.
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following year, 1993, the SCRES tightened its control over employee
shareholding practices.2 Most recently, in February of 1994, the
State Council decided to "temporarily suspend the issuance of internal
employee shares. '
c. Actively Fostering and Aiding Legal Person Shareholding.
SCRES has consistently adopted a policy of encouraging and assisting
legal person shareholding. The focus of encouragement and assis-
tance fluctuated among different kinds of legal person shareholding
organizations. SCRES, at different times, emphasized joint-stock
companies, enterprise groups, and limited liability companies. SCRES
emphasis on legal person shareholding resulted in the emergence of
6,000 joint-stock companies established through "directed offerings"
(dingxiang muji),z3 These companies have issued approximately
RMB 252 billion (face value) non-publicly negotiable shares.24
However, in June 1994, SCRES prohibited the establishment of new
companies through directed offerings.'
3. Central Government Organization in Charge of the Issuance
and Trading of Stocks. Although in the mid-1980s the local
measures regulating joint-stock companies all admitted the final
approval power of the local People's Bank branch in the issuance and
trading of stocks, these measures also recognized that the private
placement of shares to internal employees and other enterprises need
not be subject to the approval of the People's Bank. Furthermore,
municipalities proceeded upon the assumption that local branches of
the People's Bank need not seek approval from the Provincial
branches or headquarters of the People's Bank when exercising their
power to approve the issuance of stock.
The People's Bank has since come to develop a highly centralized
management system derived from the 1986 State Council Interim
21: Guojia tigaiwei guanyu 1993 nian jingji tizhi gaige yaodiande tongzhi [Notice of the
State Commission on the Reform of the Economic System Concerning Important Points of
Economic Reform in 1993], reprinted in id., 1993, no. 1, at 196.
22. Remarks by the Office of the State Council's Security Policy Committee on some policy
questions concerning this year's stock market, (Feb. 4, 1994), in ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN
JIANDU GUANLI WEIYUAN HUI GONGBAO [BULL. OF THE CHINA SECURITIEs REGULATORY
COMMIsSION] 1994, no. 1, at 30 [hereinafter CSRC BULLETIN].
23. Directed, or fixed channel, offerings are offerings made to a specific audience, such as
legal persons.
24. Zhang Xinhe,Jueqi yu gugai dachao [The Sudden Rise in the Share Reform High Tide],
ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECuRrrms], July 27, 1994, at 1.
25. ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURItIES], June 25, 1994, at 1.
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Regulations on Banking Management. Article 5 of the Regulations
empowered the People's Bank to administer stocks, bonds, and
negotiable instruments as well as manage financial markets. The
People's Bank's centralized management system has led to a shift in
power away from the local branches of the Bank to the Head
Office.26
By December, 1990, local branches of the People's Bank were
deprived of the power to approve the public offering of any shares.
In Shanghai and Shenzhen, the issuance of new shares by SOEs with
outstanding public shares became subject to the approval of the local
branch of the People's Bank. New initial public offerings are subject
to approval of the Head Office of the People's Bank.27
The internal fund raising measures of enterprises were also
brought under the unified control of the headquarters of the People's
Bank. Provincial branches of the People's Bank are responsible for
enacting the headquarter's rules at the local level. Provincial
branches distribute the quotas for internal fundraising distributed by
headquarters and exercise their assigned powers within the scope of
the quota.28
The headquarters further exercises its authority by banning the
establishment of securities companies or other financial institutions
without its approval29 and by requiring that it approve the listing of
shares by joint-stock companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen."
In addition to the powers of the Head Office, the State Council
has further centralized power over the Chinese securities market
through the establishment of the "Working Conference on the
Securities Market." This body-the highest level organization in
charge of the securities market-is led by the People's Bank and
includes members from the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning
26. Guowuyuan yinhang guanli zanxing tiaoli [Interim Rules on Bank Management],
reprinted in COLLECrION OF LAWS, SUPP. VOL, supra note 16, at 785.
27. Zhongguo rennin yinhang guanyu yan'ge kongzhi gupiao faxing he zhuanrangde
tongzhi [Bank of China Notice Concerning Strict Control of Share Issues and Transfers],
reprinted in id. at 164.
28. Zhongguo renmin yinhang guanyu jiaqiang qiye neibu jizi guanlide tongzhi [1990 Notice
of the People's Bank of China Concerning Strengthening the Management of Capital
Accumulated within the Enterprise], reprinted in COLLECTED SECuRrriEs LAWS, supra note 16,
at 121.
29. Zhongguo remnin yinhang zhengquan gongsi guanli zanxing banfa [People's Bank of
China Interim Methods for Regulating Securities Companies], reprinted in id. at 151.
30. Zhongguo renmin yinhang guanyu yan'ge kongzhi gupiao faxing he zhuanrangde
tongzhi [Bank of China Notice Concerning Strict Control of Share Issues and Transfers],
reprinted in COLLECTION OF LAWS, SUPP. VOL, supra note 16, at 164.
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Commission, SCRES, and other central government departments. All
public offerings and listing of stocks are subject to the approval of the
Working Conference on the Securities Market.
4. The Restricted Authority of Local Rules and Regulations.
Local regulations are established by the following governmental
bodies in accordance with the Organic Law of the Local People's
Congresses and Local People's Governments of the People's Republic
of China:
(1) The People's Congresses of provinces, autonomous
regions, and municipalities directly under the Central
Government.
(2) The People's Congresses of cities where the provincial
and autonomous regional people's governments are located.
(3) The People's Congresses of relatively large cities subject
to approval by the State Council.
The following authorities are empowered, under the same law, to
make local administrative rules:
(1) The administrative authorities of provinces, autonomous
regions and municipalities directly under the Central
Government.
(2) The administrative authorities of cities where the
provincial and autonomous regional people's governments
are located.
(3) The administrative authorities of relatively large cities as
approved by the State Council.3
The principal function of local regulations is to temporarily fill
the interstices left open by laws and administrative regulations
promulgated by the State Council. However, since these local
regulations may neither conflict with nor have precedence over laws
and administrative regulations, when relevant laws and administrative
regulations are promulgated, local regulations are supplanted, even if
31. ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO XINGZItENG FAGUI XUANBIAN [SELECTON OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CINA], Beijing:
FalU chubanshe, 1990, vol. 1, at 60 [hereinafter COLLECrION OF ADMINISTRATnVE LAWS].
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they are not expressly invalidated. 2 Accordingly, if in the course of
administrative litigation a judge finds a lack of congruence between
local regulations on the one hand and laws and administrative
regulations on the other, she may discard the former and use the
latter.3 However, local regulations carry greater authority than rules
promulgated by ministries because the former, unlike the latter, may
be the basis for a judgment?4 Still, it should be understood that, in
theory, local rules are not to fill gaps but serve merely as implement-
ing measures based on laws and administrative regulations in effect.
If a local rule exists in isolation without corresponding law or
administrative regulation behind it, its validity is questionable.35
Invalidating a local regulation, however, is not as simple as one
might expect. If the State Council doubts the constitutionality or
legality of a local regulation, it may appeal to the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress (SCNPC) for a determination.36
Yet, though the SCNPC is the highest administrative authority in
China, it lacks the authority to control a local legislature and may not
nullify or amend a local regulation on its own.
32. The special economic zones of Guangdong and Fujian provinces are an exception.
Based on authority granted in 1981 by the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress, the legislative organs of the two provinces may, based on principles in laws,
ordinances and policies, enact economic laws and regulations that apply solely to the special
economic zones. Thus laws, policies, and regulations do not naturally supersede the zones' local
laws and regulations. Id., vol. 2, at 2,645.
33. Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin fayuan shenli xingzheng anjian dui difangxing
fagui yu falti he xingzheng fagui bu yizhide yingdang zhixing faltU he xingzheng faguide guiding
fuhan [Reply of the Supreme Court Stating that in Hearing Administrative Cases, if People's
Courts Encounter Inconsistency between Local Laws and Regulations with National Laws and
Administrative Laws and Regulations, They Ought to Carry Out the Provisions of the [National]
Laws and Administrative Laws and Regulations]; SIFA WENJIAN XUAN [SELECTED JUDICIAL
DOCUMENTS], Beijing: Renmin fayuan chubanshe, 1993, vol. 6, at 37. Zuigao renmin fayuan,
guanyu renmin fayuan sheni xingzheng anjian duiyu fa yijude guizhangde ying ruhe canzhaode
dafu [Supreme People's Court, Response Concerning what Courts Hearing Administrative Cases
Should do When there are Problems for which there Legal Basis to Consult], Selected Judicial
Documents, 1994, vol. 6, at 44.
34. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susong fa [Administrative Litigation Law of
the People's Republic of China], art. 53, § 1, reprinted in COMPILATION OF NEW LAWS, supra
note 18, 1989, no. 2, at 3.
35. Article 52 of the Difang geji renmin daibiao dahui he difangji renmin zhengfu zuzhi fa,
[Organic Law on Local People's Congresses and Local People's Governments] stipulates that
"local administrative agencies may enact rules based on the law and on the administrative rules
and regulations of the State Council." Guowuyuan yinhang guanli zanxing tiaoli [Interim Rules
on Bank Management], reprinted in COLLECTION OF LAWS SUPP. VOL, supra note 16, at 785.
36. See Guowuyuan fagui guizhang bei'an guiding [Regulations of the State Council on
Laws and Regulations and Records], art. 8, reprinted in COMPILATION OF NEW LAWS, supra
note 18, 1990, no. 1, at 34.
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On the other hand, because the State Council's administrative
power is superior to that of the local administrative authorities, the
State Council may nullify or demand the amendment of a local
regulation when such a regulation is in conflict with an administrative
regulation or a rule of a ministry or commission. 7 Ministries and
commissions under the control of the State Council may not them-
selves invalidate or demand the local administrative authorities to
amend their local regulations, but may only issue orders to the
relevant executive organs of the local governments.
In the course of corporatization neither these rules on restricting
local rules and regulations nor the distinctions between central and
local jurisdiction were completely observed. In 1987, the State
Council stipulated that local governments had to amend their
regulatory measures for the issuance of stocks enacted prior to 1987
and put them on record with the People's Bank.38 In May, 1990, a
document issued by the General Office of the State Council (Guowu-
yuan bangongting) and SCRES actually nullified local regulations and
rules governing the issuance of stocks and debentures. After May,
1990, the Central Government treated the approval of any public
offering on the basis of local regulations alone as an ultra vires act
and declined to recognize its validity.19
Owing to this change, which retrospectively limited the effective-
ness of local regulations and rules, issuing companies and shareholders
faced unpredictable legal risks. The legality of companies whose
offerings prior to May, 1990, had been based on local government
approval now had to be reaffirmed by SCRES, the State Bureau for
37. Id.
38. See COLLECION OF LAWS SUPP. VOL., supra note 16, at 350.
39. Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu xiang shehui gongkai faxing gupiaode gufenzhi shidian
wentide tongzhi [Notice of the Central Office of the State Council Concerning Problems in
Share System Experiment Enterprises Issuing Stock to the Public], 1990; Guojia tigaiwei guanyu
xiang shehui gongkai faxing gupiaode gufenzhi shidian qiye chongxin shenpi tongzhi [Notice of
the State Commission on Reforming the Economic System Concerning Renewed Approval for
Share System Experiment Enterprises Issuing Shares to Society], reprinted in GUFENZI-I
SHIDIAN ZHENGCE FAGUI HUIBIAN [COLLECTION OF POLICIES, LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR
SHARE SYSTEM EXPERIMENTS] (Shanghai Office for Reform of the Economic System ed., 1992)
[hereinafter SHARE SYSTEM ExPERIMENT POLICIES]. In the aforementioned notice from the
Central Office of the State Council, it was stipulated: "Other than the two stock exchanges at
Shanghai and Shenzhen which have already been permitted to issue shares to society, all others
which have been approved by local governments but which have not been through the approval
procedures of the concerned ministries and agencies of the central government, must within the
designated period report to the State Commission on Reform of the Economic System, the State
Bureau for the Management of State Property, and the People's Bank of China to once again
undertake approval procedures."
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the Administration of State Assets (SBASA), and the Headquarters
of the People's Bank before the issued shares could be listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.4' Thus, corporations
which existed legally before 1990, indeed which had been encouraged
by local governments to form, found themselves bound by decrees
that subsequently came into force. Of the 100 companies targeted by
the State Council decision, only 20 were permitted by the SCRES and
the CSRC to be listed in 1993. At least for 1994, the others have lost
the opportunity to even be considered, since in February of that year,
the CSRC stopped accepting applications for listings filed by such
companies.4
1
5. The Leading Role of Public Ownership was Verified in the
Corporatization Experiment. Public ownership is playing a leading
role in the corporatization of SOEs. In 1991, while still a senior
official at SCRES, Mr. Liu Hongru, who would serve both as a
member of the State Council's Security Policy Committee (SPC) and
from 1992 to March 1995 as Chair of the CSRC, confidently com-
mented on SCRES' regulatory measures: "In all the provisions and
measures we carried out regarding the shareholding experiment, the
leading role of the public ownership is consistently stressed. So,
undoubtedly, we can say, in the shareholding experiment, we firmly
persist in the socialist direction."4'
The state of the shareholding experiment at the end of 1991
substantiate Liu's comments. There were 3,220 shareholding
experimental enterprises in China, including both joint-stock
companies and limited liability companies. Three-hundred and eighty
are legal person shareholding companies (about 12% of the total).
Two-thousand, seven-hundred and fifty-one are employee sharehold-
ing (86%). Eighty-nine are public offering (8%). The eighty-nine
publicly offered companies had a total capital of RMB 5.810 billion,
including 2.74 billion of State shares (47% of the total), 1.68 billion
legal person shares invested by other enterprises, 830 million
individual shares, and 560 million foreign capital shares. Clearly, even
in the shareholding experimental enterprises that offered shares to the
40. See sources cited supra note 39.
41. Conversation with spokesperson of the CSRC on several policy questions concerning
the current stock market, CSRC BULLETIN, supra note 22, 1994, no. 1, at 28.
42. GUFENZHI QIYE ZUJIAN HE SHIDIAN ZHENGCE HUIBIAN [COMPENDIUM OF POLICIES
ON ORGANIZATION OF SHARE SYSTEM ENTERPRISES AND EXPERIMENTS], (Reform of the
Chinese Economic System Mag. Pub. House, 1992), at 26.
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general public, public (i.e., state) ownership continued to play a
leading role.43
Transferring shares, however, is difficult. At the end of 1991,
only 13 companies among the 3220 had legally transferable shares,
and these had a face value of merely 200 million RMB. Shares may
be transferred only on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Securities
Exchanges. It should be noted that eliminating or limiting transfer-
ability of shares has created a dilemma: either continuing or ending
this freeze permanently will produce a serious crisis in the markets.
A further problem persists in the legality of publicly offered compa-
nies. Among the eighty-nine publicly offered companies, two-thirds
have problems of legality. These companies are still seeking approval
from the relevant authorities.
C. Expansion and Standardization of the Experiment
1. Background. During Deng Xiaoping's early 1992 tour of
southern China, he spoke repeatedly of the need to accelerate reform.
The expansion of the experiment in corporatization clearly echoed
these remarks." In January, SCRES presented a plan in its annual
"Key Points of the Restructuring of Economic Systems." In the
special economic zones in Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan provinces
experiments could be made in publicly offered shares not listed or
traded on exchanges. The measures and amount of issuance were to
be jointly examined and approved by the People's Bank and SCRES.
In Shanghai and Shenzhen, the plan provided that the numbers of
listed companies should be increased in a planned way. In other
areas, the policy was to develop legal person shareholding limited
liability companies, joint-stock companies, and enterprise groups. The
scope of internal employee shareholding was to be expanded in a
planned and incremental way.45
43. Id. at 11.
44. At the beginning of 1992, during Deng Xiaoping's progress through southern China,
he publicly warned against the forces obstructing reform and called for expanding and
accelerating the reforms. These remarks caused a dramatic shift in the stock markets of China.
See Wu Xianman, Deng Xiaoping nanxunhou zhongguo gushide xin fazhan [The New
Development of China's Stock Market After Deng Xiaoping's Southern Progress], ZHONOGUO
ZHENGQUAN PINGGU [CHINA SECURITIES RATING], 1994, no. 2, at 12.
45. Guojia tigaiwei guanyu 1992 nian jingji tizhi gaige yaodiande tongzhi [Notice of the
State Commission on the Reform of the Economic System Concerning Important Points of
Economic Reform in 1992], reprinted in COMPILATION OF NEw LAws, supra note 18, 1992, no.
1, at 107.
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In April of 1992, SCRES and the Production Office under the
State Council clarified the procedures for the examination and
approval of the listing of shares. Outside of Shanghai and Shenzhen,
the listing of any shares had to be examined and approved by the
Working Meeting of the State Council on the Listing of Stocks.'
As the experiment expanded, the ministries and commissions
began to promote a uniform and standardized corporation model.
From May to December 1992, around ten ministries and commissions
of the Central Government47 separately or jointly promulgated
fourteen administrative rules formalizing the corporatization experi-
ment. These rules covered joint-stock companies, limited liability
companies, and the securities market within each governmental
organ's jurisdiction. SCRES issued the two rules that drew the most
attention: The Opinion on Standards for Limited Liability Companies
and The Opinion on Standards for Joint-Stock Companies (Standards
Opinion)48.
2. Unified Control of Ministry Rules
a. Authority and Applicable Scope of Ministry Rules. In
China, binding documents issued by the ministries and commissions
under the control of the State Council are called "ministry rules". As
with local rules, the ministry rules must be based upon corresponding
laws and administrative regulations. Departmental rules may not be
used to fill in legal lacunae, except for the purpose of autonomously
exercising their administrative functions within their delegated
authority.4
9
The scope of the departmental rules conforms with the jurisdic-
tional scope of the particular ministry or commission formulating the
departmental rule. If a ministry or commission is itself a vertical
system (such as the People's Bank of China) and extends its power to
46. SHARE SYSTEM EXPERIMENT POLICIES, supra note 39, at 8.
47. The ministries and commissions included SCRES, the State Planning Commission, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Personnel Administration, the
Ministry of Material Supply, the State Land Administration, the State Bureau for the
Administration of State Assets, the State Taxation Administration, and the State Scientific and
Technological Commission.
48. Standards Opinion, supra note 3. As used throughout this Article, the abbreviation,
"Standards Opinion," refers to only the Opinion on Standards for Companies Limited by Shares.
49. See XIANFA (1983) [Constitution], art. 90 (China); Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
guowuyuan zuzhifa [Organic Law of the State Council of the People's Republic of China], art.
10; see also Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng fagui xuanbian, supra note 27, at 8, 58.
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the local level by setting up branches, its departmental rules will be
binding upon the whole system. If a ministry or a commission is not
a vertical system of power with branches at local levels of govern-
ment, it remains an open question whether this ministry or commis-
sion's rules are binding upon local governments. If in conflict with
local regulations, ministry rules, as we have noted above, will be
trumped.
b. Comparison Between Ministry Rules and Local Regulations.
As argued earlier, the increasingly prominent role of central govern-
ment organs in the corporatization enterprise led to stricter, more
standardized rules. This point is particularly well illustrated by the
way in which the Standards Opinion differs from local regulations of
the 1980s. The Standards Opinion:
(1) Set qualification limitations on promoters of companies.
Under the Opinion, individuals and private enterprises may
not promote joint-stock companies.50
(2) Limits the quantity of individual shareholding. The
shares held by individual investors may not exceed 0.5% of
the outstanding shares of the company.
(3) Requires a higher minimum capital requirement. The
initial paid-in capital of a joint-stock company shall not be
less than RMB 10 million.52
(4) Requires that, without exception, State shares shall be
common shares.53
(5) Requires the promoter, before the company is estab-
lished, make contact with the administrative department in
charge of the line of business in which the company seeks to
trade.54
(6) Allows that the procedures for approving the establish-
ment of a company may involve the provincial government
or the Central Government.5
50. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 10, 2, art. 24, 3, art. 12, 3, art. 24, 2, § 1,




54. Id. art. 13, 2. Gufenzhi qiye shidian banfa [Methods for Enterprise Experiments in
the Share System], part 9 (stipulating that "[a]t the time a trial is approved, a controlling agency
should be selected based on the operational scope of the trial enterprise.").
55. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 13, para. 4.
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c. Ministry Rules and the Distribution of the Administrative
Approval Powers. Examination and approval rights regarding the
establishment of corporations are distributed among various central
and local government organs. Though the language in the ministry
rules concerning examination and approval rights are unambiguous,
as we shall see the procedures for applying such approval are often
vague.
The governmental bodies that may permit an enterprise to
commence procedures to initiate or promote a company will only
accept applications from companies that have received permission to
apply from the administrative agency in charge of their trade or
industry.16  This power may be called the permit to apply for
initiation. This power generally belongs to the competent administra-
tive departments in charge of the industry, unless the application
involved a foreign invested enterprise is concerned, in which case, the
power belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation and
Trade. 7
This request for permission to apply implies that certain of an
individual's right in private and public law, have been absorbed by the
administrative department in charge of the individual's industry or
trade. Therefore, the individual may claim only those rights subject
to the administrator's consent. Thus, governmental organs which are
obliged to protect the individual's rights are responsible only to the
competent administrative departments, not the individual possessing
such rights.
SCRES, or provincial commissions for restructuring economic
systems, 8 hold the power to approve or refuse the application for
56. An agency in charge of a trade or industry is a central or local government organ that
within its authorized scope exercises governmental power in regard to all legal and natural
persons in that trade or industry. Moreover, in matters outside its own jurisdiction that require
approval by another government organ, it either permits or represents the legal and natural
persons under its supervision in seeking approval from that other governmental organ.
57. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, para. 3.
58. In 1992, an ad hoc organization-the Office for the Joint Examination and Approval
of Shareholding Experimental Units-was established in each province. The Provincial
Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems is the core of the Office. See Fang Liufang,
Approval Procedures for the Establishment of Companies in China, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN CHINA,
1993, no. 4, at 167-84. The benefit the examination and approval power provided to the officials
of Commissions for Reform of the Economic System (CRES) is patent. In April 1993, the
deputy director of the Shenyang Municipal CRES subscribed 74,000 yuan (face value) of a
company before it was listed. After its listing, he sold 68,000 shares at 16 yuan a share, for a
profit of 900,000 yuan. In 1994 he was indicted for accepted bribes. BAOKAN WENGAO
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initiation (the most important permit needed for the establishment of
a joint-stock company). Promoters of corporations may not apply
directly to SCRES or a corresponding provincial commission for
restructuring the economic system, even if the promoters have
obtained consent of the competent administrative department in
charge of the enterprise's trade. The promoters must first submit an
application to the local commission for restructuring economic
systems. The provincial commission, before approving an application
for initiation, often conducts an examination of the application in
conjunction with other governmental organs such as the state assets
bureaus, branches of the People's Bank, and the Planning Commis-
sion.
Under the Standards Opinion, in addition to its right to permit
initiation, SCRES' permit rights include, but are not limited to: (1)
transfer by directors and managers of shares in their names; (2) the
acquisition by shareholders (other than the promoters) of more than
10% of the outstanding shares of the company; (3) the company's
redemption of its own shares; (4) the amendment of the company's
articles of association; and (5) the merger and break-up of companies.
SCRES also has the power to instruct any company to correct any
actions in violation of the Standards Opinion and to suggest that the
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) impose
sanctions on offending companies.59
Other powers involved with the corporatization of SOEs are
vested in various central government organs. The People's Bank
controls the permit power for the issuance of shares-whether or not
an IPO-as well as the power to formulate and distribute issuance
quotas. The State Bureau for the Administration of State Assets
exercises the power to affirm assessments of state-owned property and
to approve the transfer of state shares. It also participates in the
examination of the application for initiation. Property powers are
vested in the State Land Administration, which is responsible for
investments involving the sale, transfer, or lease of the land use
right.60
[PERIODICAL REPRnTS], Jan. 13, 1994, at 1.
59. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, arts. 30(6), 31, 32, 83, 89-90, 106-07.
60. Guojia tudi guanli ju [State Bureau of Land Management], Gufenzhi shidian qiye tudi
zichan guanli zanxing guiding [Interim Provisions for the Administration of Land Assets in Share
System Experimental Enterprises], reprinted in COMPnATON OF NEW LAWS, supra note 18,
1992, no. 3, at 188.
CHINA'S CORPORATIZATION EXPERIMENT
Where the initiation of a joint-stock company concerns a new
construction project, or a SOE that formerly implemented the state's
mandatory plan is to be reorganized into a joint-stock company, the
State Planning Commission may possess the authority to issue the
power of initiation permit.61 If the promoter is registered as a high-
technology enterprise, the State Commission on Science and Technol-
ogy will participate in the examination of the application for
initiation.62 Only after promoters of corporations have obtained
permits from other governmental organs will the SAIC handle the
registration procedures.
In the current environment in which every agency urgently seeks
to extend its bureaucratic power, this system of allocating powers to
approve corporatization experiments encounters bureaucratic
problems. It is almost impossible to accurately define the powers of
a specific government agency since the power to issue a permit is
defined by the government agency itself. Without subsequent
recognition by the State Council, one agency's power does not have
binding force over other governmental organs at the same level.
Furthermore, governmental organs divide their permit authority into
sub-permits so as to produce work for the organ's subordinate
bureaus and departments. Governmental organs have also proven
adept at creating permit procedures for newly developing areas not
covered by existing permit powers. With the proliferation of new
areas and the ever finer divisions within industries, conflicts among
the licensing powers of different government organs appears to be a
permanent fact of life. Thus, promoters of corporations must
supplicate different government organs or apply to one government
organ several times.
d. Retroactivity of Rules. Emerging companies in China need
not only a "birth" permit, but also a permit for their continued
existence. This is because the Standards Opinion and the administra-
tive rules issued contemporaneously with the Standards Opinion all
had retroactive effect. Whether a company registered before the rules
61. Guojiajihua weiyuan hul [State Planning Commission], Gufenzhi shidian qiye hongguan
guanli zanxing guiding [Interim Provisions for the Macro-Management of Share System
Experiment Enterprises], reprinted in id., no. 2, at 303.
62. Guojia kexue jishu weiyuan hui [State Commission on Science and Technology],
Guanyu zai guojia gaoxin jishu chanye kaifaqu chuangban gaoxin jishu gufen youxian gongsi
ruogan wentide guiding [State Commission on Science and Technology, Provisions on Several
Questions Concerning Startups of Joint Stock Limited Liability High Technology Companies in
State High Technology Industry Development Zones], reprinted in id., no. 4, at 301.
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became effective could continue to exist after the rules entered into
force depended upon whether the company's operations and structure
matched the new rules. Thus, each new administrative rule is a threat
to the continued existence of a company.
The experience of one company which was established in 1986
and had issued stock is illustrative. Between 1986 and 1994, the
company faced four "checkups" and "reexaminations and reapprov-
als." The local government conducted "serious examination and
checkup"'63 to certify that the company was qualified to continue as
a joint-stock company.' During the 1988 to 1990 corporate "rectifi-
cation and consolidation" (qingli zhengdun) process, the company was
required to undergo further inspections by various governmental
organs to re-register.5
The company obtained the required permit to "continue as a
shareholding experiment" (thus legalizing its continued existence), in
May 1991, after surviving various examinations carried out separately
or jointly by six central and local government organs. In gaining the
legal imprimatur for its continued existence, the company went
through several bureaucratic hoops. The company petitioned the
Provincial Commission for Restructuring Economic Systems to affirm
the registration it received five years before. After gaining the
approval of the local Commission for Restructuring Economic
Systems, the company was required to apply to SCRES for reaffirma-
tion. It also had to submit an application to the provincial branch of
the People's Bank, petitioning the Bank to affirm the company's share
issuance completed five years before. After the provincial branch
approval, the company was required to apply to the Headquarters of
the People's Bank for reaffirmation. Furthermore, the company had
to petition the local Bureau for the Administration of State Assets in
order to affirm the transfer five years previously of state assets from
the SOE to the joint-stock company. With the approval of the local
Bureau for the Administration of State Assets, the company could
then apply to the State Bureau for the Administration of State Assets
and SCRES for their joint-affirmation of the company's legality.66
63. As demanded by Document No. 52, 1987 of the State Council.
64. See COLLECnON OF LAWS, SUPp. VOL, supra note 16, at 350.
65. See Fang Liufang, Zhongguo gongx: gongfa quanliyu sifa quanli kangheng zhijiedian
[Chinese Companies: The Cynosure of the Clash Between the Power of Public and Private Law],
in ZHONGGUO FAZM GAIGE [REFORM OF CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM], Hong Kong, 1994.
66. See sources cited supra note 36.
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The company faced another legal challenge when, in May 1992,
five ministries and commissions under the Central Government jointly
issued the "Measures for Experiment in Shareholding Enterprises,"
which demanded a "complete checkup of all the experimental
shareholding enterprises according to the standardized requirements
and re-application for examination and verification."'67
In order to list its shares in 1993, the company had to petition the
State Council's Securities Policy Commission (SPC) to reaffirm the
legality of its existence. Finally, in 1994, the CSRC (which is directly
subordinate to the SPC) categorized these kinds of companies as
"residual historical problems" and refused to accept their applications
to list shares.6" If the rule of legal retroactivity controls, there is no
way for anyone to judge whether or not a company that already
lawfully exists may continue to exist lawfully. Nor is there anyway to
judge either the validity of a government organ's decision, or the
length of its validity.
3. Reallocation of Permit Power and the Establishment of the
China Securities Regulatory Commission.69  The months surround-
ing the release of the Standards Opinion witnessed the peak of the
67. GUFENZHI QIYE ZUJIAN HE SHIDIAN ZHENGCE HUIBIAN, supra note 42.
68. Conversation with spokesperson of the CSRC on several policy questions concerning
the current stock market, CSRC BULLETiN, supra note 22, at 28.
69. According to a December 17,1992, notice issued by the State Council, the CSRC is not
an administrative organ, but is an institution (shiye danwei) belonging to the State Council's
Securities Policy Committee. In 1994, the CSRC was listed as an institution belonging directly
(zhishu) to the State Council. See CSRC BULLETIN, supra note 22, 1994, no. 1, at 1. This
description specifically refers to the 5 organizations-the Academy of Sciences, the Academy
of Social Sciences, the State Council Center for Research on Economic Technological and Social
Development, the State Council Center for Research on Rural Development, and the New
China News Agency-which all lie outside the jurisdictional authority of ministries and
commissions, fall under the direct leadership of the State Council, and lack any administrative
functions. See Guowuyuan, Guanyu guowuyuan jigou shezhide tongzhi 1988 [State Council 1988
Notice Concerning the Establishment of State Council Organizations]. For an organization like
the CSRC, which is under the jurisdiction of the State Council's Security Policy Committee and
wields broad administrative powers, to be listed as "an institution directly belonging to the State
Council," is an extraordinary precedent. The arrangement was made in order to allow the
highest policy making levels to have a certain room for retreat: before sufficient experience has
been obtained to create a stable management system, a relatively low level organization can be
on the front lines exploring, while the Security Policy Committee can walt behind the scene until
the time is ripe to concentrate power in its own hands.
In March 1995, the General Office of the State Council issued another notice formally fixing
the CSRC internal structure and the limits of its authority. See CSRC BULLETIN, supra note
22, no. 4, at 1. The CSRC has been formally listed as an organization directly under the State
Council.
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People's Bank's power. In April 1992, the People's Bank forced the
Hainan Provincial Government to disestablish the Hainan Internal
Stock Exchange Center."0 In May 1992, the Bank established an
Office for Securities Administration and began to draft the Interim
Regulation on the Management of the Issuance and Trading of
Securities. Concurrently, SCRES was drafting a regulation of the
same name.71 In June, 1992, the People's Bank requested that other
government organs conduct examinations and approvals of corpora-
tions in such a manner as not to exceed their authority and reiterated
the bank's exclusive control over the quotas for stock issues and the
listing of shares.72
Through the summer of 1992, the People's Bank sought to
protect its position as the most powerful government organ in charge
of the corporatization experiment in China. In July 1992, the
President of the People's Bank convened the National Working
Conference on the Management of Securities,73 including delegates
from more than ten Central Government organs. This Working
Conference, which supplanted the 1991 Working Conference on
Securities Markets, established its permanent office within the
People's Bank and decided to organize the CSRC. Per the decision
of the Conference, the CSRC was to have the character of a quasi-
governmental organ (ban guanfang jigou).74 Vigorously guarding its
turf, the Bank objected to establishing a committee above the CSRC,
an idea then under discussion. The Bank concluded that, "under the
current circumstances, it is unrealistic to set up a nation-wide unified
70. The Hainan Internal Stock Exchange Center was organized by the Hainan Economic
Reform Committee, the Legal System Bureau, and the provincial branch of the People's Bank.
It formally opened on March 26, 1992. Three companies' common stock was traded, and 14
local securities dealers acted as the center's members. In the roughly twenty days of the
Center's existence, the total value of trading was 130 million RMB, with the largest single day
volume approximately 12 million RMB. Owing to opposition from the central office of the
People's Bank, the center was closed in the last week of April. The provincial government
opened the center because at that time, Hainan already had five companies which had begun
to issue stock to the public. These shares had no way of coming to the market on either the
Shanghai or Shenzhen exchanges. Thus, if the stock was to circulate, there was no other choice
but to open the center in Hainan. Interview with a leading official of the Hainan trading
exchange, in Haikou, Hainan (May 1992).
71. Jiji wentuofazhan woguo zhengquan shichang [Enthusiastically and Smoothly Develop
China's Securities Market], RENMIN RmAO [PEoPLE'S DAILY], June 17, 1992, at 2.
72. Gupiao faxing shangshi bixu yange an chengxu shenpi [Issuing and Listing Stocks Must
be Done According to Procedures of Examination and Approval], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], June 7, 1992, at 2.
73. This body succeeded the 1991 Working Conference on Securities Market.
74. RENMIN RMAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], July 4, 1992, at 1.
CHINA'S CORPORATIZATION EXPERIMENT
and centralized organization."'  The Bank felt that a national
organization could be established when the securities market had
matured. Clearly, a less powerful Working Conference better served
the People's Bank's aim of maintaining its leadership role in
developing the nascent securities markets.76
The end of 1992, however, witnessed a diminution in the power
of the People's Bank. On October 25, 1992, the State Council
decided to disestablish the National Working Conference on the
Management of Securities and organize the Securities Policy
Committee (SPC) and the CSRC.
The duties of the SPC were defined in the December 17, 1992,
Circular of the State Council, which delineated various ministries and
commissions administrative authority over the securities markets,
The SPC was charged with:
(1) Drafting laws and administrative regulations concerning
the securities market;
(2) Researching and formulating guidelines, policies, and
rules concerning the securities market;
(3) Enacting a comprehensive plan for the development of
securities markets and making planning suggestions;
(4) Directing, coordinating, supervising and inspecting
various departments involved with the securities market;
(5) Overseeing the CSRC.
The membership of the SPC is drawn from the People's Bank,
SCRES, the State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance, the
State Bureau for the Administration of State Assets, the SAIC, the
State Tax Bureau, the Supreme People's Court, and the State
Administration for Foreign Currency Control. Until now, the SPC
has failed to become a permanent organization. Instead, it is a loose
confederation of officials from Central Government ministries and
commissions.
75. Id.
76. Zhengquan bangongshi fuzeren tan zhengquan guanli tizhi [Senior Official From the
Securities Office Discusses the System of Securities Regulation], ZHENGQUAN TOUZI ZHOUKAN
[SEcumrEs AND INvEsTING WEEKLY], 1992, no. 16, at 1.
77. Guowuyuan guanyu jin yibu jiaqiang zhengquan shichang hongguan guanlide tongzhi
[Notice of the Sate Council Concerning Further Strengthening the Macro Regulation of the
Securities Market], reprinted in COMPILATION OF NEW LAWS, supra note 18,1992, no. 4, at 262.
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According to the Circular establishing it, the CSRC-a non-
official organization able to exercise governmental power only with
the authorization of the SPC-does not itself possess the authority to
issue administrative rules. Instead, the CSRC proposes and drafts
"methods" concerning the management of the securities market. Such
"methods" are made effective only after they are approved and
promulgated by the SPC. However, the CSRC has broad supervisory
and regulatory powers over the actual issue and exchange of
securities. After May, 1993, the CSRC obtained the power to re-
examine the issuance and listing of stocks-in effect, the power of
ultimate approval.
Thereafter, other governmental organs no longer had the power
to directly interfere with the securities market. However, the
following governmental institutions do have roles to play in the
securities market. The State Planning Commission is responsible for
working out the volume of stocks and debentures to be publicly issued
each year. The People's Bank regulates broker-dealers through
permits to open and operate (although the CSRC maintains the right
of supervision and control). Likewise, the Ministry of Finance is
responsible for the administration of accountants and accounting
firms, though accountants engaging in securities work are required to
get an operation permit from the CSRC. The Shanghai and Shenzhen
Securities Exchanges are governed by local people's governments, but
are also subject to the CSRC's supervision.
The SCRES is responsible for the drafting of relevant laws and
regulations for shareholding experiments as well as the organization
and coordination of shareholding experimental enterprises. However,
the powers to govern the stock exchange, which SCRES conferred
upon itself in the Standards Opinion, are not recognized by the
highest governmental authorities.
The December 17th Circular also substantially altered the permit
system for the initiation of corporations specified in the Standards
Opinion. The Circular specifies that the transformation into a joint-
stock company of an enterprise directly subordinate to a ministry or
commission of the Central Government is subject to the joint
approval of the agency in charge of the enterprise's line of trade and
the SCRES. Whether or not local governments' commissions on
reform of the economic system may exercise the power of approval
depends on whether the local government has granted them that
authority. Even if they have received such authorization, it is not an
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exclusive one and must be exercised jointly with the administrative
agency in charge of the enterprise.
Two constitutional issues are raised by the Circular's regulations.
First, may the State Council authorize the SPC to "draft" laws (fali!)?
Second, may the SPC authorize the CSRC to exercise broad govern-
mental power?
The constitution of the PRC invests the power to enact laws
(falii) exclusively with the National People's Congress (NPC) and its
Standing Committee."8 The power to draft laws belongs to the
Legislative Affairs Commission under the Standing Committee of the
NPC. Except when delegated with such power from the legislature,
the State Council may not exercise legislative power.
In April 1985, the NPC authorized the State Council to formulate
"interim provisions and regulations" as part of "restructuring the
economic system and opening up to the outside world."79  This
authorization excluded the possibility that the State Council would
draft laws. In 1992, the Standing Committee announced that it had
placed the enactment of the Company and Securities Law on its
agenda. The Legislative Affairs Commission and the Financial
Committee-both subordinate to the Standing Committee-were
drafting the Company and Securities Laws, respectively. Thus, it is
problematic whether it is constitutional for the State Council to have
authorized the SPC to "draft" laws governing the securities market.
The constitution of the PRC does not specify whether the State
Council or its subordinate organs may authorize non-governmental
organizations to exercise state powers. However, in China, the co-
existence of governmental and non-governmental functions in a public
entity was already widespread when the Constitution was enacted in
1982 and has not substantively changed since. Each public organiza-
tion in China-whether a company, a school, or a association-is a
subordinate unit of the competent administrative department
supervising its affairs. Through their subordinate units, these
supervising agencies extend governmental power into the daily life of
78. XIANFA (1983) [Constitution], art. 58 (China).
79. Quango remnin daibiao dzhui guanyu shouquan giuowuyuan zai jingji tizhigzigehe
duiwai kaifang fangmian keyi zhiding zanxingde guiding huozhe tiaoli jueding [The Decision of
the National People's Congress to Grant State Council Authority to Enact Interim Provisions
and Regulations with Respect to the Reform of the Economic System and the Opening to the
Outside], reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FALC HumiAN, 1985-1989
[COMPELATION OF THE NEW LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (People's
Publishing, 1989) at 66.
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every individual. Thus, the administrative departments and their
subordinate units are mixed within one legal entity. Any effort to
separate official from non-official organizations is meaningless. A
public entity's exercise of governmental power in regard to its
employees and branches is a de facto phenomenon. Unless there is
evidence to the contrary, the situation should be presumed to be
authorized by the government.
However, some specific powers of a governmental organ are not
transferable. For example, a governmental organ at a certain level
cannot authorize a non-governmental organ to issue directives to, or
formulate written rules binding on, another governmental organ at the
same level. The power of the SPC to coordinate the management of
the securities market among the various government ininstries and
commissions cannot be delegated. In certain areas, where the
authority of the SPC overlaps with the authority of other governmen-
tal organs, only documents jointly formulated and issued may have the
binding force of administrative rules.
From January to March 1993, the CSRC jointly promulgated
provisions on permits for engaging in the securities business by
lawyers, accountants, asset estimate agencies, and auditors. Those
ministries cooperating in jointly fashioning these rules were the
Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the State Bureau for the
Administration of State Assets, and the State Auditing Office."0 The
CSRC unilaterally exercised licensing power over the stock underwrit-
ing business, stipulating that the CSRC must reaffirm the People's
Bank' issuance of a permit to underwrite."'
80. These regulations are divided as follows: (1) Sifabu, zhengjianhui, guanyu congshi
zhengquan falti yewu lushi ji lushi shiwusuo zige querende zanxing guiding [Temporary
Provisions Concerning the Confirmation of the Qualifications of law firms and lawyers engaged
in securities law], issued by the Ministry of Justice and China Securities Regulatory Commission,
1993; (2) Caizhengbu, zhengjianhui, guanyu congshi zhengquan yewude kuaiji shiwusuo zhuce
kuaijishi zige querende guiding [Provisions Concerning the Confirmation of the registration and
qualifications of Accounting firms and accountants engaged in securities industry work], issued
by the Ministry of Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, 1993; (3) Guojia
zichan guanli ju, zhengjianhui, guanyu congshi zhengquan shiwude zichan pinggu jigoujigou zige
querende guiding [Provisions Concerning the Confirmation of the Qualifications of Property
Appraisers and Property Appraisal Organizations that are Engaged in Securities Work], issued
by the State Asset Management Bureau and the Securities Regulatory Commission, 1993; and
(4) Shenjishu, zhengjianhui guanyu congshi zhengquan yewude shenji shiwusuo zige queren
youguan wentide tongzhi [Notice Concerning Problems in Confirming the Qualifications of
Auditing Firms Engaged in Securities Work], issued by the Audit Office, the Securities
Regulatory Commission, 1993. CSRC BULLETiN, supra note 22, 1993, vol. 2, at 289-97.
81. Zhengiianhui [Securities Regulatory Commission], guanyu zai gupiao gongzhuozhong
qianghua zhengquan chengxiao jigou he zhuanyexing zhongjie jigou zuoyongde tongzhi [Notice
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Ministries and commissions made great concessions to the CSRC,
because of its gatekeeper role in the securities industry. With the
exception of companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, all other compa-
nies seeking to make public offerings and to list their shares must
obtain final approval from the CSRC. And, if they want to attract
clients, lawyers, accountants, assessors, and auditors need their
qualifications recognized by the CSRC which may refuse to accept
documents prepared by unauthorized professionals.
Under the current legal framework, whether professionals need
to acquire a second permit in order to engage in the securities
business, and wherefrom the permit shall be issued, ought to be
determined independently either by the administrative department in
charge of the trade or the trade association. However, the licensing
provisions described above have created a precedent: if necessary, a
governmental organ may formulate administrative rules jointly with
a non-governmental organization to govern matters within the scope
of its authority. In essence, this is a transfer of administrative rule
formulation power by a governmental organ to a non-governmental
organization.
Yet one cannot find in either China's current needs or in its legal
system a justification for such a power transfer. When a governmen-
tal organ makes essentially a "blank check" grant of authority to a
non-governmental organization, and permits the non-governmental
organization to exercise this power broadly in matters of public
interest, the governmental organ is relinquishing power it should
exercise itself. This poses questions about the necessity for the
governmental organ in the first place.
This analysis applies to the governmental organs that have
granted the CSRC its authority. The CSRC exercises broad govern-
mental powers, yet it is not bound by administrative or judicial
review. A decision made by an agency reviewing a complaint against
the consequences of its own prior grant of authority may be treated
skeptically. However, a party who believes that a CSRC decision has
violated its rights may only either seek administrative review by the
SPC, or bring suit against the SPC under the administrative litigation
law.' An ultra vires action by the CSRC may victimize the party
Concerning Strengthening the Role of Securities Underwriters and Specialized Intermediaries
in the Stock Industry], BULLETIN OF THE CSRC, 1993, vol. 1, at 61-62.
82. Article 11, 2, of the Xingzheng fuyi tiaoli [Administrative Reconsideration
Regulations] states: "Applications for reconsideration of specific administrative acts of
departments under the State Council shall come under the jurisdiction of the department which
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affected and the SPC. However, under the Rules on Administrative
Review and the Administrative Litigation Law, the CSRC, as a quasi-
governmental body, cannot be subject to administrative review or be
made a defendant in an administrative proceeding. This kind of
delegation of power exempts the CSRC from any possible liability.
4. Quota for the Issuance of Shares and the Re-Examination
Procedure.
a. Origin of the Quota System. The Central Government is
especially concerned with two factors in creating joint-stock compa-
nies. First is preserving public ownership. Second is placing the
issuance of shares-the product of a market economy-under the
strict control of a state plan.
Before 1991, it was unnecessary to establish a complex planning
and control system for publicly issued shares, because the total shares
publicly issued in Shanghai and Shenzhen was worth no more than
RMB 200 million. However, in the last quarter of 1991, in what can
be considered the first stock issue quota, the Working Conference on
Securities Market of the State Council examined and approved the
public offering of a total of 130 million shares by nine Shanghai
companies.' At this time, because the public offering experiment
was limited to Shanghai and Shenzhen, the government was not faced
with the problem of allocating share issuance quotas for the whole
country.
The expansion of the public offering experiment engendered
intra-governmental rivalries. In April 1992, SCRES decided to extend
the corporatization experiment to Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan.
However, it did not make clear whether the application for public
offering of shares had to be reaffirmed by the Main Office of the
People's Bank after approval by the provincial branches of the
People's Bank. From April to June 1992, a number of joint-stock
companies in the cities of Anshan, Xiamen, and Chongqing issued
public offerings after they had obtained approval from their local
governments and local branches of the People's Bank.' However,
took that specific action." The Administrative Litigation Law of the PRC, in CHINESE LAW AND
GOVERNMENT 88 (Pitman B. Potter ed., 1991). Article 25 of the Administrative Litigation Law
(Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingzheng susong fa) states: "Where specific administrative acts
are performed by organizations entrusted by administrative organs, the entrusting organs shall
be the defendants." Id. at 25.
83. See GuFENzHI OWE ZUJIAN HE SHIDiAN ZHENGCE HUIBAN, supra note 42, at 27.
84. See Jiji wentuo fazhan woguo zhengquan shichang, supra note 71.
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the General office of the State Council issued a notice specifically
criticizing this sort of local authorization.
Contemporaneously, the Main Branch of the People's Bank
released the quotas for public offerings and the procedures to apply
for a quota. These guidelines provided that:
(1) The provincial branches of the People's Bank shall, after
consultation with provincial government organs, conceive
and then submit for final approval to the Main Branch,
annual plans for issuing shares and descriptions of those
entities applying to issue shares;
(2) Based on these reports the Main Branch of the People's
Bank shall allocate an annual quota to each province for
issuing shares;
(3) The provincial branches of the People's Bank shall,
within the quota allocated to the province, determine the
size of each applicant's issue;
(4) The provincial branches of the People's Bank shall
submit each applicant's plans of issuance to the Main Branch
of the People's Bank for approval.
When an enterprise was not issuing shares to the public but only
issuing its internal shares to its employees or other legal persons, the
same set of procedures was to be followed, but with one exception.
The plan for issuance had to be approved only by the provincial
branches of the People's Bank. 5 This matches the method adopted
by the People's Bank to control state loans, one marked by central-
ized control of the totality of loans and levelled management of loan
quotas. The People's Bank still uses this method to control debenture
issuance.8 6
In May 1992, before the December 17 Circular restructured its
role in the markets, the Main Office of the People's Bank announced
that the totality of shares issued might over fulfill the previously set
1 billion ceiling of issuable shares.' The actual issuance quotas were
85. See Gupiao faxing shangshi bixu yange an chengxu shenpi, supra note 72.
86. Guojia jiwei [State Planning Commission], renmin yinhang [People's Bank], Guanyu
faxing qiye zhaiquan shixing e'du shenbao shenpi banfade tongzhi [Notice Concerning Methods
of Quota Reporting and Approval for Issuing Enterprise Bonds], COLLECTED SECURITIES
LAWS, supra note 16, at 129.
87. In 1992 more than 1 billion shares were issued. ZHENGQUAN TOUZI ZHOUKAN
[SEcuRrims INVESTOR WEEKLY], 1992, no. 10, at 1.
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about 1.5 billion. Because in 1992 Shenzhen and Shanghai alone
issued to individual investors shares with total face values of 500
million and 400 million RMB, respectively, the quotas acquired by
other provinces and cities were quite small!' Even if they received
the quotas, the other provinces and cities, specifically Guangdong,
Fujian, and Hainan, could not implement the quotas until the relevant
plans for share issuance were approved by the central government.
b. Quotas Allocated in 1993. The total amount of shares
allocated for issuance throughout China in 1993 was 5 billion. This
figure was set jointly by the SPC and the State Planning Commission
and submitted to the State Council for final approval. The SPC and
the State Planning Commission then allocated the issuance quotas to
ministries and commissions with directly subordinate enterprises, to
provinces, to autonomous regions, and to municipalities directly under
the Central Government, thereby completing the first distribution.
After acquiring their respective quotas, the recipients allocated the
quotas to issuing companies.
The 1993 distribution of issuing quotas resulted in three, large-
scale state, ministry-affiliated enterprises-Ma Steel (Magang),
Shanghai Petrochemical, and Guangzhou Shipyard, acquiring issuing
quotas for 1.35 billion shares, 27% of the national total. Quotas
allocated to companies ranged from 10 million to 680 million
(Magang). Quotas obtained by provinces, autonomous regions, and
the municipalities directly under the Central Government varied from
Xinjiang Province's 50 million to 500 million for Shanghai, which, as
a municipality directly under the Central Government, has the same
status as a province.
Not all of the companies that received quotas were permitted to
issue shares in 1993. Those companies located in places other than
Shanghai or Shenzhen that had previously offered shares could use
their 1993 quota only to offset earlier issuings, not to make new ones.
For example, in June 1992 the Xiamen Oceanic Fishiery Developing
Co. Ltd., with the approval of the municipal branch of the People's
Bank, made a public offering of 10 million shares. The SPC
88. In 1992,53 Shanghai companies issued individual shares with a face value of 463,382,000
yuan. Among these shares, those from 9 companies should be considered part of the 1991
quota, so the 1992 quota was roughly 400 million RMB. See Shanghai guplao nian faxing liang
[Yearly Amount of Shares Issued in Shanghai], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN [SHANGHAI
SECURrrMES], 1992, no. 37. In 1992, the total face value of shares which received permission to
be listed was 1.5 billion RMB, more than 50% higher than the subscribed quota.
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confirmed the legality of the issuance in May 1993, but conditioned
its approval on the Xiamen municipal government's agreement that
the 1993 quota would apply to shares issued in 1992. Had Xiamen
not agreed, Oceanic Fishery could not have applied to list its stock on
either the Shanghai or Shenzhen Securities Exchanges.
Thus, sometimes the issuance quotas were actually listing quotas.
In 1993, around twenty companies successfully obtained issuance
quotas but failed to issue shares. The total amount of shares actually
issued in 1993 was around 4 billion, 1 billion short of the quota. This
gap was compounded by the addition of still another requirement: the
1993 consignment of Treasury Bills from the Ministry of Finance had
to be sold before a public offering could be made under a provinces',
autonomous regions', or municipality's quota.89  By 1993, the
issuance quota had become a fixed system and was inscribed in the
Interim Regulations on the Regulation of Stock Issuing and Trading,
which took effect in May 1993.90
c. Contradiction Between the Issuance Quota System and the
Application Procedures. Comparing the procedures on the
application for issuing stock and the de facto practices formed by
quota control will help us to judge the answers to the following
questions: Have generalized norms been established under the
statutes? Are the allocation and reallocation of issuance quotas
compatible with the procedures on application or approval? What
parts of the currently valid law have become and integral part of the
current norms and what parts exist only on paper? Which of the
currently effective regulations has become an integral part of the
practical legal framework?
Under articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Interim Regulations,
applications for the public offering of shares are made in the following
manner. First, before an application for public offering is made to a
governmental organ of the local or Central Government, the
application must meet certain requirements:
(1) the applicant must be a joint-stock company, or have
obtained permission to initiate a joint-stock company and
registered the promotion with the SAIC;
89. Zhengquan weiyuanhui Guanyu 1993 nian gupiaofashou yu rengou banfayijian [China
Securities Commission, "Opinion Concerning Methods of Sale and Subscription for 1993 Shares"],
BULLETIN OF THE CSRC, 1993, vol. 1, at 13.
90. CSRC BULLETIN, supra note 22, 1993, vol. 2, at 202.
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(2) the applicant must have already retained experts to
conduct financial auditing, prepare an assessment of compa-
ny assets, and provide legal advice; the applicant must also
have an auditing report, property assessment report, as well
as a "document of confirmation" from the State Bureau for
Administration of State Assets regarding the reports and
legal opinions from lawyers;91
(3) the applicant must have an underwriting contract
specifying the category and volume of the shares to be
issued, their face value, their offering price, and the starting
and ending dates of the offering. The underwriting period
may not exceed ninety days. Furthermore, the applicant or
its underwriters must produce a prospectus.
(4) the applicant must have acquired a permit for fixed
assets investment.
Second, the governmental organ of the local government or the
Central Government will, after receiving the issuance quotas, conduct
an examination of the applicant. If the government determines that
the applicant is properly qualified, it will agree to assign the applicant
an issuance quota and approve its application for offering.
Third, the CSRC will carry out a re-examination of the decision
of the governmental organ (either the local or central government)
approving the application for offering. If the applicant passes the re-
examination, it may apply to be listed on a securities exchange. After
the exchange has approved the listing of the applicant's shares, the
applicant may make the public offering.
However, getting to steps two and three is highly problematical,
because, based on the rules and regulations in effect, no applicant can
satisfy the four conditions in the first step.
If the applicant is an existing joint-stock company, it can issue
new shares only after it has been established for twelve months.'
The issuance of new shares entails amending the company's articles
91. When preparing these documents, both the applicant and the experts must possess
extraordinary foresight. Before the quotas of public offerings are granted, they must be sure
that the employee shares issued months or years before do not exceed 10% of the issuance
quota (the maximum number of shares that may be issued to employees), that the sum of shares
issued and the new shares issued will not be less than 50 million shares (the minimum paid.in
capital for listed joint-stock companies), that the subscription by the promoters may not be less
than 30 million shares, and that all the shares previously issued by the company would not be
more than three times the issuance quota.
92. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 36.
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of association, a process subject to the approval of the SCRES.93
SCRES' approval of amended articles of association could be
construed as an ultra vires assignment of an issuance quota by
SCRES, since the approval would permit the company to issue new
shares. Rejection by the SCRES voids the underwriting contract.
This regulation has often been violated. I have read all the
prospectuses of the forty-eight joint-stock companies in which a SOE
has been the sole promoter (during the period of June 1992 to
December 1993). The records show that, at the establishment of
these companies, there has been only one shareholder-the State.
The interval between the companies' establishments and their public
offering is an average of twenty-three days. Thus, these forty-eight
joint-stock companies, without exception, violated the provision that
SOEs shall be transformed into joint-stock companies by raising initial
capital through public offerings and shall offer additional new shares
only twelve months after the establishment of the company.
If the applicant is the promoter of a joint-stock company and has
registered the prepatory plan for establishing the company, the
SCRES must have already approved the initiation application, which
would have included the total volume of shares to be issued.94 This
process means that after approval the issuance quota has been
assigned and need not be applied for again.
Before the assignment of the issuance quotas, the applicant has
no justification for conducting an appraisal of its property. Only after
the administrative department in charge of the trade of the enterprise
has applied to and received permission from the State Bureau for
Administration of State Property, may the enterprise retain an
appraisal organization." Because of the utter unpredictability of
obtaining an issuing quota, applications for property appraisals made
by enterprises before the quotas are issued will never be accepted.
The procedure for issuing shares includes many uncertainties.
For example, before the assignment of an issuance quota, in order to
produce a legal opinion on a matter that has not, and may never,
93. Id. art. 83.
94. Id. art. 13. From the listing notices of companies, we can see that the approval permit
from the State Economic Reform Commission (tigaiwei) or "Joint examination office"
(lianshenban), generally includes, total number of shares, legal person shares, individual shares,
quota of state shares, offering price, and date of offering.
95. Guoziju [State Asset Bureau], Guanyu gongkaifaxingshangshi gupiao gufenzhishidian
qiye zichan pinggu xiang queren wentide tongzhi [Notice Concerning the Property Evaluation of
Share System Experiment Enterprises Which Will be Publicly Offering and Listing Shares], CSRC
BuLLETIN, supra note 22, 1993, vol. 2, at 281.
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happen, the lawyer must make a choice between facts and fabrication,
between professional ethics and money.
Furthermore, the applicant and underwriters conclude an underwriting
agreement and produce a prospectus before they know if they can get
a quota, and if so, how large a quota. Other than manufacturing an
invalid contract. and a prospectus full of false and misleading
information, the only other purpose of this exercise is to polish the
parties' story-telling technique.
It is an even more difficult thing for the applicant to acquire
permission for fixed asset investment before it has raised enough
funds to begin operations. For example, a real estate company in
Shanghai applied to construct a building. The process involved 28
governmental organs giving 98 official seals. Among these govern-
mental organs, 18 would stamp more than two official seals, the most
egregious of which attached 12 official seals. It will take a company
at least one and perhaps as many as three to five years to complete
this sort of complicated procedure.9'
Under the current system of issuing quotas, the problem is not
how to apply. for the public offering but how to apply for the
assignment of a quota. In the case of applying for a quota, an
applicant is unable to start its application until two conditions have
been met. First, the issuance quota must be publicly allocated to the
local government and the organs of the Central Government. Second,
the governmental organs responsible for the reallocation of the quotas
must publicly announce the qualifications for an application. These
two conditions have never been satisfied, because the allocation and
reallocation of issue quotas are processed in a surreptitious way.
Enterprises submit their applications and produce their requisite legal
and official documents, approval documents of government organs,
and underwriting agreements before the company has an idea whether
its locality could be assigned any quota. Unknown as well are the
qualifications required for an application, and the starting time and
deadline for the application. The applicant may, in defiance of the
Interim Regulation, prepare the required documents for their
application after the governmental organs have assigned the company
an issuance quota. In my view, most companies will choose to defy
the interim regulations and prepare applications after the assignment
of quotas. Thus, the basic fact is that since at the time they allocate
96. See WENHUIBAO, Sept. 8,1991, at 3. In 1994, the State Planning Commission changed
the project approval rules. A company may first be established and then the project reported.
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the issuance quotas government organs have already selected the
companies that will issue, the application system is moot. The quotas
have rendered the statutory procedures meaningless.
Initial approval of the application for an issuing quota does not
guarantee that the company will be permitted to make public
offerings. The application must still be re-examined by the CSRC.
A CSRC document provides:
the application materials shall, after the examination, verification
and approval of the local governments, be submitted to the Public
Offering Division of the CSRC directly by the local government or
underwriters authorized by the local government .... The CSRC
will neither receive inquiries or materials directly from the
enterprise nor have any direct contact with enterprises. 7
Usually, it is the government body that has approved the issuing
application that sends a letter to the CSRC affirming the applicant's
submission of its materials. Therefore, the applicant has no rights in
this review process, and cannot present any additional information or
explanation to the examiner. The CSRC reviews acts as a check on
the legality of the local government and Central government decisions
to approve the issuance applications.
The Interim Regulations' provisions concerning application to list
shares are indeed singular. First, they require the applicant and the
securities exchanges to implement two contradictory directives.
Article 12 provides that between the time its application to list has
been reexamined and before it has issued shares, the applicant must
further apply to a securities exchange to have its shares listed. Only
after the exchange has accepted the listing may the shares be issued.
This means that the CSRC conditions its approval for issuance on
whether the securities exchanges have approved the listing of stock.
Yet, on the other hand, under article 30 the first condition to be
satisfied by a company applying to have its shares listed is that "its
shares must have been issued to the public." And article 81 defines
"public issue" as "the making of an invitation to offer for an issuer's
shares, the making of an offer for an issuer's shares or the sale of an
issuer's shares by the issuer to the public, other than the issuer,
through a securities trading firm."
Second, these conflicting provisions create a dilemma for the
securities exchanges. On one hand, the exchange is required to
97. CSRC BULLETIN, supra note 22, 1993, no. 1, at 61-62.
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promise to accept a listing of stock when the offering of that stock has
not started. The offering may fail or be suspended and cancelled; for
example, some of the applicants have not yet established their
company and there exists a risk that the company is never created, or
the shareholders of an established company have not approved the
public offering. On the other hand, the exchange must conduct
examinations as to the listing applications according to the specified
requirements in order to fulfill its obligations to public investors, yet
these listing requirements cannot be determined before the public
offering is made.
Third, the procedures and requirements for listing as provided in
the Interim Regulations are completely incompatible with the
procedures and requirements in articles 29 through 39 of the
Professional Experimental Rules of the Shanghai Securities Ex-
change.9" These contradictions and conflicts can only lead to
confusion for the applicants. Many questions arise as to the effect for
each set of regulations. Which provisions should be binding on the
applicant? Shall the listing procedures and requirements be stipulated
by law or independently by the securities exchanges themselves? Is
the application, and the acceptance of application, to list a contractual
relationship for the company and exchange, or is it an executive
relationship between the applicant and law enforcement organiza-
tions? In case of dispute, should contract law or the Administrative
Litigation Law govern?
The Interim Regulations effectively grant the CSRC the power
to examine the listing application without bearing any responsibility.
Moreover, if the applicant fails to pass this reexamination, the
governmental organ that earlier assigned the quota and approved the
issuance application may withdraw the quota from the applicant.
5. Issuance Quotas and Transaction Costs.
a. Issuance Quotas and the Subscription Fee. Prior to 1992
and the new central government laws, Shanghai and Shenzen issued
shares by lottery. To enter the lottery, a subscriber would fill out a
numbered lottery form obtained from the underwriter and pay RMB
400 in earnest money. The underwriter then provided an identically
numbered subscription order receipt, which served as the lottery
number. The unlucky got their earnest money back.
98. CouECrED SECURITIES LAWS, supra note 16.
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In 1992, Shanghai and Shenzen publicly issued share subscription
certificates and share subscription lottery forms, respectively (practices
the SPC extended nationwide the following January). In January of
1992, the Shanghai municipal government sold 2.087 million share
subscription certificates which were valid for the whole year and cost
RMB 30 each. There was no maximum limit on an individual
purchase and the sale netted a total income of approximately RMB
62.24 million. In 1992, Shanghai held four lotteries, none of which
had a preset chance of success, and which, together, resulted in
individual winners subscribing to roughly 400 million shares.99
In August 1992, the Shenzen municipal government sold 5 million
share subscription lottery forms, each of which was priced at RMB
100. It also sold 500 thousand share subscription lottery forms
individually priced at RMB 1000. The income from the subscription
sales totaled RMB 1 billion, equivalent to two times the face value of
all the shares issued in Shenzen that year. Official corruption during
the sale of the forms led to street demonstrations and bloody
conflicts.' °
By 1993, the central government also adopted two other means
by which one was selected to purchase stock. One method was
unlimited subscription application forms. The second method was to
connect subscriptions to savings accounts in banks. Of the 100
companies that issued shares in 1993, 98 used the former method.' '
99. See SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SECURITIES DAILY], Jan. 13,1992, at 1;
SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO, Feb. 10, 1992, at 1.
100. See ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN [SECURITIES MARKET WEEKLY], 1992, no. 6,
at 3; ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN, 1992, no. 7 at 3.
101. See Zhengquan weiyuanhui Guanyu 1993 nian gupiao fashou yu rengou banfa yijian,
supra note 89.
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TABLE 1: PRICE FOR BUYING LOTTERY TICKETS IN 1993*
Subscription
Stocks Issued Lottery Expense for
to the Public Tickets Lottery Ticket Earning from per Share at 1
Name of (in million Sold (in Price yuan/ Lottery Tickets yuan par value
Companies shares) million) per ticket (in million yuan) (in yuan)
Susanshan, Taiji 120 33.15 3 99.45 0.82
Qingdao
Brewery 100 287.34 2 574.69 5.74
12 Companies
in Shanghai 187.88 182.72 5 913.66 4.86
Hefei Meiling 30 119.65 2 239.3 7.97
Zhuhai Lizhu 41.57 24.09 2 48.18 1.15
Wuhan
Fenghuang,
Changyin 82.9 50.84 2 101.6 1.2
5 Companies in
Guangzhou 226.87 128.03 2 256.1 1.12
* The information from this table was drawn from ZHONGGUO ZHEN QUAN BAO [CHNA SECUR-
rims DAILY] Sep. 29, 1993 at 1; Oct. 27, 1993 at 6; Jan. 4, 1994 at 1.
Table I shows that to buy one common share with a face value
of RMB 1 in 1993, investors needed to pay RMB 3 to buy a subscrip-
tion form. The subscription costs depended on the prefixed chance
of winning and on the number of shares a subscription form entitled
a purchaser to buy. Thus, among the 100 companies issuing shares in
1993, the chance of buying Xiamen Engineering Machinery Co., Ltd.,
shares was the lowest (only 0.00248%) and the cost of subscribing for
one share with face value of RMB 1 was RMB 16. By contrast, the
4.485% chance of buying one share of Magang with face value of
RMB 1 was the best, and the subscription forms commanded a
commensurately lower price of RMB 0 .4."°
Lottery subscription is, in fact, a gambling contract with unpre-
dictable risks for the participants. The gamblers' opportunities to win
decrease with an increase in the number of participants. In contrast,
the.banks have guaranteed profits which continue to increase as more
individuals join the lottery.
The lottery also warps the ability of a purchaser to evaluate
stocks and make an informed purchase. Potential subscribers have no
information as to which stocks will be offered or in what quantity.
Furthermore, when more of the shares of several different companies
102. ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECuRTEs DAILY], Jan. 6,1994, at 1.
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are joined together for a lottery subscription, subscribers lose their
right to choose a company in which to invest, and the role of
securities investment in optimizing resource allocation is lost.
Additionally, the application forms mix together high quality stock
shares with junk stocks which end up being distributed per capita.
The result is a system of stock purchasing which is not based upon the
nature of the business, the company performance, general financial
conditions, or policies that influence the investor's investment
decisions. These decisions are instead made for them by the lottery,
an uncontrollable, unpredictable force. It is therefore not the law of
the market which controls capital distribution but a random gamble.
An additional problem with the lottery subscription is that it
forces the subscriber to bear all of the risks which should be borne by
the underwriters and issuer companies. If a subscriber is lucky
enough to be chosen to purchase, he or she will be unlikely to pass on
the opportunity, even when the stock offered is of questionable value.
This is especially so, because the investor has paid several times the
price of shares just to obtain this subscription opportunity. Since the
purchase is almost certain to be made, the underwriters and issuer are
not subject to any risk that an offer will not be successful.
The lottery system also artificially constricts the supply of stocks.
The shortage effect that this creates drives the stock prices even
higher, as was demonstrated in 1993 when the RMB 1 trillion in
savings that had been excluded from purchasing the RMB 5 billion of
initial offerings flooded into the narrow trading markets. Thus people
are still willing to pay the high prices for the subscription opportunity
in the issuance market, because the shortage effect makes the value
of subscription opportunities exceed the property right included per
share. The value in the subscription opportunities lies in the
possibility of resale of the shares at much higher prices in the trading
market. The unending upward spiral in stock prices stimulated by the
high costs of subscription cannot be sustained in the long-term and
must inevitably collapse.
Finally, the lottery system wastes too much paper. For example,
Guangzhou City printed 300 million application forms, and only 120
million of them were sold. The extra forms were destroyed. Another
example, 300 million forms were printed for the issuance of shares of
the Tsingtao Brewery Co., Ltd., 280 million were sold, but only 180
thousand were lucky ones, thus reducing 298.2 million application
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forms to worthless pieces of paper."° According to estimates by
securities market experts, the RMB 12.2 billion paid for this sort of
lottery ticket is about 3 times the total face value of shares issued to
the public in 1993204
b. Issuance Quota and the Underwriting Fee. Underwriting of
shares would appear to be superfluous in a lottery subscription
system. Direct issue of shares by the company to the lottery winners
would seem a less wasteful choice. However, in both the Interim
Regulation and the local rules, underwriting of shares is mandatory.
This requirement forces companies to pay commissions for underwrit-
ing services, regardless of whether they were needed.
TABLE 2: EXPENSE OF UNDERWRITING OF SHARES OF 11
LISTED COMPANIES IN 1993*
Shares issued Ratio of
to the public Price per share commission to
(in million of 1 yuan par Commissions total par value
Rank Issuer's Name shares) value (in yuan) (in million yuan) of public issue
1 Magang Steel 687.81 3.45 59.83 8.69%
2 Huaxin Cement 40 3.8 5.66 14.15%
3 Lizhu 13 6.38 1.88 14.47%
4 Mindong 33.54 1.68 0.84 2.5%
Electrical
Machinery
5 Meiling 30 4.8 4.5 15.0%
Refrigerator
6 Qingdao Haier 50 7.38 4.4 8.8%
Refrigerator
7 Changchun 20 4.2 6 30.0%
Motor City
8 Wuhan 230 2.5 6.9 3.0%
9 Guangzhou 126.49 5.23 16.44 12.9%
Shipyard
10 Tsingtao 100 6.38 13 13.0%
Brewery
11 Shanghai 550 3.0 30 5.4%
Petrochemical
* Sources of Information: (1) Prospectus, Shanghai Securities, Nov. 4, 1993, at p.4; (2)
Underwriting agreement, Files of CSRC; (3) Id.; (4) Id.; (5) Id; (6) Id.; (7) ZaoNoouo
zHBNGQJAN BAO [CHNA SEcumrns DAILY], Dec. 1, 1993 (Listing report); (8) Underwriting
agreement, Files of CSRC; (9) ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECuIUTIES DAILY], Oct.
27,1993, at 10; (10) ZHONGGUO ZHENGQuAN BAO [CmNA SncuRrrins DAILY], Aug. 25,1993, at
4; (11) Prospectus, p.7.
103. 93 nian: Zhongguo xingu faxing nian [1993: China New Share Issue Year], ZHONG(UO
ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURTmEs DAILY], Jan. 4,1994, at 1.
104. ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN [SECURIIES MARKET WEEKLY], 1993, no. 43, at
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Underwriting fees are not the only fees an issuer pays to securities
firms. The issuing company also pays an agent network fee, compen-
sation for underwriting management, expenses for public relations and
advertising, and costs for the production of a shareholder name list.
For example, as Table 2 shows, the Wanneng Company paid 13.225
billion to the underwriters, which included not only the 6.90 million
in underwriter's fees, but also the aforementioned list of additional
expenses. The shares offered to the public by the underwriters were
only 63 million instead of 230 million, because 160 million legal
person shares and 7 million employee shares did not have to be sold
through the underwriters. Therefore, the ratio of the face value of
the shares actually issued to the underwriting commission was: 1322.5
+ 6300 = 21%.
In 1993, the CSRC issued a rule which permitted securities
houses to charge 1% to 2.5% of the amount underwritten as their
underwriting fee for both best effort (daixiao) and firm commitment
underwriting (baoxiao).05 This essentially increases the underwrit-
ers profits. The underwriters also are allowed to set their fee at the
price offered rather than at the face value price, which is usually
significantly lower. Underwriters have also calculated their fees by
including shares they have not underwritten, such as those issued to
employees, thus increasing their profits even further.
After the ratio of the offering price to the underwriting fee is set,
the most widely used method to increase the underwriting fee is to
increase the number of shares underwritten. Certain shares, such as
those subscribed by affiliated companies, investment organizations and
employees, do not require the assistance of an underwriter to issue,
and their offering may have been initiated or even completed before
the participation of underwriters. However, underwriters usually
include these shares in their calculations of shares underwritten. As
Table 2 shows, Shanghai Petrochemical made a public offering of
shares with the face value of RMB 550 million, 300 million shares of
which were legal person shares and employee shares. However, the
underwriting fees up to RMB 30 million shows that the legal person
shares and employee shares were regarded as part of the shares
underwritten.t 6
105. CSRC, Guanyu fabu 1993 nian xingu chengxiao feiyongde guidingde tongzhi [Notice
Concerning Regulations on Underwriting Fees for New Shares in 1993], CRSC BULLETIN, 1993,
no. 1, at 24.
106. The underwriting agreement between the company and the Shanghai Global Securities
Company (Shanghai wanguo zhengquan gongsi) provided that 400 million shares were
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These fees to the underwriters are only part of the issuing costs.
At a minimum, pre-offer costs include property appraisal (RMB 200
thousand), as well as lawyers fees and accountants fees (each, RMB
100 thousand to RMB 500 thousand). Necessary post-issue costs
include at least a listing recommendation fee RMB 200 thousand to
RMB 500 thousand paid to a securities broker that is a member of
one of the exchanges, stock trust and registration fee (RMB 500
thousand), and a listing fee (RMB 10 thousand). Additionally, every
issuing company will pay at least 1 million for printing relevant
documents, for travel expenses, and for publication of its prospectors
and listing announcement. The fewer the shares issued, the higher the
offering costs are.
Issuing companies pay a large sum of money to issue their stocks.
A company issuing stocks with a face value of 20 million pays as
much as 6 million in underwriting fees alone. Table 2, for example,
shows that Changchun Auto City paid RMB 6 million in underwriting
fees for its RMB 20 million issue of stock. For another example, the
1992 Annual Report of the Shanghai Erfangji Co., Ltd., reveals that
the company paid RMB 23.57 million for the issuing expenses and
new share listing fees required in order to issue its 3.82 million A
shares and 1.25 million B shares (each with a face value of RMB 10).
The price equals 46.8% of the total face value of the shares issued
and 16.5% of the after-tax profit of the company that year. One
cannot help but wonder about the reasonableness of such payments.
Articles 40,41 and 48 of the Accounting System for Shareholding
Experimental Enterprises promulgated by the Ministry of Finance in
1992 govern the accounting procedures for share issuance. The
articles stipulate the following three ways of accounting treatment for
expenses incurred in the corporatization process.17
(1) The expenses used in the corporatization shall be listed
separately in the column of other assets as "establishment
costs" (kaiban fei), which shall be amortized (tanxiao) over
five years.
(2) If the shares are issued at face value price, the offering
expenses shall be included in the column of other assets as
undertaken in firm commitment underwriting and 150 million in best effort underwriting.
107. COMPILATION OF NEW LAws, supra note 18, 1992, no. 2, at 286; PRC, Share System
Experimental Enterprise Accounting System, reprinted in CHIA'S NEW COMPANIES, supra note
3, at 49.
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"costs to be amortized for a long time," and the amortiza-
tion period shall not be less than one year.
(3) If the shares are issued at premium price, the premium
incomes shall be used to offset the offering expenses and the
amount left shall be placed into the reserve fund.
Problems arise with the third method of accounting. If a company is
established after its offering of shares and those shares are offered at
a premium price, should the offering expenses be listed in the
establishment cost or be offset by the premium income? If the latter,
then the offering expenses will be kept in separate accounts. But how
then could these expenses be reflected in the company's financial
statement? The General Rules of Financial Affairs of Enterprise
promulgated by the Ministry of Finance provide that the establish-
ment cost shall be listed in the column of successive extension as a
separate item.'
Such methods of accounting do not treat expenses incurred for
an offering as long term investments, and thus distort the financial
health of a company and fail to allow for depreciation.
The practice of most companies is to deduct the lump-sum
offering expenses from the premium income generated by the issue
and convert the remainder into a capital reserve fund. Because the
promoters (and, under most circumstances, also the institutional
investors) purchased the shares at the face value price while the
outside investors purchased at the offering price (premium price), the
payment of huge expenses for the issuance and listing of shares by the
company will result in the dilution of the outside investors' interests.
c. Offering Price of Shares.
i. Determination of Offering Prices. After 1988, as
joint-stock companies in Shanghai-both existing companies issuing
additional shares and new ones making initial public offer-
ings-routinely issued shares at prices over the face value, the size of
premiums increased. In April 1988, the Shanghai Dianzhenkong
Company, Ltd., issued its new shares at an offering price of RMB 113
against a face value of RMB 100. In October 1990, the offering price
for shares of the Shanghai Yanzhong Industrial Company, Ltd., was
RMB 40 against a face value of RMB 10. And in August 1991, the
108. COMPILATrON OF NEW LAwS, supra note 18, 1992, no. 3, at 109.
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Shanghai Xingye Real Estate Company made a public offering of its
shares at RMB 60 offering price against a face value of RMB 10.
Hualian Shopping Center Company Limited, sold shares at the
highest premium to date, whenin June 1992 it set an offering price of
RM1B 9.2 for its shares against a face value of RMB 1. In 1992, all of
the shares offered in Shanghai and Shenzen were offered at premium
prices on average five times the face value of the shares. This
astounding increase in prices has not been justified based on financial
grounds. Nor has there been an attempt to rationalize or standardize
premium pricing practices.
However, after personal investigation consisting of discussions
with government officials and company managers, I concluded that
the offering prices are fixed in the following manner.1"
First, the competent government organizations"' will, on the
basis of the average price/earnings (P/E) ratio of listed commercial
enterprises, determine an artificial ratio for the stocks that are to be
issued. For example, if the average PIE ratio is 30, then the issuing
company's P/E ratio might be set at 20-25.
Second, the company itself calculates its average after-tax profit
per one hundred yuan net assets for five years: that is, the actual
after-tax profits of the two years prior to the issue and the predicted
after-tax profits for the three years after the issue. Thus, if the face
value of the shares that are to be issued is RMB 100, then the
offering price equals the average after-tax profits per RMB 100 of net
asset value for five years, multiplied by the PE ratio.
ii. Dilution of New Shares. In Shanghai, the 53
companies that made public offerings in 1992 fell into one of three
categories: (1) those that were established before the issuance of
shares, (2) those that were .established during the issuance, and (3)
those that were established after the issuance. In the companies that
were established during or after the issuance (categories 2 & 3), there
were two types of subscription prices: the promoters purchased the
shares at the face value price, while other shareholders purchased the
shares at a price 2 to 9 times the face value. In companies established
109. Shanghai hualian shangsha gufen youxian gongsi [Shanghai Hualian Shopping Center
Co., Ltd.], Gupiao shangshi baogaoshu [Announcement of Stock Listing], SHANOHAI
ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SEcuRTEs DALY], July 27,1992, at 11.
110. The organizations involved are: (1) the financial management section of the branches
of the People's Bank; (2) the share system experimental enterprises, at the core of which is the
commission for restructuring the economic system; and (3) the offices for security management.
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before the issuance, there was a similar practice. New shares were
issued to outside shareholders at a price 2 to 9 times the face value
while old shares were offered at face value. When new shares are
subscribed at higher prices than the face value, the value of the new
shares is reduced by the presence of older shares which had been
offered at lower prices. Therefore, the rights and interests of the
outside shareholders are actually diluted. This situation did not
change in 1993 when the national situation concerning issue prices was
essentially the same it had been in Shanghai the previous year.
The case of Shanghai Hualian Shopping Center Company Ltd.
illustrates the changes in shareholder interests after the issuance of
new shares. Within a short period of 15 days, the interests of the old
stock shareholders grew from 100.7 million to 231.9 million, an
increase of 130%."' At the same time, the value of the shares held
by individual and institutional shareholders was diluted by 31%, and
the value of a share was reduced from RMB 9.28 to RMB 6.35.2
Individual and institutional shareholders total investment of
131.85 million [(9.82-6.35) * 4500] evaporated without ever allowing
shareholders to realize their interest. At the same time, their rights
and interests of RMB 6.35 per share were also mixed in with
corporate assets such as creditorship, inventory, and asset assessment
and appraisal appreciation, all of which are difficult to convert into
cash.
Raising the premium price also enables companies to evade the
restrictive effect of the issuance quota which does not govern
premiums. A company approved for an offering of 20 shares would
raise only RMB 200 if it had offered the shares at the face value of
RMB 10. By increasing the price to RMB 15, it raises RMB 300, the
sum it would have raised if it had been approved for 30 shares. For
example, Shanghai Hualian actually used 45 million issuance quotas
to raise RMB 417.6 million in capital. Despite the fact that the
shareholders know their rights will be diluted, the outsider sharehold-
er is still willing to subscribe the new shares. Such behavior illustrates
once again the distorting effects of the issuance quotas.
In addition, the high price of offerings has increased the capital
reserve of companies to one to four times of their share capital.
111. Shanghai hualian shangsha gufen youxian gongsi [Shanghai Hualian Shopping Center
Co., Ltd.], Gupiao shangshi baogaoshu [Announcement of Stock Listing], SHANGHAI
ZHENGOQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SECURITIES DAILY], July 27,1992, at 11.
112. Id.
1995]
196 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:149
According to the accounting rules applicable to joint-stock companies,
the capital reserve may be used only to increase the share capital or
make up losses. But increasing share capital through issuance of new
shares is limited by provisions stating that two consecutive offerings
cannot be made within 12 months of each other and must be
examined and approved by level upon level of competent administra-
tive departments. So, if there is no loss or only a small loss, the
capital reserve, instead of being used for re-investment, is deposited
in interest earning accounts or used to buy debentures. In 1993, the
mid-term financial statements of listed companies showed that interest
from bank accounts and debentures constituted a substantial part of
joint-stock companies's profits. Clearly, joint-stock companies have
not yet become an optimum medium for the allocation of resourc-
es.
113
d. Assessing the Extent to which the Quota System Controls the
Amount of Issuance. In 1992, the total number of shares offered
greatly exceeded the total cap. The total issuance quotas for the
whole country was RMB 1 billion, but just 100 companies in Jiangsu,
Shangdong, Shanzi provinces, Beijing, Tianjing and Shenzen by
themselves issued RMB 8.98 billion worth of shares to the public.
Among these shares, 22 enterprises of Tianjin publicly offered RMB
4.04 billion stock, four times the issuance quota for the whole
country.14 The issuance quotas for Shanghai in 1992 were 400
million, yet in 53 enterprises in Shanghai issued four lots of legal
person and individual shares with a total face value of RMB 2 billion.
Using an average of the issuing price equalling 5 times the face value,
we can calculate RMB 10 billion of capital was raised."'
In 1993, the national issuance quota was RMB 5 billion, but the
companies being listed raised 7 billion by requiring existing sharehold-
ers to purchase untransferable stock warrants and new shares. 6
Through 1993, the employee shares issued by the unlisted companies
amounted to RMB 25.3 billion." 7 Finally, a quasi-private company
113. Bannianyingyun, yixiyiyou [Halfa Year of Good Operation], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN
BAO [CHINA SECURIrIs DAILY], Sept. 12, 1993, at 2.
114. 92 zijin da fenliu, zhengquan shichang zhan jiduo [The Great Capital Flow, Securities
Markets Tie up Too Much], ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN [SECuRiTIS MARKET WEEKLY],
1993, no. 2, at 15.
115. Id.
116. Jiansu kuorong, baohu gushi [Slow the Expansion, Preserve the Securities Market],
ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEcuRITIEs DAILY], Feb. 1, 1994, at 4.
117. ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECuRiTIEs DAILY], Oct. 17, 1993, at 1.
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in Beijing raised RMB 1 billion capital, which equalled the national
issuance quota of 1992.118 This de facto disregard of the issuance
quota further underscores the need for its abolishment.
e. The Role of Lawyers in the Issuance Application. The
CSRC mandates that lawyers provide a legal profile of applicant
companies. The lawyers shall examine the applicant's
shareholding structure, the purpose of the fund raising, the articles
of association, the organizational structure, the applicable tax rate,
the legality of the business, management and the possession of the
property,... the legality of the public offering and share listing.
... [and] the lawyers shall present a written legal opinion on these
matters to the CSRC.119
In fulfilling this duty, a lawyer is faced with conflicting interests. On
the one hand she has been retained at great cost by the client
specifically to prepare a legal opinion on the client's application, and
professional ethics demand that the client's wishes be satisfied. Thus
the legal analysis may not be wholly objective. On the other hand,
the requirements of the CSRC, however, instruct the lawyer to
produce a letter of opinion about the legality of the listing; if she
believes it to be unlawful, her opinion should say so. The government
sees the lawyers as "economic police," but they are police who prior
to conducting their public business have been paid handsomely by the
"suspects".' °
The conflicts between the issuance quota and the application
procedures (noted above), leave little room in the public offering
process for lawyers to perform their services. Prior to the allocation
of issuance quotas, when the companies do not know whether they
118. Shiyi yuan pianjude pochan [The I Billion Yuan Fraudulent Bankruptcy], RENMIN
RBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Aug. 24, 1993, at 2.
119. Zhengquanhui faltlbu fuzeren qiangdiao: zhengquan congye lushi yao qinmian jinze
[Senior Official of the State Council Securities Policy Committee's Law Office Insists: Lawyers
Engaged in Securities Work Must be Diligent and Fulfil Their Responsibilities], ZHONGUO
ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEcuRIEs DAILY], July 28, 1993, at 1.
120. The remuneration for these two to three page written legal opinions range from 100
thousand to 500 thousand yuan. Some commentators wonder if the amount of legal work and
the trustworthiness of the opinions is worth so much money. "If the Securities Policy Committee
had not forcibly demanded that lawyers participate, enterprises would have been unwilling to
waste so much money." Zhengquan lushide qianzi zhi duoshao qian [How Much is a Securities
Lawyer's Signature Worth?], ZHENGQUAN SI-IKAN ZHOUKAN [SECURrrMEs MARKET WEEKLY],
1994, no. 43, at 29.
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will even acquire a quota, companies retain lawyers. After the
assignment of issuance, the government organizations responsible for
the distribution of the quota conduct substantive examinations of the
issuers, but the lawyers have no authority to examine the legality of
the decisions of the government body, nor are they hired for this
purpose. In answer to part of this problem, the CSRC invented a
professional permit which transfers government powers to lawyers,
accountants, and other professionals to share some of the CSRC's
examination duties. While this allows professionals to use the
government powers to engage in profit seeking activities, it also,
however, forces the applicants to choose professionals who operate
within the parameters determined by the CSRC.
The specific permit system setup by the CSRC means that a
lawyer must have a permit to practice law in the securities field. This
has created a precedent whereby other administrative organs may also
require similar permits to practice law in the areas under their
control. To push the argument further along this line, would it be
unreasonable for courts to require permits for lawyers practicing
before them? Moreover, the permit system means that the lawyer has
lost her independence and becomes merely an affiliate of an
administrative organization. Additionally, the permit system will not
solve the conflict of interest problems. Will clients trust lawyers who
have to obtain permits from the CSRC to bring administrative suits
against the CSRC? Nor will permits solve the problem of lawyers who
solicit and accept commissions from clients on issues about which they
have no specialized knowledge. Only the double pressure of market
competition and malpractice damages will cause avaricious lawyers to
stop accepting commissions they are incapable of accomplishing. Yet
under the present structure, there are no market forces. The Interim
Regulation and the permit system both force the applicant to retain
lawyers. The lawyer is then required to render opinions about
complex financial transactions, much of which is speculative due to
the nature of the application process. Finally, the required adminis-
trative procedures that interfere with the contractual freedom of the
parties create job opportunities for lawyers within the scope deter-
mined by the CSRC.
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III. CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA OF STOCKS AND THE
MARKET ACCESSIBILITY OF DIFFERENT
KINDS OF STOCKS
A. Unification of Classification Criteria
One of the characteristics of the shareholding experiment formed
by the Standards Opinion was the recognition of a customary uniform
set of classifications for company shares: state shares, legal person
shares, individual shares, and foreign capital shares. While this
classification structure had been observed locally prior to the new law,
there was some lack of uniformity in interpreting what each category
actually meant.
The development of the classification system began in the mid-
1980s. The Shanghai branch of the People's Bank issued a resolution
to classify the shares offered to outsiders in two categories: collective
shares and individual shares. There was no mention of state shares.
The meaning of individual shares is self-evident: they were offered to
individual members of the public. Collective shares, regardless of
whether an enterprise were a state-owned or collectively-owned
enterprise, referred to shares subscribed by an enterprise with its
retained capital. This resolution must have been implemented after
unpublicized revisions, because the earliest seven joint-stock compa-
nies all issued unit shares (danwei gufen), which, despite the different
term, was the same as collective shares. Three of these seven
companies issued State shares as well.' In other provisions of the
Shanghai Municipal Government, stocks were classified as govern-
ment shares, unit shares, and individual shares.Y
In Shenzhen, local government rules in the 1980s did not require
that shares be classified according to ownership. If a SOE was the
promoter, the shares it subscribed were taken over by the Shenzen
Municipal Investment Management Company, a beneficiary share-
holder on behalf of the local government. If more than 25% of a
company's shares were held by a foreign business, it was governed by
121. Zhongguo renmin yinhang Shanghai shi fenhang guanyu faxing gupiaode zanxing guanli
banfa [Interim methods for regulating stock issues, Shanghai Branch of the People's Bank of
China], 1984, reprinted in STocK ECONOMICS, supra note 6, at 381.
122. Shanghai shi gufenzhi qiye zanxing banfa [Interim methods for share system enterprises
in Shanghai], reprinted in STOCK ECONOMICS supra note 6, at 250.
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a special provision, promulgated in 1986, by the Guangdong Provin-
cial Government."z
In Fuijan Province the provincial government required shares to
be classified according to ownership. Shares formed by state-owned
assets were called "state-owned assets shares," shares purchased by
enterprises other than the promoters were called "outsider enterprise
shares," shares held by the promoters with their own capital were
called "this enterprise assets shares," and shares subscribed by an
individual investor were called "individual assets shares." 124
Beginning in 1989, and then especially between 1991 and 1993,
the categories became increasingly unified. First, starting in 1989,
SCRES consistently divided joint-stock companies into three types
toward which it adopted differential policies: legal person sharehold-
ing, employee shareholding, and public shareholding. Then, after
1991, the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges demanded that all listed
companies divide their shares into State shares, legal person shares,
foreign capital shares, and individual shares. It is important to note
here that like so many other elements in the securities markets, these
categories were in fact handed down from above-more a product of
the administration discretion of the People's Bank, which was then in
charge of the exchanges, than a decision by the exchanges. The
bank's influence on this matter was felt in other ways as well.
According to a document released by the Bank two weeks before the
establishment of the Shanghai exchange, applications for listing and
trading of joint-stock companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen had to be
examined by the local branches of the Bank and finally approved by
its main branch."z  Clearly, whatever forms the Bank confirmed
would be imitated by later applicants.
Probably one of the main reasons for administrative organs to
have established classification standards is the disparity in the
transferability of different types of shares. State shares and legal
person shares are theoretically nontransferable, foreign shares may
only be traded in a special, closed market, and individual shares may
be transferred only between Chinese citizens.
123. Guangdong sheng jingji tequ shewai gongsi tiaoli [Guangdong Province special economic
zone regulations for companies with foreign elements], (1986), reprinted in STOCK ECONOMICS,
supra note 6, at 360.
124: See SECuROriEs LAwS, supra note 14, at 108.
125. See Zhongguo rennin yinhang guanyu yan'ge kongzhi gupiao faxing he zhuanrangde
tongzhi [Bank of China Notice Concerning Strict Control of Share Issues and Transfers],
reprinted in COLLECTiON OF LAWS, SUPP. VOL., supra note 16, at 164.
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The final step in the unification of classification criteria was the
replacement of local rules and regulations with national ones. After
May 1992, the Standards Opinion divided companies into directed
offering (diangxiang muji) and public offering (shehui muji), depend-
ing on the scope of their initial share offering. In a directed offering
(which might also be translated as fixed channel offering) companies'
promoters subscribe a portion of the shares, and offer the remainder
to other legal persons and employees of the company. Public offering
refers to companies which make their initial offering open to all
investors. When the Standards Opinion further classified the shares
themselves into state shares, legal person shares, foreign capital
shares, and individual shares, the precedent established by the
Shanghai exchange became the national rule.
B. Ideological Background of the Criteria for the Classification of
Shares
The use of the classification system promotes the principle of
public ownership in that it shows whether or not a company has met
the ideological requirement of maintaining the leading role of the
public economy by having state and public organizations hold the
majority of shares. On this point, the suggestion of influential, Beijing
University economics professor Li Yining is representative:
if we provide the shares held by individuals shall not exceed a
certain proportion in the total capital of the enterprises and the
proportion of individual shares in the total capital of the enterprises
shall be under that of the public ownership shares, that enterprise
is still a joint-stock enterprise with the public ownership playing a
leading role.26
Mr. Li Yining's proposals were embodied in the regulations,
administrative rules and securities trading rules later formulated by
the government. In the Measures for the Experiment in Shareholding
Units promulgated by the State Council in April 1992, the shares held
by the State and the public organizations were called "publicly owned
assets shares," and the other shares were called "non-publicly owned
assets shares." Furthermore, in the Standards Opinion and Interim
Regulations on Share Issuing and Trading, promulgated shortly
126. Li Yining, Guoyou qiye zai gongyouzhi jichushang shixian gufenzhide tujing [The Path
for State Owned Enterprises to Realize the Share System on the Basis of Public Ownership],
GAIGE [REFoRM], 1991, no. 1, at 158.
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thereafter, the maximum individual shares was stipulated as .5% of
the total outstanding shares of the company, and individuals and
private enterprises were not permitted to be promoters."z Gradual-
ly, majority shareholding by state and public organizations became an
implicit precondition for listing. Until August 1993, out of all the
15.47 billion (face value) shares listed on the Shanghai Exchange by
70 companies, 68% were State shares, 12% were legal person shares,
10% were transferable individual shares, 1.2% were untransferable
employee shares, and 8% were B shares.'
C. Shares Classified According to the Identity of the Shareholders
1. State Shares. As more SOEs are corporatized, the State
has a correspondingly greater interest in owning more shares of the
new joint-stock companies. While the State is willing to give up
exclusive ownership of the firm, it is not willing to lose all power to
direct and influence the activities of the firm. Majority ownership is
one method by which such influence can be maintained while also
presenting the opportunity to raise capital from the sale of other
shares.
State shares are those issued and held by the State. If a SOE is
the only promoter, it transfers all its rights and obligations to the
joint-stock company and then it terminates once the joint-stock
company is established. The shares subscribed by a SOE as promoter
must be held by a government organization or by a controlling
company authorized by the government.'29
Therefore, not all shares constituted by state-owned assets are
state shares, but instead, the State shares are a special phenomenon
127. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 24.
128. 1993 nian Shanghai zhengjiaosuo shangshi gongsi zhongqi baogao gailan [Overview of
the 1993 Midterm Report on Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange], ZHONOGUO
ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECURITIES DAILY], Sept. 5, 1993, at 2; ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN
BAO, Sept. 8, 1993, at 3. As of November 1, 1994, the face value of the issued shares of the 170
companies listed on the Shanghai exchange was 45,594,460,000 yuan. The percentages of this
face value by share category was: individual shares, 17%; state shares, 50%; promoter shares,
7%; legal persona shares, 9%; employee shares, 1%; B shares, 6%; H shares, 9%; foreign
invested enterprise legal person shares, 1%. Shanghai zhengjiaosuo shangshigongsigubenjiegou
[The Share Capital Structure of Companies Listed on the Shanghai Exchange], ZHENGQUAN
SHIKAN ZHOUKAN [SECURrs MARKET WEEKLY], 1994, no. 48, at 24-6.
129. Gufenzhi shidian qiye guoyou zichan guanli zanxing guiding [Interim Regulations for
Management of State Assets of Share System Experiment Enterprises], CSRC BULLETIN, supra
note 22, 1993, no. 2, at 277. Guojia guoyou zichan guanli jude 'jidian shuoning' [National
Bureau for Management of State Assets, 'Several points of clarification'], id, 1993, vol. 2, at 280.
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occurring with the disappearance of a SOE (the promoter) in the
process of the corporatization. However, if several SOEs jointly
promote a joint-stock company and continue to exist after the
establishment of the new joint-stock company, or if at the time they
subscribe shares of a company the SOEs are not the sponsors, the
shares held by the SOEs are called "legal person shares." This is the
case even though these shares, like those formed during the transfor-
mation of SOEs into joint-stock companies, originated from state-
owned assets. The difference lies in the fact-that the legal persons
forming the new company have not been extinguished but retain their
separate identities.
That administrative rules from different government organizations
have different definitions of the State shares exacerbates the problems
of definition, for the content and extension of State shares will be
substantially different as each different set of rules is applied.
According to the Standards Opinion, state shares are the shares
formed by authorized government departments and organizations
investment of state-owned assets into companies. On the other hand,
according to the provisions of the State Bureau for the Administration
of State Assets, state shares shall include:
(1) The shares converted from the net assets of SOEs which
have been transformed into joint stack companies.
(2) Shares initially issued by companies and purchased by
the governmental departments investing on behalf of the
State.
(3) Shares initially issued by companies and purchased by
the investment companies, assets management companies,
and economic entity companies authorized to make invest-
ment on behalf of the State. The extension of this provision
is obviously broader than the former one.3'
130. The State Asset Bureau's provisional regulations were superseded on November 3,1994,
by the "Interim measures for administering the rights of state shares in joint stock limited
liability companies" (Gufen youxian gongsi guoyou guquan guanli zanxing banfa), promulgated
jointly by the State Asset Bureau and SCRES. See CHINA SEcuRrIrmS DAILY, Nov. 5,1994, at
2. Based on the new regulations, state shares (guojia gu) may be obtained by transfer of state
assets under the following circumstances: (1) a state enterprise has been absorbed and merged
into a joint-stock company; (2) when a joint-stock company's accumulated capital exceeds the
net book asset value of a state enterprise by 50%; (3) a state enterprise's autonomous operating
capital has been completely or largely transferred to a joint-stock company; (4) they are the
initial shares offered by a company subscribed to by a state investment organization. State
shares may be held only by a state authorized investment organization. Before the law made
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We can reasonably conclude that the current criteria for
distinguishing state shares are a mixture of the capital origin and the
identity of the shareholders. However, these criteria only solved one
question: who has the right to possess the shares of a company when
it becomes established and the promoter terminates?
2. Legal Person Shares. Legal person shares are those owned
by a legal entity, such as another company. However, these can also
be owned by the State, in the sense that if the State is not the entity
making the initial public offer, but rather is a purchaser, the shares
are owned by the State. Because the State is not the promoter, the
shares are called legal entity shares. This is the most complex of the
four classes of shares. Based on the source of the capital, legal person
shares can be subdivided into state-owned legal person shares,
collective enterprise legal person shares, private enterprise legal
person shares, foreign invested enterprise legal person shares, and
institutional legal person shares.
a. State-Owned Legal Person Shares. With the exception of
state shares, all shares having their origins in state-owned assets and
held by state-owned organizations are state-owned legal person
shares. State shares and state-owned legal person shares differ only
in the status of the share holder: the holder of state shares must be a
government organization or a company with governmental functions;
the holder of state-owned legal person shares may not be a govern-
mental organ. For example, as the listing announcements of the 10
companies in Table 3-113' reveal, it is fairly common for financial
this stipulation, state shares were held by various levels of bureaus of state asset administration
or their deputed investment organizations. A state enterprise that has turned all its assets over
to a joint-stock company must be dissolved and can no longer, as before, hold shares to preserve
the empty shell.
There is some doubt as to whether these new rules can be implemented. This uncertainty
arises not simply because one ministry's or commission's rules have binding effect over other
ministries, commissions and local governments, but also because the efficacy of any new division
of administrative jurisdiction is uncertain. At present, ownership of state assets is divided among
the different levels of the central and local governments. This situation has been maintained for
a long time and was further consolidated following the recent division of tax revenues between
the central and local governments. Under these conditions the administrative authority over
state assets is exercised in all cases by central and local government "agencies in charge of the
trade" (hangye zhuguan bumen). If the State Asset Bureau's new regulations are put into effect,
the reorganization of a state enterprise into a joint-stock company would signify that control had
been transferred from the agency in charge to the State Asset Bureau, an arrangement the
agencies in charge will not lightly accept.
131. See infra p. 218.
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organizations (e.g., trust and investment companies and securities
companies) to hold the legal person shares of listed companies.
Indeed, they often hold the next largest number of shares after the
state shares of the promoters.
b. Collective Enterprise Legal Person Shares. Collective
enterprise in China comprises three types: enterprises owned by the
local government; enterprises whose assets come from the State, but
which, for policy reasons, are not classified as state owned; and
enterprises funded by individuals, but which attach themselves
(guakao) to a supervisory administrative department in order to avoid
discrimination or obtain favorable treatment otherwise available only
to public enterprises, such as tax benefits or licenses for a particular
trade sector.3 2 The first two types of collective enterprises are not
substantially different from state-owned ones.
Although it is unusual for collective enterprises to subscribe to
shares of other companies of companies outside their own domicile,
they often possess a large number of shares in local small-scale
companies. Moreover, when collective enterprises act as the promoter
of a company, they often continue to exist after that company's
establishment. Indeed, the sole purpose of this continued existence
is to be an empty shell with legal personality in order to hold shares.
Otherwise a government organ will take over the shares subscribed by
the promoter. The greater the ambiguity concerning the final
ownership of a collective enterprise's property, the fiercer the desire
of the collective enterprise as promoter to hold shares under its own
name.
133
132. "Attached" (guakao) enterprises are commonly called "wear the red hat" (dai
hongmao) private enterprises. Reports from several local surveys reveal that the number of
"attached" enterprises is one to two times greater than the number of registered private
enterprises. In 1994, there were 420 thousand registered private enterprises.
133. Before 1994, in Beijing's Zhonguancun New Technology Development Zone, privately
invested enterprises were required to register as "collective enterprises without a supervisory
agency" (wu zhuguan bumen jiti qiye). Within a certain period of time, private investors could
obtain a certain rate of profit commensurate with the amount of their invested capital. Other
than this, they could assert no property right in regard to the enterprise. At the time such
enterprises reorganized into joint-stock companies, the central issue was who owned the shares
based on the property put up as the enterprise's investment? Legally, an individual may not be
the beneficial owner of transferred collective property. Yet in these collective enterprises,
without a supervisory agency, there existed no government organ qualified to hold the shares,
prompting some of the already reorganized enterprises to retain an "empty shell" (kongqiao)
to hold the shares.
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c. Private Enterprise Legal Person Shares. These are limited
liability companies with legal person status whose capital comes
entirely from private individuals. Private enterprises could exist
legally only after the Constitution was amended in 1988 to allow
private enterprise. Prior to the Company Law on July 1, 1994, private
enterprises were prohibited from being promoters of joint-stock
companies. Therefore, private enterprises usually purchased the
shares of companies after the establishment of the companies.
However, legal prohibitions could not deter these strong private
enterprises from adopting flexible methods to promote companies.
For example, first, together with a collective or state-owned enter-
prise, a private enterprise would organize a jointly operated enter-
prise. Then, by attaching itself (guakao) to the administrative agency
in charge of the industry, it would establish one or several collective
enterprises under its own control. Finally, using the name of this
enterprise, it would promote a joint-stock company. Two companies
listed on the Shenzhen exchange, Hainan minyuan gufen gonsi and
Xin nengyuan gufen gonsi, were both essentially established through
this route. In this sort of company, a significant portion of the legal
person shares are in fact controlled by a private enterprise.
d. Foreign Invested Enterprise Legal Person Shares. From the
mid 1980,s overseas investors starting joint-stock companies or
purchasing shares were subjected to almost no limitations by local
regulations in Guangdon province or the Shenzhen Special Economic
Zone. As the discussion in Section 4 of Yuanye Ltd. shows, this
Hong Kong company not only promoted a Shenzhen joint-stock
company but also acquired all the shares held by other shareholders
and for a short while became the sole shareholder of the joint-stock
company. Moreover, as SCRES and the Bank of China discovered in
a May 1990 study of about 20 Shenzhen joint-stock companies, 27%
of their shares were held by foreign-invested enterprises and overseas
investors.
In 1992 the Standards Opinion prohibited overseas investors from
holding A shares, but permitted sino-foreign equity joint ventures and
sino-foreign contractual joint ventures to promote joint-stock
companies, so long as they constituted no more than one third of all
promoters. Thus, according to this provision, an overseas investor
may not buy or sell A shares under its own name. But, if the
overseas investor establishes a sino-foreign equity or cooperative joint
venture in China, it is then permitted to promote a joint-stock
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company or purchase A shares, so long as the holder of the A shares
is an economic entity with legal personality under Chinese law and
not the foreign investor, itself.
The relevant legal question that readily arouses debate is this: if
a sino-foreign equity joint venture dissolves after promoting a joint-
stock company, and through the division of the surplus assets acquires
A shares, is this acquisition legal? In localities such as Guangdong's
special economic zones where local regulations permit overseas
companies to become promoters of companies, the legality of this
action is without doubt. The force of local regulations supersedes the
Standards Opinion, for while the former may be used as the basis for
a legal decision, the latter may not. Even if local rules and regula-
tions had no explicit provisions concerning this matter, if prior to the
Standards Opinion and its coordinate rules taking effect, the local
government permitted overseas investors to hold A shares, this
shareholding remains legal. For, no prohibition can pursue behavior
that was not proscribed before the prohibition took effect. However,
at the moment the Standards Opinion took effect and thereafter, even
if local regulations clearly permitted it, overseas investors could not
legally hold A shares, regardless of whether or not they had obtained
permission from the local government. This was the case because, a
regulation of the State Planning Commission had established a rule:
after a company promoted by an overseas invested enterprise was
terminated, any shares that the overseas investor obtained through
division of the surplus property had to be converted into B shares.'34
However, once the Company Law took effect on July 1, 1994, the
Standards Opinion was voided, and the Company Law has no
prohibitions on foreign investors holding A shares.
e. Institutional Legal Person Shares. Shares subscribed in the
name of trade unions, the Communist Youth League, or the Women's
Federation with funds raised from individuals are called institutional
legal person shares. Under the name of institutional legal person
shares, companies not permitted to make public offerings could issue
their shares to individuals other than their employees, and individuals
who could not hold a company's internal shares could subscribe to
shares under the name of a legal person.
134. Gufenzhi shidian qiye hongguan guanlide zanxing guiding [Interim Regulations for
Macro Management of Share Experiment Enterprises], reprinted in COMPILATION OF NEW
LAWS, supra note 18, 1992, no. 2, at 303.
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f. Problems with Legal Person Shares. Constant policy
changes have caused legal person shares to become an inextricable
knot. From 1992 through the first half of 1993, legal person shares
became a speculative hot spot. There are several reasons for this.
First, legal person shares were encouraged because they were
regarded as a barrier against privatization (siyouhua). Under the
aegis of this sort of thought, legal person shares circulated for a while
in the market. In the beginning of 1992, SCRES proposed an
experimental program in the "internal circulation of legal person
shares" (farengu neibu liutong). In special situations, trading of legal
person shares could be conducted between organizations. In July of
that year, SCRES gave a special permit for the National Automatic
Securities Quotation System (STAQ), which became the sole center
for trading in legal person shares. By the end of the year, three
companies listed on the STAQ legal person shares with a face value
of RMB 197.27 million. The shares were all underwritten by
securities firms belonging to STAQ.
Thus, in May 1993, another trading center devoted to legal
person shares was opened with the backing of the People's Bank of
China-China Securities Trading System Limited (NETS). The
involvement of SCRES and the People's Bank of China in the trading
market for legal person shares made investors optimistic about the
future of these shares. Companies which, owing to the limitations of
the issuance quotas, could not make public offerings, and thus had no
hope of being one of the companies listed on either the Shanghai or
Shenzhen exchanges, were attracted to STAQ/NETS in the hope that
they could obtain permission to list and trade legal person shares.
Second, initially, institutional investors had little interest in the
legal person shares of listed companies. But in 1992, institutional
investors seemed to obtain a commitment from the local authorities
in Shanghai and Shenzhen that it would not be long before legal
person shares would be traded on the market. A precedent in the
Shanghai exchange gave these investors reason to rely on this
promise. In 1991 when the first group of 8 companies listed their
shares, individual and legal personal shares totalled 70 million and
15.4 million shares, respectively. After the company shares were
listed, the exchange surreptitiously permitted some companies legal
person shares to be circulated. This is what caused institutional
investors to believe that shortly after the listing of companies'
individual shares, legal person shares would be allowed to circulate.
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Statistics on 1992 Shanghai issues indicate several things about
legal person shares. They do not seem to have been subject to the
issuance quota, issuing companies thus happily increased the number
of legal person shares, and, inevitably, legal person shares became an
increasingly important element in securities trading. Of the RMB 2
billion (face value) in shares issued in 1992 by 53 Shanghai companies,
there were approximately 460 million worth of individual shares and
1.54 billion of legal person shares. The shares were issued in four
batches, and with each batch there was a sharp increase in the
percentage of legal person shares. In the first group of 9 companies,
the ratio of legal person shares issued to individual shares was 1:2.3;
in the second group of 34, 1.3:1; in the third group of 5, 1.9:1; and
finally in the fourth group of 7 companies, 4.5:1. For organizations
subscribing to shares, the costs were significantly lower than for
individuals because organizations did not have to first buy lottery
tickets at 2 to 6 times the face value of shares. Therefore, many
employees of powerful organizations bought legal personshares in the
name of their employer. If an organization was a government organ
prohibited by law from shareholding, its officials use the name of
trade unions, the Youth League or other groups to accomplish the
same goal. Clearly the former coldness toward legal person shares
had been replaced by enthusiasm. Of course, misappropriation of
public funds, insider trading, and bribery were a disastrous, hard-to-
contain concomitant.
Third, at the time China's non-banking financial organizations,
which for the most part were the brokerage houses belonging to
STAQ and NETS, acted as the underwriters and listing advisers, their
purchase of legal person shares was limited only by the amount of
their own capital. Moreover, since brokerages' trading in individual
shares was completely legalized after September 1993, illegal trading
in individual shares was a short-term speculative play which did not
need to tie up capital for a long time. Thus, the non-banking financial
organizations put large amounts of capital into the market in legal
person shares.
Still, for a number of reasons, the market in legal person shares
never became the gold mine some people imagined. The Shanghai
and Shenzhen exchanges constantly adopted measures to prevent
STAQ and NETS from siphoning off the capital in their exchanges.
Companies which had already listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen
exchanges were not permitted to allow their legal person shares to
circulate on either STAQ or NETS, and companies which had already
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listed their legal person shares on STAQ or NETS had no hope of
listing their individual shares on the exchanges. Indeed, in June 1993,
the Shenzhen Municipal government issued an order to this effect.
Without specific permission, no Shenzhen company "could on its own
authority prepare to list on the Beijing legal person share market [i.e.,
STAQ or NETS]"' 5 and no local securities company could "act in
Shenzhen as the transaction agent for Beijing legal person
shares.
1 36
Other factors also served to cool interest in legal person shares.
Beginning in 1993, when the CSRC took over SCRES' and the
People's Bank's authority over securities issues and exchanges,
questions arose about whether or not the SCRES supported STAQ
and the Bank supported NETS could accept applications to list
without the approval of the CSRC. Moreover, when non-banking
financial institutions disrupted financial order by borrowing heavily
from their parent institutions-the banks-to purchase legal person
shares, the central government ordered all specialized banks to recall
for a certain period all loans to non-banking financial institutions.
The result was a reduction of capital flowing into the trading markets.
Concurrently, the listing of large quantities of individual shares on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges diluted the market capital. If
additional legal person shares had been permitted to .circulate, it
would have led to a further drop in share prices.
In June 1993, the CSRC notified STAQ and NETS to stop
accepting applications to list legal person shares, and in February 1994
reaffirmed the halt in listing of legal person shares.
3. Individual Shares. Individual shares are the shares held by
Chinese citizens. Individual shares offered to a company's employees
are called "internal employee shares" (neibu zhigong gu), while shares
offered to the general public are called "public individual shares"
(shuihui geren gu).
Internal employee shares were once the key shareholding
experiment advocated by the government. Shortly before the release
of the Standards Opinion, a government policy document still
recommended that "the emphasis ought to be on the establishment
and experiment of the first and second types of shareholding
135. ZHENQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN [SECURMES MARKET WEEKLY], 1993, no. 27, at 23.
136. ld.
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enterprises,"'37 namely legal person shareholding and employee
shareholding joint-stock companies. But shortly thereafter, employee
shareholding was severely restricted. In August 1992, the head of the
People's Bank of China, which at that time was in charge of the
securities markets, announced a temporary suspension in the
development of employee shareholding joint-stock companies. In
April 1993, SCRES and the CSRC issued a notice "resolutely halting
the non-standard [i.e., vis-A-vis the Standards Opinion] issuance of
internal employee shares."'3 Finally, in July 1993 SCRES issued
special provisions on the management of internal employee
shares. 3
9
The Standards Opinion provided that the number of shares
offered to employees through directed offerings (dingxiang mUji) may
not exceed 20% of the company's total number of shares. If it has
already exceeded that amount, it could obtain permission to issue and
sell to the public 10% of its total shares, but could not set aside any
of these shares for sale solely to employees. In a number of ways this'
is a muddled provision. If shares are issued before a company is
established, how is the promoter to distinguish who are employees of
the company? How can the company predict how many shares it will
be allowed to sell to the public and determine whether or not to use
the opportunity to ration shares for sale to its employees (peishou
gufen)?
In 1993, a new administrative regulation was issued that reduced
the percentage of employee shares to 2.5%, though no revisions were
made to the Standards Opinion. Once again, one can see the ad-hoc
administrative influence on the development of securities markets in
China.
4. Foreign Capital Shares. Foreign capital shares include B
shares and H shares. B shares are shares of Chinese companies that
are denominated in Chinese currency, issued and listed within China,
purchased by foreign investors with foreign currency, and traded only
among foreign investors. H shares are shares of Chinese companies
that are directly issued and listed in Hong Kong. Between 1991 and
137. Guojia tigaiwei guanyu 1992 nian jingji tizhi gaige yaodiande tongzhi, reprinted in
COMPILATION OF NEW LAWS, supra note 18, 1989, no 2, at 55.
138. RENMIN RIBAO [PEoPL s DAILY], April 8, 1993, at 4.
139. Dingxiang muji gufen youxian gongsi zhigong chigu guanli guiding [Regulatory
Provisions for Directed Offering to Workers and Staff of Joint-Stock Companies], RENMIN RIBAO
[PEoPLE'S DAILY], July 30, 1993, at 3.
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1993, 19 companies, each in Shanghai and Shenzhen, offered shares
with a face of value of RMB 2.45 billion. In 1993 six companies
issued H shares.
D Market Accessibility of Various Classes of Shares
1. Transferable Individual Shares and the Unreliable Index of
Share Prices. To avoid the privatization of shares held by state and
public organs, Peking University economics professor Li Yining once
proposed the separate trading of three classes of shares and three
separate securities markets."4 If a company's shares were all state
shares, trading of its shares would be limited to state investment
organizations. If a company's shares comprised state shares and
public organization shares, trading could occur among state invest-
ment organizations, among public organizations, and between the two
types of shareholders. If a company's shares comprised state shares,
public organization shares, and individual shares, the trading of its
shares should be confined to the respective categories of sharehold-
ers.'4 At least superficially, Li's proposal became the reality of
China's securities markets. Trading of individual shares is confined
to individuals, trading of foreign capital shares occurs only among
foreign investors, and the trading of a small quantity of legal person
shares occurs only among public organizations. From the establish-
ment of the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets to the time I completed
this Article, the only transferable listed company shares are individual
shares.
The Shanghai Securities Exchange Annual Statistical Report
(Shanghai Exchange Annual Report) for the years 1990 through 1992
publish only the total number of individual shares at the time of a
company's listing and not the number of additional shares issued after
listing. The total number of transferable individual shares in a given
month or given year have never been disclosed. Employing other
means to make the calculation presents three difficulties. First, the
Shanghai exchange grants a number of local companies the special
privilege of transferring a portion of legal person shares into
individual shares. The amount transferred has never been disclosed
140. Li Yining, Guoyou qiye zai gongyouzhi fichushangshixian gufenzhide tujing [The Path
for State Owned Enterprises to Realize the Share System on the Basis of Public Ownership],
GAIGE [REFORM], 1991, no. 1, at 158.
141. Id.
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and the privileged local companies are unwilling to make a public
disclosure. As of February 1994, the Shanghai exchange had
permitted the transfer of 14 companies' legal person shares.142
Second, the listed companies repeatedly issue new (rationed) shares
to shareholders. Most of the new shares are subscribed by individual
shareholders, with legal person shareholders buying a minority. The
1990-92 Annual Reports do-not reveal the change in the total number
of individual shares after the assignment of these new shares. Third,
through a private placement, the state shareholder of companies listed
in 1993 transferred a large quantity of shares to individual and legal
person shareholders. Unless these listed companies reveal the
information in their 1993 end-of-the-year reports, we cannot know
how much this transfer increased the number of individual shares.
The issue of hidden shares is not an arcane legal problem. It has
a direct and immediate effect on investors, because the number of
shares influences market valuation. The formula for calculating the
Shanghai Stock Exchange A share price index for a given day
(Shanghai Share Index) is:
Index= TCMVX100TBMV
where: TCMV=total current market value of listed shares
TBMV=total base market value of listed shares
The market value of a share is simply calculated by multiplying the
stock's closing price by the number of shares issued for that stock.
The total market value (TMV) is therefore the sum of the market
value of all listed shares, or:
TMV=F (CPxNS)
where: CP=given stock's closing price
NS=number of shares issued for given stock
142. There is some evidence to suggest that the first thirteen Shanghai companies to list on
the Shanghai exchange by November 1992 had surreptitiously put 30 million yuan worth of state
and legal person shares into circulation. The way in which the Shanghai exchange gave local
companies special privileges and concealed the news from the mass of investors received
criticism from the news media. See Ping Wei, Hushi liutong panzi jiujing duoda [In Fact How
Large is the Circulation in Shanghai?], ZHENGQUAN SICEANG ZHOUKAN [SECURmEs MARKET
WEEKLY], 1992, no. 18, at 18.
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The distinguishing feature of the Shanghai Share Index is this: all
of the shares of a listed company. are treated as transferable shares
and calculated into the "listed total," then on the basis of a given
days' closing quote for every listed company's transferable shares the
market value of all a company's stock is calculated, and finally one
calculates the market value of all the shares of listed companies.
Unquestionably, this method of calculating the stock price index
misleads investors. First, it conceals the fact that most of a listed
company's shares are non-transferable, exaggerates several fold the
true scale of the market, induces entry of capital that ought not be
circulating in the stock market and which only aggravates the
speculative trading. Second, it greatly diminishes the volume of trade
and the rate of turnover, concealing the seriousness of short term
speculation, and making it difficult for even knowledgeable investors
to make reasonable predictions of risk. Third, given that a large
portion of listed shares are frozen, the number of shares needed to
manipulate the market is much smaller than usual, and the danger of
market manipulation through continuous buying and selling of a stock
is much greater.
If the Shanghai exchange included only transferable shares in the
listed volume, the changes in the index caused by manipulation would
be far clearer. Knowledgeable investors would be reminded to make
careful judgments and would not be defrauded by manipulative
behavior. Fourth, the index's TMV assumes that all listed shares may
be transferred at market price. Thus, when a listed company's state
shareholder transfers state shares to an individual shareholder there
exists no reason to require a premium to divest the state share of its
privilege. Yet, in,1993 the Shanghai Exchange stipulated that when
state shareholders transfer shares to individual shareholders the share
price ought to "divest the privilege." Shifts in prices caused by this
practice are hard for investors to predict.
2. Circulation Across Boundaries by Different Categories of
Shares. Circulation among sate, legal person, and individual shares
has, not truly been obstructed. During the 1980s, the Shanghai and
Shenzhen rules regulating securities neither prohibited organizations
from over the counter transactions nor restricted the transfer of
organization held shares to only other organizations. There seems to
be no insurmountable obstacle to exchange of individual and legal
person shares.
In the fir.nt year after the establishment of the securities exch-
anges, only individual shares could be listed, and only individual
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shareholders could trade on the exchanges or open trading accounts
with securities companies. However, buying and selling by the
securities companies themselves has never been explicitly prohibited.
Only organizations other than brokerage houses were superficially
excluded from securities trading markets. But despite the theoretical
legal risk, this exclusion could not prevent organizations from opening
stock trading accounts in individual's names in order to trade.
In June 1991, in an effort to attract more capital to the market
and halt an uninterrupted fall in prices, the Shenzhen branch of the
People's Bank took the lead in eliminating controls on organizations
entering the market. It permitted enterprises and other institutions
(shiye danwei) to use their own funds to buy individual shares of
listed companies. Clearly, then, transactions in the names of securities
firms were also legal.
On October 16,1992, the Shanghai Exchange formally announced
that member brokerages could engage in trading activities, but limited
them to trading in companies with more than 1 million transferable
shares and required them to hold purchased shares for seven business
days before selling them.43
On September 4,1993, the Shanghai Exchange and the Shanghai
Central Securities Registration and Accounting Company (Shanghai
zhengquan zhongyang dengji jiesuan gongsi) jointly issued a notice
announcing that "except for those prohibited by the state from
participating in stock trading, all institutional investors may from this
date initiate procedures for opening a trading account and begin
investing in the securities market."'"
Thereafter, the individual share market was completely opened
to institutional investing. The shares purchased by a legal person in
the primary market are called legal person shares, and the shares it
purchases in the secondary market are called individual shares. When
a listed company announces the number of individual shares, the
figure includes individual shares held by legal persons but not shares
transferred by legal persons to individuals. If the category of shares
can be transferred only among shareholders of the corresponding
class, the separation between different classes of shares can perhaps
still be maintained. But if shareholders of different classes may
143. SHANGAHI ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SEcuRTms DAILY], Sept. 19,1992, at 1.
144. Jigou rushi damen yi bikai [The Door to Organizations Entering the Market is Well-
Opened], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SECURITIES DAILY], Sept. 4,1993, at 1.
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possess the same kind of shares, the policy of separating classes will
lose all meaning.
IV. STOCK OWNERSHIP AND CORPORATE CONTROL
I open this section with three tables illustrating the relationship
in ten listed companies between stock ownership and corporate
control. Table 3-1 is a general overview; table 3-2 covers stock
ownership; table 3-3 treats the relation between shareholders,
directors, and legal person representatives. Throughout this section,
I will draw extensively on these tables.
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Date of Date of outstanding
Company Date of 1st public shares shares (in
Rank Name* Sector Promotor** registration issue listed million yuan)





2 KEM Industry KEMP Dec. 30, Dec. 8, Jan. 28, 156.88
SOE) 1992 1992 1994
3 GSI Industry GSF June 7, A shares: Oct. 494.67
(SOE) 1993 Sep. 1993 1993
H shares
July 1993
4 TB Industry TBF June 16, A shares Aug. 900
(SOE) 1993 July 1993 1993
H shares
June 1993
5 XHTI Finance 8 financial Dec. 1992 Oct. 1993 Jan. 28, 175
institutions 1994
(SOE)
6 QHR Industry QHRC Apr. 28, Dec. 1988 Nov. 170(collective 1989 1993
enterprise)
7 NH Commerce HMGP Dec. 1988 Dec. 1988 Aug. 69.8
(SQE) 1993
8 NMT Industry NMC Feb. 1989 March Aug. 53
(SOE) 1989 1993
9' ZJG Industry JCF (SOE) March not July 70.54
& 6 town 1993 disclosed 1993
enterprises
10 SHSS Industry No.5 SSF Dec. 18, Oct. 1992 July 400
& 6 SOEs 1992
* The full name of ten listed companies:
1. SP: Shanghai Petrochemical Co. Ltd.
2. KEM: Kiamen Engendering & Machinery Co. Ltd.
3. GSI: Guangzhou Shipyard International Co. Ltd.
4. TB: Tsingtao Brewery Co. Ltd.
5. XHTI Xinjiang Hongyuan Trust & Investment Co. Ltd.
6. QHR: Qingdao Haier Refrigerator Co. Ltd.
7. NH: North-east Hualian Co. Ltd.
8. NMT, Ningbo Machinery & Thbe Co. Ltd.
9. ZG: Zhejiang Jianfeng Group Co. Ltd.
10. SHSS: Shanghai Huchang Special Steel Co. Ltd.
The full name of the main promoters of ten listed companies:
1. SPC: Shanghai Petrochemical Complex
2. KEMF: Kiamen Engineering Machinery Factory
3. GSF: Guangzhou Shipyard Factory
4. TBF: Tsingtao Brewery Factory
5. XHIC: Xinjiang Honjgyuan Investment Company
6. QHRC: Qingdao Haler Refrigerator Complex
7. HMGP: Hunjiang Municipal Grocery Plaza
8. NMC: Ningbo Machinery Complex
9. JCF: Jinhua Cement Factory
10. No.5 SSF: Shanghai No.5 Steel Factory
In this table the main promoters are entities which are dissolved after they have promoted and
have registered the company.
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TABLE 3-2: STOCK OWNERSHIP IN TEN
LISTED COMPANIES*
Holding size** Holder number Largest holding size
Name per group (%) per group per group (%)
SHS LHS IHS FHS SHS LHS IHS FHS LHS IHS FHS
SP 64.2 2.4 6.4 27.0 1 I 316310 6057 .19 .003 10.8
KEM 74.5 / 25.5 / 1 I 11107 I / .13 I
GSI 42.6 I 25.5 31.8 1 I 24044 1129 I .46 11.8
TB 44.4 5.93 11.1 35.2 1 3 21571 4662 3.3 .19 I
XHTI 28.6 42.8 28.5 I I 16 3415 I 28.6 I l
QHR 65.2 I 34.8 I I 2 22638 I 61.7 .41 l
NH 26.1 25.8 53.0 I 2 21 9817 I 2.8 .33 I
NMT 21.3 53.0 25.6 I 1 28 2651 I 17.8 I I
ZJG 61.0 18.3 20.6 I 1 8 7209 I 8.15 .30 I
SHSS 48.8 42.4 8.75 I 1 523 58228 I 26.1 .019 I
* The holders of SHS or promotor held shares in ten companies are as follows:
1. SP: China National Petrochemical Holding Co.Ltd.
2. KEM: Kiamen Municipal Bureau of Fimance
3. GSI: China National Shipyard Industrial Co.Ltd.
4. TB: Qingdao Municipal Bureau of State Assets Management
5. XHTI: China Construct Bank Xinjiang Branch
6. QHR: Haer Group Company
7. NH: Jlin Provincial Bureau of State Assets Management, Hunjiang Municipal
Bureau of State Assets Management
8. NMT: Ningbo Municipal Bureau of State Assets Management
9. ZIG: Jinghua Municipal Bureau of State Assets Management
10. SHSS: Shanghai Municipal Bureau of State Assets Management
* SHS: state held shares
LHS: legal entity held shares
IHS: main land Chinese individual held shares
FHS: foreign investor held shares
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TABLE 3-3: RELATION BETWEEN HOLDERS, DIRECTORS
AND LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES IN TEN
LISTED COMPANIES
Number of Directors
Relative to the Number of
Board of Directors State or Holder Groups* Directors
Hold
SH Concurrent
Date Directors or Corporate Post of Legal
Name Created Number State LEH** IH PH FIH Officials Representatives***
SP June, 1993 15 1 I / 14 / 12 Board President &
General Manager
KEM December, 7 / I I 7 / 7 General Manager
1993
GSI May, 1993 19 I I I 17 2 16 Board President &
General Manager
TB June, 1993 9 I 1 1 7 1 7 Board President &
General Manager
XHTI December, 10 1 7 / 2 / 2 Bank Official
1993
QHR April, 1989 7 1 I I 7 / 6 Board President
NH September, 17 4 1 / 12 / 12 Board President199
NMT March, 11 / 5 I 6 / 2 Board President &
1989 General Manager
ZIG March, 13 1 6 I 6 1 6 Board President &
1993 General Manager
SHSS December, 19 1 6 I 13 / 12 Board President
1992




FIH: foreign investor holder.
** Directors related to the legal entity holders are those whose professional experience is not
linked to the main promoter and they are nominated as directors neither because they are
holders nor because of their posts in government institutions.
*** The relation between legal representatives and promoters or state holders are as follows:
1. SP: General Manager or SPC
2. KEM: Chairman of Worker Union in KEMF
3. GSI: General Director of GSF
4. TB: Senior Engineer of TBF
5. XHTI: Bank Official
6. QHR: General Manager of both holding company and promoter
7. NH: Former Vice-director of Provincial Economic Structure Reform Committee
8. NMT: General Director of NMC
9. ZG: General Director of JCF and representative of state holder
10. Director of No.5 SSF which is the promoter of company and holds 26.18% outstanding
shares.
Sources of information for Tables 3-(1-3):
(1) Shanghai Petrochemical, Prospectus of A Shares (818/1993); Prospectus of H Shares (July
1993); Report on Listing A Shares(2/11/1993).
2 Kiamen Engineering,Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 24/1/1994.
3 Guangzhou Shipyard, Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 27/10/1993.
Qingdao, Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 25/8/1993.
5 Xinjiang Hongyun, Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 31/1/1993.
6 Qingdao Haier, Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 14/11/1993.
7 North-East Hualian, Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 6/8/1993.
8 N'mnbo Machinery, Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 25/1993.
9 Zhejiang Jianfeng, Report on Listing A Shares, China Securities, 25/1993.
(10 Shanghai Huchang, report on listing A shares, China Securities, 11/7/1993.
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A. Three Approaches to Restructuring SOEs as Public Corporations
Three methods exist by which a SOE may be transformed into a
corporate entity. These methods are designated as the "merger
method" (jianbing tujing), "splitting method" (xinshe tujing), and the
"mixture method" (hunhe tujing), and are distinguishable by the type
of initial offering used in the corporatization.
1. Merger Method. Under the merger method, a prospective
joint-stock company makes an initial offering to a single subscriber,
usually a state enterprise. Once the subscriber purchases the shares
and transfers its own assets to the new company, the subscriber's legal
status terminates and the new company is established. When these
transactions are completed, the new joint-stock company assumes
completely the subscriber's rights and obligations vis-h-vis third
parties.
Most state enterprises use the merger method to become joint-
stock companies. The transaction between the state enterprise
subscriber and its other "self'"-the joint-stock company-involves the
transferring of debts and exchanging of shares and property owner-
ship. At the instant the process is completed, the state enterprise
ends, and the joint-stock company emerges. At its establishment, the
joint-stock company has only one shareholder. This shareholder
nominates all of the members of the first board of this newly formed
corporation. Board chairmen are elected by the directors under the
direction of the shareholder. Of the companies listed in Table 3,
Guangzhou Shipyard, Shanghai Petrochemical, Tsingtao Beer,
Dongbei Hualian, Ningbo Machine Tools, and Siamen Engineering
Machinery used the merger method to establish joint-stock companies.
Within a month of their formation, each of these six companies
made additional share offerings to the public. For the promoter or
controlling shareholder, this method of merger and sequential share
offering provides obvious benefits. First, the initial subscriber has
total control over the election of directors and all introductory matters
involved in corporatization. Although on average the size of the six
companies' new offerings were 44% of the initial one, there was no
additional selection of directors. Thus, during the three years
between the first and second meetings of the boards of directors, since
outsider shareholders could not exercise their right either to nominate
or elect directors, promoters acted alone. From calling the opening
meeting, through reviewing the appropriateness of promoting fees and
the legality of the way stock was issued, to the selection of directors
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and the application for registration, the outside public shareholders
had no choice but to accept these faits accompli.
Second, by making two offerings within a short period of time,
the promoter could avoid the legal constraint imposed by the
Standards Opinion's rule that "similar classes of shares offered at the
same time must be issued at the same price."' 45 Despite the short
time interval between the offerings, the price of the second offering
was as much as 2 to 3.4 times the first and generated substantial paid-
in surplus as a windfall for the original shareholder.'"
2. Splitting Method. In this method, a certain percentage of
a company's initial public offering is subscribed to by two or more
promoters, with the. rest of the shares issued to the public. The
promoters do not lose their identity upon the formation of the joint-
stock company. The chief promoter is split into two parts: the SOE
which retains its existence after transferring all or most of its assets
into the joint-stock company, and the newly established joint-stock
company in which the SOE is the majority shareholder. Of the
companies listed in Table III, only Shanghai Huchang Special Steel
used this method to establish itself. Shanghai Huchang was initiated
by Shanghai Number Five Steel Factory (Shanghai Steel) together
with six state enterprises and financial institutions. Shanghai Steel
used the capitalized value of a building in construction as consider-
ation to buy 75% of the shares.47 The other six promoters used
cash as consideration to obtain 2.6% of Huchang's shares. The
remaining 22.4% of the shares were issued to the employees of the
state enterprise, the general public, and various organizations.
The splitting method of corporatization differs from the merger
method in several respects. First, the initial offerings of the two
methods involves different players with very different results. In the
145. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 27.
146. In June 1992, when Shanghai's Hualian Company issued additional news shares, the net
value of the old shares was 2.75 RMB per share. The new shares were issued at a per share
price of 9.28 RMB. The ratio between the net value of the old share and the issuing price of
the new was 1:3.4.
The disclosures in the Huachang notice of offering demonstrate that there were three
subscription prices for the initial shares issued at face value of 10 RMB per share. The state
shareholders and the five Shanghai Steel factories were priced at 14.5 RMB. The six sponsors
other than the 5 steel factories paid 26 RMB per share. Organizations other than the founding
sponsors and individuals each had to pay 28 RMB per share.
147. Of this Shanghai Steel actually holds only 26.18%. The other 48.82% is controlled by
the Shanghai State Asset Bureau.
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splitting method, shares are issued to the promoters and the general
public in the initial offering, instead of holding a second offering just
for the public. Also, with this method, the establishment of the joint-
stock company does not terminate the promoters' or enterprises'
entity or any rights and obligations of these enterprises. The
promoters issue the stock under the name of the joint-stock company.
These promoters are jointly and severally liable for their promoting
activities and assume the risk of failure in the initial stock offering.
Under the merger method, the original subscriber is relieved of
liability, since the joint-stock company assumes the responsibility.
Under the splitting method, the promoter remains liable, even after
the company is formed, for fraud and misrepresentations during the
share offering.
Finally, under the splitting method, the public shareholders have
greater control over the initial formation of the corporation. The
promoters are obliged to notify the new shareholders about the
inaugural meeting of the corporation.' 4' The promoters and the
public shareholders are able to participate in the selection of the first
board of directors. Thus, the promoters do not have the same
opportunity to concentrate their power that they do in the merger
method.
3. Mixture Method. Under this method of corporatization,
two or more promoters subscribe a set amount of shares in the new
company during the initial offering. Other subscribers are then
allowed to purchase shares in a subsequent offering to the public. At
least one promoter has his legal status terminated after the offering.
This promoter also transfers his rights and obligations to the joint-
stock company upon establishment.
Of Table 3's companies, Qingdao Haier, Xinjiang Hongyuan, and
Zhejiang Jianfeng, were established using the mixture method. The
promoters of these companies used all of their net assets as consider-
ation for the shares, which were then merged into the newly formed
joint-stock company. In this respect the mixture method is similar to
the merger method. Otherwise, it is more like the splitting method.
4. Critique of the Merger and Splitting Methods. Unlike the
mixture method, both the merger and "splitting" methods have
several aspects which cannot survive scrutiny under the Standards
148. See Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 19.
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Opinion. Under the Standards Opinion, when a state enterprise is the
sole promoter of a company, it must establish the company by making
a public offering (muji) and must have at least two shareholders upon
establishment.'49 However, under the merger method, only one
shareholder exists upon formation. Thus, the legitimacy of the
corporation's legal status under the merger method can be easily
challenged.
Setting aside this obvious problem, the company formed under
the merger method faces yet another legal dilemma. The Standards
Opinion mandates a twelve month period between any two share
offerings."5 The splitting method does not violate these provisions,
since it offers shares to the promoters and to the public during the
initial offering. However, under the merger method, there are
separate offerings to the state enterprise and to the public. The
second and third offerings to the public occur within one month of the
establishment of the joint-stock company, clearly violating the twelve
month waiting period mandated by the laws.
The splitting method is not free from defects either. Under the
Standards Opinion, a class of shares being offered at the same time
must be offered to all buyers at the same price.' However, in the
initial offering under the splitting method, the company offers shares
at lower prices to the promoters than the prices offered to the other
subscribers. Thus, both methods of corporatization have certain
aspects which are prohibited by the terms of the Standards Opinion.
B. Control of the Majority Shareholder
Some Chinese corporations have a majority shareholder who
owns more than 50% of the common stock. Whether under the
former regime of the Standards Opinion or the new one of the
Company Law, this shareholder has the right to elect more than 50%
of the directors, to appoint all managers, and to dismiss all of the
directors and managers.152  Thus, the majority shareholder in
Chinese corporations has the ability to control the management of the
corporation.
149. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 9, 2.
150. Id. art. 36.
151. Id. art. 27.
152. These actions require, though, majority votes at the meetings of the shareholders and
directors, respectively. Id. art. 43, 1, item 6, art. 47; Gongsifa [Company Law], art. 106, art.
2, art. 117.
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Four companies listed in Table 3, specifically Shanghai Petro-
chemical, Xiamen Machine Tool, Zhejiang Jianfeng, and Qingdao
Haier, have one shareholder who holds more than 50% of outstanding
shares. The state is the controlling shareholder in all of these
companies, except Qingdao Haier. These four companies have forty-
two directors combined. Of these forty-two directors, thirty-two of
are former managers or party officials at the sole or most important
promoter, while two others are representatives of relevant govern-
ment agencies. Twenty six directors who hold concurrent managerial
or senior positions were formerly managers at the promoting
companies.
1. Shanghai Petrochemical Case Study. Among the four
companies mentioned above, Shanghai Petrochemical was the largest
company to be listed in China in 1993. It also represents a typical
example of a corporation formed by the merger method. Shanghai
Petrochemical has fifteen directors divided into two groups called
executive directors and non-executive directors. The non-executive
directors comprise the highest positions in the company, such as the
general manager and the vice general manager. They also hold such
other important positions as managers, heads of party committees or
chairmen of trade unions in subsidiary companies. Three other
directors are presidents of promoters, outside legal counsel, and
professors. Except for the promoter, no other shareholders have seats
on the board of directors.
Candidates for director positions can be nominated by any
shareholder who owns more than 5% of the shares. These directors
can only be elected or dismissed by a majority of the votes cast at the
shareholder meeting. Board chairmen are elected or dismissed by a
two-thirds majority of the directors' votes. The vice-chairmen are
then elected by the chairmen, subject to the approval of a majority of
the directors.
Since Sinopec (China Petrochemical), the state shareholder, owns
a majority of the shares in Shanghai Petrochemical, this majority
shareholder can control more than 60% of the board. Without the
majority shareholder's approval, no other candidates can be elected
as directors. Similarly, without its consent, no director can be
dismissed.
The remaining shares of Shanghai Petrochemical are held by a
variety of shareholders. About 316,200 individuals hold approximate-
ly 400 million shares. Their holdings amount to approximately 6.4%
of the 6 billion outstanding shares. Thus, the average number of
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shares held per individual is 1265 with each share having a face value
of RMB 1. Actually, the shares are not equally distributed among
these shareholders, since one individual holds 210 thousand shares,
accounting for 2% of all the outstanding shares. This is a large
portion of the 6.4% held by the other individuals collectively. The
prospectus did not disclose the number of legal person shareholders,
but altogether they hold about 2.4% of the total shares, with a face
value of RMB 1.5 billion. The top ten legal person shareholders hold
a combined 27 million shares, with the maximum amount held by a
single legal person being 12 million shares.
Foreign investors hold about 27% of the total outstanding shares
in the form of 1.68 billion Hong Kong listed H shares. This number
of shares is distributed among the 6057 total foreign shareholders,
with the average amount of shares held by each foreign investor being
277,000 shares. The top ten foreign shareholders hold approximately
1.141 billion shares, while the top foreign holder owns 0.67 billion
shares, representing 10.86% of the total outstanding shares.
These disparate categories of shareholders' ability to influence
corporate affairs varies widely. Ownership by individuals of A shares
is most dispersed, so no single shareholders is qualified to attend a
shareholders meeting. Even if all these individual shareholders
assigned their voting rights to a single representative, they could still
nominate only one director. The legal person shareholders hold
insufficient A shares to nominate even a single candidate for director.
By contrast, H shares are the most concentrated, and the single
largest shareholder can nominate two directors. Also, collectively, the
foreign shareholders can nominate five candidates for director. Thus,
foreign shareholders will always have representation on Shanghai
Petrochemical's board of directors.
In 1993, the CSRC, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE),
and the SCRES signed a memorandum which gave shareholders of H
shares immunity, allowing them to purchase more than 10% of the
total outstanding shares without obtaining the approval of the Chinese
government. Thus, no legal obstacle to concentration of H shares
exists. Although in the short-run Sinopec's control of Shanghai
Petrochemical seems impervious to an H share challenge, the H
share's potential impact cannot be neglected.
2. Zhejiang Jianfeng Case Study. The other companies listed
in Table 3 have some similarities and some differences when
compared to Shanghai Petrochemical. While Xiamen Engineering
and Qingdao Haier have majority shareholder characteristics similar
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to those of Shanghai Petrochemical, Zhejiang Jianfeng differs in
several aspects. Compared to the power held by the Shanghai
Petrochemical majority shareholder, Zhejiang Jianfeng has a much
less centralized control structure. In Zhejiang Jianfeng, there were
seven promoters, chief among them Jinhua Municipal Concrete
Factory, a state enterprise. The other six were township and village
enterprises, with five having their initial investment divided into state
shares and legal person shares. Although the chief promoter was
merged into Zhejiang Jianfeng and state shares constitute 60% of the
total shares outstanding, the assets represented by those shares came
from six enterprises. Thus, the control of the majority shareholders
is not as exclusive as in Shanghai Petrochemical.
To illustrate, of the thirteen directors in Zhejiang Jianfeng, six of
them were nominated by legal person shareholders other than the
primary promoter, and one is a government official. Managers at the
leading promoter occupy six seats on the board, and occupy such
important positions' as the director, vice directors, general manager,
and vice general manager. In this company, the majority shareholders
and the minority shareholders both control the same number of seats
on the board. Due to this board composition, the one vote of the
government official becomes crucial in the event of an impasse.
C. Control of the Minority Shareholders. In other companies,
the state shareholders have a minority holding rather than the
controlling interest of those companies discussed above. In Table 3-2,
Guangzhou, Shanghai -Huchang, Ningbo, Dongbei Hualian, Xinjiang
Hongyuan, and Tsingtao Beer lack a state shareholder with a majority
interest. Among these companies, the highest percentage of state
shares is 48% of total outstanding shares, and the lowest percentage
is 21%. The average state holding among all these companies is
about 29.5%. However, the state still owns the largest block of shares
with the remaining shares dispersed among the shareholders. The
next largest holding constitutes approximately 27% of the state's
shares. Thus, even though it is not a majority shareholder, the state
can still control as a minority shareholder through its power to
appoint or remove at least half the directors and managers on its own.
1. Dongbei Hualian Case Study. Among the above-men-
tioned companies, Dongbei Hualian has the second-lowest percentage
of state shares, at 21.1%. The 14.77 million shares owned by the state
are held by two government agencies. The Jilin Province State Assets
Administration Bureau (SAAB) holds 13 million shares while the
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Huijiang Municipal SAAB holds 1.77 million shares. In addition to
these state-owned shares, 18.03 million shares, or 25.8% of the total
shares, are held by twenty-one institutions. Each institution thus
averages 85,000 shares, with the maximum holding among these
investors being only 2.8% of the total. Individual shareholders hold
the remaining 37 million shares. These shares, totalling 53% of the
total shares, are held by 9817 individual shareholders. Thus, each
individual shareholder only holds a small amount of shares and can
exert little control over the corporation.
The formation of Dongbei Hualian illustrates the control which
can be exerted by the sole promoter even where the state is not a
majority shareholder. In December, 1988, the sole promoter,
Huijiang department store, established Dongbei Hualian using the
merger method. In 1992, the local government reinvested RMB 13
million to the corporation. Among the twelve directors who were
also managers of the newly formed company, eleven of them were
from the promoter or its subsidiary. The general manager and three
assistant general managers were all members of the Board. Thus,
unless ownership of other types of shares (e.g., individual and legal
person) becomes more concentrated while, in the course of transfer,
ownership of state shares becomes more dispersed, if the leading
promoter of the joint-stock company is a state enterprise, regardless
of whether state shares constitute a majority or minority, the leading
promoter will ineluctably retain its control of the corporation.
2. Guangzhou Case Study. Guangzhou is one of the ten
largest companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE). 53
Guangzhou was established under the merger method, with Guang-
zhou Shipyard as its sole promoter. The total face value of the shares
is RMB 494.67 million. Individuals own 25.55 percent of the total
shares, distributed among 24,043 individuals. The average amount
held by an individual is 5260 shares, or .1% of the total outstanding
shares. The maximum holding of an individual is 2.3 million shares,
or .4% of the total shares. Also, in the form of H shares 1129 foreign
shareholders own 31.8% of the total shares. The maximum H shares
held per person is 55.8 million shares, or 11.89% of total shares, and
153. Tsingtao Beer actually has the highest percentage of state shares among the companies
with minority state ownership in Table 3. However, since the company did not disclose crucial
information in its prospectus, we cannot analyze the degree of centralization or dispersion of
share holding. Thus, Guangzhou, which is very similar to Tsingtao in its percentage of state
share holding, was chosen as the subject of this case study.
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27.9% of the state shares, but the average H share owner holds only
139,406 shares. Agents of these foreign investors occupy two of the
nineteen seats on the board of directors with the remainder filled by
managers from the promoter, Guangzhou Shipyard.
D. Legal Person Representative
In a Chinese -enterprise which has legal person status, the legal
person representative is the most powerful figure. Many examples
exist which illustrate the power the representative has over company
affairs. For example, a contract between two enterprises can only
take effect upon signing by both legal person representatives.
However, the legal person representative may confer this power to
others in writing. Also, any shares transferred without the signature
of the legal person representative cannot be used as a share certifi-
cate. A bank will not accept a company's check without the
representative's signature and will not write a note for the company
without written authorization of the representative. Also, the
representative is the only person who may represent the company to
the public, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. The
legal person representative may not claim the defense that his
activities were ultra vires, since all of his actions on behalf of the
company are authorized and legal. Thus, the representative is the
embodiment of the company. The corporate managers may speak on
behalf of the company only with the authorization of the legal person
representative.
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of association, the board
chairman is the legal person representative of the company." The
positions held by the legal person representatives of the ten compa-
nies listed in Table 3 are fairly typical. In eight of the companies,
representatives are from the highest managerial level of the leading
promoter, while Hongyuan and Dongbei Hualian have government
officials as legal person representatives. Five of the ten representa-
tives act both as the board chairman and the general manager. One
of them is also the representative of the shareholders.
Because the representatives hold dual positions in representation
and share holding, they obtain unlimited control over the dismissal of
managers in the company. Thus, there is no need for the representa-
154. Standards Opinion, supra note 3, art. 59. According to article 113 of the Company Law,
the representative of a joint-stock company legal person can only be the chair of the board of
directors. Company articles of association leave no room for flexibility. Gongsifa, art. 113.
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tive to be the manager of the subsidiary company. However, the legal
representative must transfer a certain amount of power to the
managing staff in order to guarantee their cooperation. The legal
person representative system is therefore helpful in building the
corporate managers' authority and in improving management's
efficiency in operation. However, this system may present problems
of granting too much power in the representative without any system
of checks and balances to control his behavior. Without such checks,
there is no way to ensure that the representative will exercise his
authority in the best interests of the shareholders or to ensure that he
handles corporate matters as diligently as he handles his own personal
matters.
E. Administration of State Shares
1. Control of State Shares. The administration of the state
shares is distributed among the ministries and commissions of the
State Council, as well as to the local government agencies. State
shares subscribed as a promoter by enterprises directly attached to the
ministries and commissions belong to the appropriate ministry or
commission or a national company under their aegis, which has a
governmental function. Shanghai shihua and Guangzhou are
examples of companies which fit this description. On the other hand,
as in the cases of Tsingtao Beer and Ningbo Zhongyuan, state shares
subscribed for by local state enterprises in the name of a promoter
belong to a relevant agency designated by the local government.
In locations where a SAAB exists, the local government's SAAB
is the shareholder of the state shares. However, where none exists or
where it is part of the Bureau of Finance, then the Bureau of Finance
is the holder of the state shares. One exception does exist to these
general rules, as seen by the case of the Shenzhen Municipal
Government. In 1988, this government set up a state-run investment
management company to participate on behalf of state shareholders
in the management of the company. Thus, the investment company
actually functioned as a management company and as the SAAB.'55
Another situation arises where a state enterprise is a subsidiary
of another state enterprise. Even though the legal status of the
subsidiary terminates upon the formation of the joint-stock company,
the shares subscribed for it by the promoter will be held by the parent
155. GUIDE TO THE STOCK SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 156.
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rather than the SAAB as in the previous examples. For instance,
Guangzhou Baiyun and four other factories are wholly-owned
subsidiaries of Baiyun Enterprises Group, which in turn ultimately
belongs to a state holding company, Guangzhou municipal Nong
Gong Shang general company. In 1992, the five factories acted as
promoters in setting up Guangzhou Baiyun as a joint-stock company,
thus terminating their legal .status upon the establishment of the
company. The shares subscribed for by these five factories are all
held by the Baiyun Enterprise Group, as delegated by the state
holding company.
2. Voting Rights. The ultimate shareholding company usually
adopts one of several methods to exercise its voting rights as a state
shareholder. It may delegate the voting right to the board chairman,
who was previously the general manager of the state enterprise. The
company of Zhejiang Jianfeng is an example of a company which
adopted this method. The board chairman and state share representa-
tive is the president of Jinhua Shuini, which, was the leading promoter
of the joint-stock company.'56
Other methods exist by which the holding company may exercise
its voting rights. It may delegate the voting right to the managing
staff in the former state enterprise, with the votes distributed
according to the ranks of the managers' titles.157 Also, the company
may delegate the voting right to its own official who is the director of
the company. Also, the SAAB may set up an assets operation
management company to be the parent holding company of the joint-
stock company. The SAAB, however, often faces resistance from
other government organizations in its exercise of the administration
of state shares. One solution to this problem is to allow the govern-
ment agencies claiming a right to administration of the shares to send
their own representatives to the board.
When government agencies cannot reach an agreement as to who
can designate a representative as a director, the post of director is left
vacant. This situation occurred in Shanghai Number 2 textile, which
156. Also, in 1992, Zhangjian SAAB authorized the board chairman of Guangdong Huawei,
who is the ex-president of Huawei Bingye, the leading promoter, to hold 28,800,000 shares on
behalf of the state. In another example, the board chairman and ex-general manager of Manan
Shan steel company, which was the leading promoter, is now the state share representative of
Magang. The company's prospectus, reprinted in SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI
SEcumTEs DAILY], Nov. 11, 1993, at 5.
157. See GuoJiagu rengehua pozai meijie [The Urgency of Converting State Shares into
Individual Shares], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SECuRrTIs], Sept. 15, 1993, at 1.
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was established as a joint-stock company in 1991, but had no director
nominated by institutions holding state shares until 1993.
When state enterprises are restructured as joint-stock companies
and SAABs hold state shares, the power of the government agencies
who used to supervise the former state enterprise is significantly
weakened. At the same time, the newly established SAAB also does
not have enough power to command the joint-stock companies. Thus,
in the midst of power redistribution the joint-stock company apparent-
ly enjoys even greater autonomy than the state enterprise had. A
survey of seventeen listed companies conducted in 1993 by the
Shanghai municipal government revealed that the fourteen possible
operational autonomies allowed in joint-stock companies had been
granted to most of the companies surveyed. The percentage of
implementation of these autonomies in joint-stock companies was
20% higher than the percentage in state enterprises.' However,
this trend will possibly be reversed with the rise in SAAB power. In
1993, for example, Shanghai and Zhejiang founded SAABs with
broadened powers. China's economic reform makes clear that the
expansion of state agencies' power inevitably restricts the autonomy
of the individual, company, and community.
3. Effects of Distribution of Control. Although distributing
the power to administer state assets among government agencies may
not bring about revolutionary change, it at least forces the govern-
ment agencies holding state shares and administrating state assets to
play three conflicting roles. First, as a government agency, it has the
obligation to give equal treatment to the competing enterprises within
its jurisdiction and to avoid getting involved in their competition.
Second, the diversification of the state investment and high percent-
age of state shareholding may force the representative of the
government agency to act as director in two competing companies.
As director, he is entrusted with the duties of disclosing his interests
in other companies to the board and to the shareholders, maintaining
the confidentiality of commercial secrets, and avoiding competition
with the company. However, as a director in competing companies,
he may have a duty to one company which forces him to violate his
duty to another company.
158. Shanghaigufenzhi qiye chengixianzhuo [The NotableAchievements ofShanghai's Share
System Enterprises], WENHUIBAO, Jan. 17, 1994, at 2.
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Third, the administration of the state assets presents complica-
tions of legal relationships as well. The beneficiary of the state shares
is the state. However, whether this state is represented by central or
local government must be determined by looking to precedents and
to the separation of administrative power. If the share beneficiary is
separated from the holder, then the former is no longer a shareholder
in the legal sense. In this case, the state shareholder is not the state
itself but rather the government or a' holding company with a
governmental function. The state representative becomes the trustee,
responsible for the protection of the state's interests, as well as those
of the minority shareholders. Thus, he cannot bring benefits to the
state at the expense of the minority shareholders interests. In the
end, the dispute over who represents the state and holds shares is
resolved by fait accompli, rather than by statute.
F Transferring State Shares
1. Transfer of Harbin Pharmaceutical's State Shares In 1993,
three companies listed on the SHSE transferred a large amount of
their state shares to the companies' individual shareholders. Among
these companies, Hayiyao (Harbin Pharmaceutical) was the most
outstanding case.
On June 6, 1993, Harbin Pharmaceutical was listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange. At that time, the face value of the total
shares is RMB 252.64 million, with 74% being state shares and the
remaining 26% owned by individuals. The state shareholder was the
promoter's controlling company, called Harbin Pharmaceutical Group.
On July 17, 1993, Harbin Pharmaceutical's board announced that
it was calling a special meeting of the shareholders to approve transfer
of 52 million state shares (face value of RMB 1) to individual
shareholders at a price of RMB 4.06 per share. The board provided
that any one individual holding more than ten individual shares could
subscribe for up to eight state shares, with the subscription right being
non-transferrable. The subscription period lasted from July 29 to
August 6. One day before the news was disclosed to the general
public, Harbin Pharmaceutical's closing price was RMB 16.75 per
share. 59 On July 26, 1993, the CSRC notified the Harbin municipal
159. Hayiyao gufen youxian gongs, gupiao shangshi gonggaoshu [Listing Announcement of
Harbin Pharmaceutical, LdJ, SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO [SHANGHAI SECURITIES DAILY],
June 19, 1993, at 6, 7.
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government and SHSE in writing that it wanted Harbin Pharmaceuti-
cal to terminate the transfer of state shares. The Commission gave
two reasons for the termination. First, the transfer of state shares
should have been approved by the SAAB rather than the special
shareholder meeting held by Harbin Pharmaceutical. Second, article
47 of the Stock Regulative Ordinance requires any legal person
shareholder who holds more than 5% of the total outstanding shares
of a listed company to report to the issuing company, the CSRC, and
the SHSE in writing whenever its holdings increase or decrease by
more than 2% of the total outstanding shares. This report must be
made within three working days of the time the change occurs. The
Commission contends that Harbin Pharmaceutical violated this
provision by not writing this report within the time specified.
The Harbin municipal government and its SAAB responded to
the CSRC's demand by stating their case in the media. First, the
State Council had affirmed "united leadership and multi-level
administration" in the administration of state assets.16° Within the
scope of the authority granted them, local governments could transfer
state assets. Second, they asserted that the Heilongjiang provincial
government had sent written authorization for the Harbin municipal
government to transfer or auction state assets within its jurisdiction.
Harbin Pharmaceutical's state shares are from the local state
enterprises' investments. These shares fall within the state assets
under the administration of Harbin's SAAB. Third, the state
shareholder, Harbin Pharmaceutical Group Company, obtained
approval from the Harbin SAAB before it made the transferring
decision. Fourth, in all fairness to the public, the transfer could not
be halted because once news of the transfer had been disclosed, heavy
trading of Harbin Pharmaceutical's shares had affected investors.
Fifth, failure to notify the CSRC in writing had been an oversight for
which the city was willing to take responsibility. To make amends,
Harbin's mayor would personally go to Beijing to report to the
CSRC.16'
For its part, the SHSE issued a statement that was an indirect
criticism of the CSRC: "[a]ny policy decision by the concerned
160. Hayiyao xiang geren gudong zhuanrang bufen guojiagu [Harbin Pharmaceutical
Transfers a Portion of State Shares to Individual Shareholders], SHANGHAI ZHENGQUAN BAO
[SHANGHAI SEcuRrIEs DAILY], July 24, 1993, at 1.
161. Id.
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authorities ought to take into account its impact on the market."1 62
Eventually, Harbin Pharmaceutical completed the transfer of state
shares pursuant to its original plan.
2. Legal Issues Arising from the Transfer of Harbin Pharmaceu-
tical's State Shares The legal issues involved in the transfer of
Harbin Pharmaceutical state shares extend beyond the disputes
between the CSRC and Harbin municipal government. Did the state
shareholder have the right to transfer the shares under its own name?
Why did the state shareholder rush to sell its shares at prices far
below the market price on the Xth trading day after the shares were
listed? Was damage to the state interest caused by the transfer in this
case? Was the offer from the state shareholders to individual
shareholders subject to the constraints of article 47 of the Regulations
on Issuing Shares? Finally, did the CSRC have the power to demand
that the Harbin municipal government change its decisions?
a. Transfer Rights. Harbin Pharmaceutical group company,
the promoter and holding company, is Harbin Pharmaceutical's state
shareholder. The beneficiary of the state shares is Harbin municipal
government. The beneficiary's agent is Harbin SAAB, which
delegated its power to act in the best interest of the beneficiary to
Harbin Pharmaceutical group company. Thus, whether the transfer
of state shares by Harbin Pharmaceutical is subject to the approval of
the municipal SAAB depends on whether the latter's authorization
included the right to make the transfer. This question touches on the
relationship between the municipal SAAB and the Haiyiyao group
and is regulated by contract law. In deciding these issues, a court can
judicially intervene upon the request of one party, unless the
administrative regulations specially provide otherwise or an adminis-
trative organization has been granted the authority to act on its own
initiative. The Methods for Administering State Property in Share
System Experimental Enterprises (Gufen shidian qiye guoyouchan
guanli banfa) enacted by the state SAAB in 1992 says nothing either
about limiting the SAAB's right to transfer shares or about all
transfers requiring approval by the national SAAB. Neither the
authorization by the Security Policy Commission to the CSRC nor the
Regulations on Issuing Shares grants CSRC the power to prohibit the
162. Hayiyao guoyougu zhuanrang zaichengjiaodian [Harbin Pharnaceutical's Transfer of
State Shares Again Becomes a Focus of Attention], ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN
[SEcuRrrIEs MARKET WEEKLY], 1993, no. 31, at 3.
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transfer of state assets or to exercise supervision regarding the validity
of such transfers. Thus, whether the CSRC's intervention exceeded
its jurisdiction should be decided by administrative or judicial review.
b. Share Offering. In January 1992, 65 million individual
shares of Harbin Pharmaceutical were offered to the public with a
face value of one yuan per share. The municipal government granted
a 65 million share issuance quota in 1993 solely to make Harbin
Pharmaceutical's 65 million individual shares issued in 1992 eligible
for listing and trading. Thus, Harbin Pharmaceutical cannot rely on
this quota to support any further issuance of shares, since it was only
a "listing quota" rather than an "issuance quota". Compared with
other companies which were granted an "issuance quota" in 1993,
Harbin Pharmaceutical paid an incredibly high price for the listing of
its shares. Generally, the other companies offered their individual
shares at prices three to eight times the face value. This means that
a company getting a quota to issue each share with a face value of
one yuan could raise three to eight yuan per share. Harbin Pharma-
ceutical, however, offered all of its 65 million individual shares at face
value. Aside from this loss, Harbin Pharmaceutical now also needs
at least 4 or 5 million yuan for the expenses of asset estimation, audit
of financial condition, legal services, trust of shares and listing
advertisements. So, Harbin Pharmaceutical will surely be faced with
a serious shortage of cash flow after the listing of its shares.
c- Harm to State Interest. Because of the issuance and listing
quotas, a company may transfer only one-fourth of its shares issued
within the previous year and may not issue new shares. In an attempt
to inject circulating funds into its subsidiary, the controlling company
was forced to transfer its shares at a low price. Such was the
background for Haiyiyao's actions. If Harbin Pharmaceutical caused
damages to the state-owned assets, the question arises whether this
harm should be attributable to the transferor, or to the quota control
system which exerted such financial pressure on the transferor.
In the five days immediately preceding Harbin Pharmaceutical
Group's decision to transfer its state shares, the average closing price
was RMB 16.52 per share. However, the 52 million state shares were
sold at a much lower price of RMB 4.06. In a fully opened stock
market, this type of behavior would be out of the ordinary. However,
the Shanghai Securities Exchange is not such an opened market.
The market price of the Harbin Pharmaceutical shares only
reflected the true value of the one-fourth of the total shares which
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were transferrable, since all state shares were frozen at this time. Had
the state shares been transferrable, the Harbin Pharmaceutical shares
might have had a much higher price. Thus, the RMB 16.52 price was
an incorrect price resulting from the classification of shares and the
discretion of the stock trading market. Critics have argued that the
state shares should be transferred at the market price to avoid the
transferring of the state shares at low prices and thereby draining the
state-owned assets. However, these critics overlook the fact that these
non-transferrable state shares have neither a market nor a market
price. Valuing the state shares at the individual shares' market price
allows the state shares to unjustly obtain the favorable high price
without bearing any of the inherent market risks. Thus, Harbin
Pharmaceutical rightly did not attempt to transfer its state shares at
market prices, and thus did not disadvantage the individual sharehold-
ers in the process.
A shareholder may transfer its shares at any price and for any
purpose except to manipulate the market. This decision depends
solely on the shareholder's business judgment and may not be
interfered with by any other person. The price available to the
shareholder is not necessarily equal to the market price. When all
shareholders attempt to sell their shares at this price, the competition
may drive the price down so that no one actually concludes a
transaction at this predetermined market price. Therefore, under such
circumstances, a transfer below the market price is a rational and
predictable choice for the shareholder.
When first listed, the per share net value of the Harbin Pharma-
ceutical shares was only RMB 2.28. Within less than a month of the
listing, Harbin Pharmaceutical transferred 52 million of its state shares
at a price of RMB 4.06 per share. This transaction made RMB 92.56
million in profits for Harbin Pharmaceutical in addition to recouping
its capital outlay. This investment recovery rate of 178% suggests the
unreasonableness of characterizing this transaction as detrimental to
the interest of the State.
d. Application of Article 47. Article 47 of the Regulations on
Issuing Shares contains a clause which applies specifically to the
acquisition of corporations. Harbin Pharmaceutical's transfer of
shares may not fall under this provision though, since it may not be
a "corporate acquisition." In Harbin Pharmaceutical's transfer of its
state shares, a majority shareholder transferred its shares to thousands
of minority shareholders, each of which could buy the transferred
shares in their ownership proportions. Thus, this transaction was a
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dispersion of the shareholdership, which is the direct opposite of the
corporate acquisition. Furthermore, when the Harbin Pharmaceutical
Group offered to transfer its state shares to the individual sharehold-
ers, no increase or decrease of shareholdership amounting to 2% of
the total shares issued had occurred as *required in the statute. So,
even if the "corporate acquisition" clause was applicable to the case
at bar, Harbin Pharmaceutical did not have to make a report since the
2% threshold was not reached.
G. CSRC as a Competent Authority in the Business Sector
At the time of the Harbin Pharmaceutical transfer, the newly
established CSRC was eager to establish in several spheres its
examining and approving authority, because, generally, this sort of
authority was formed on the basis of customary practice. Thus, the
CSRC disapproved of Harbin Pharmaceutical's transfer of state shares
precisely in order to establish the CSRC's approval authority over
such matters. Regardless of whether the CSRC had a proper
justification for this action, a non-governmental organization has no
legal grounds on which to order a local government to alter its
decision.
Harbin Pharmaceutical did not invent the transfer of state shares;
it simply followed the precedent set by two companies on the
Shanghai exchange. The first case occurred in April 1993, when the
Shanghai Lujianzhui Co. (LJZ) transferred its 30 million state shares
to its individual shareholders at a price of RMB 2.9 (the face value
was RMB 1). For each individual share held, the holder was
permitted to buy two state shares. Before the transfer, the total share
capital of the company was RMB 715 million, with 93% state shares,
5% legal person shares, and 2% individual shares. According to the
listing requirements of the SHSE, the "shares publicly offered" could
not be less than 10% of the actual paid-in share capital. Thus, even
if all the legal person shares and individual shares of IZ were
treated as "shares publicly offered", the company would still have
only 7% publicly offered and would not meet the 10% requirement
of the SHSE. The state shareholder declared that it transferred the
state shares just to enable the company to meet the listing require-
ment.
Another case is important for its precedential value to Harbin
Pharmaceutical. Just one week before Harbin Pharmaceutical
transferred its state shares, Shenneng Co. Ltd, one of the biggest
listed companies in Shanghai, transferred 60 million of its state shares
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to its individual shareholders. The holder of each individual share
was allowed to purchase two state shares at RMB 3.5 per share, well
below the pre-transfer market price of RMB 15 per share.
Clearly, Harbin Pharmaceutical was inspired by the fact that
these two Shanghai companies' suffered neither interference from the
CSRC nor any form of censure.'o
V. THE ROLE OF LITIGATION IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CHINESE CORPORATE LAW
A. The Case of People's Bank v. Yuanye and Runtao
In 1990, Yuanye Industrial was created from the Shenzhen
Municipal Yuanye Textile Corporation, Ltd. (Yuanye Textile), which
had been established in 1987 according to the Interim Provisions of
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Experimentation of the
Shareholding System in SOEs.' 6 The story of Yuanye Textiles
acquisition by a privately held Hong Kong company, Runtao, its
accumulation of debt and the subsequent litigation with its creditors
illustrates how law becomes reality through litigation and how
administrative influence and concerns impinge on that process.
163. In its defense, the Harbin municipal government referred to these Shanghai precedents,
but the CSRC maintained that Shanghai and Shenzhen were shareholding experimental areas.
Thus, it argued, the Central Government specially permitted these two areas to carry out bold
experiments which other areas were not privileged to perform. On October 25,1993, the CSRC
made the following decision regarding Harbin Pharmaceutical: at the time the state shares were
transferred, the company did not fulfill its duty to report to the CSRC; however, afterward it
recognized its mistake, and therefore will receive only a warning. See CSRC BULLETIN, supra
note 22, 1993, no. 1, at 117.
164. See GUIDE TO ThE STOCK SYSTEM, supra note 6, at 132.
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TABLE 4: CHANGE OF STOCK OWNERSHIP IN YUANYE
INDUSTRIAL CO. LTD. (1987-1993)
Size of holding(%)
Par value of
outstanding Shares held by
shares (in Holder's each holder (in State owned Foreign Individual
Date thousand yuan) name** thousand yuan) enterprises Investors Investors





























































** The full name of holders: "
1. XY: Xinye Clothes Co. Ltd., a state owned enterprise
2. SH: Shenhai Clothes Co. Ltd., a state owned enterprise
3. KS: Kaisheng Co. Ltd., a Hong Kong company
4. PJD: Peng Jiandong, the manager of SH, the majority holder of Tanco and the board
president of Yuanye from 1988 to 1993
5. LKM: Li Kuimou, the brother-in-law of PJD
6. Tanco: Tanco Industrial Holding Co. Ltd., a Hong Kong company
7. LZ, XJS: Li Zhi, Xu Jingshu, individual holders
8. CF: Champaign Fashion Co. Ltd., the subsidiary of Tanco
9. II: individual holders, both employees of Champaign and the public
10. KYT: Kangya Textile Co. Ltd., a company held shares for the benificial of Tanco
11. ZC: Zhejiang Colthes Co. Ltd., a company held shares for the benificial of Tanco
12. HKCI: Hong Kong Chian Investement Co. Ltd., a Hong Kong company taking over most
of Tanco's shares in August 1993
13. SCCD: Shenzhen City Construct Development Co. Ltd., a state owned company taking
over part of Tanco's shares in August 1993
Significent facts relating to law suits:
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1. In June 1987, Kaisheng, a HK Co., subscribed shares but did not contribute subscription
money.
2. In February 1988, Tanco Industrial Holding Co. Ltd, a company registered in Hong Kong,
replaced Kaisen as the holder of Champaign and subscribed an additional issue of common stock
at 2.7 million yuan par value, but did not contribute subscription money.
3. In 1988, Shenhai transferred all of its stock to Xinye and withdraw from Champaign.
4. In August 1988, Nine hundred thousand shares of common stock held by Xinye were
converted into preferred stock at a fixed annual premium of 350,000 yuan. Tanco paid all of its 3
million yuan subscription money.
5. After evaluation, the net assets of champaign increased from 4.2 million to 31.73 million
yuan in October 1988. After paying a premium of 350,000 yuan to the preferred stockholders,
the increased book value was distributed among three common stock holders according to the
size of their common stock holdings at 91%, 4.5% and 4.5% respectively.
The increased ownership of Tanco amounted to 24.67 million yuan. Tanco reinvested 13.6
million yuan into Champaign and th6 other 13.93 million yuan was designated as Champaign's
debt to Tanco.
6. Mr.Peng transferred all of his shares to the other three individual holders.
7. In March 1989, three individual holders transferred all of their shares to Tanco and Tanco
was in reality the only holder of Champaign. It held 56.6 million yuan par value of shares under
its own name. The others were held under the names of the other three companies.
8. In February 1990, Champaign issued 24.5 million yuan par value common stock to the
public.
9. In August 1993, the restructuring group of Champaign made the decision to deprive Tanco
of all of its stock ownership. The municipal government approved the decision.
* Sources for the chart: 1) Yuanye falti guwen tan Yuanye ande lailong qumal [Yuanye's legal
adviser tells the story of the Yuanye case], ZHENGOUAN SHICHANG ZOUKAN [SECURITIES
MAP r WEEKLY], 1992, no. 13, at 9-14; 2) Yuanye di'er an shenli [Hearing the second Yuanye
case], ZHENGQUAN SMICHANG ZHOUKAN [SEcuRInES MARKET WEEKLY], 1992, no. 16, at 6; 3)
Shenzhen yuanye gonsi an kaiting chuqi bolan [Opening of yuanye case causes waves],
ZHENGOUAN SHICHANG zHOUKAN [SEcurTIEs MARKET WEEKLY], 1992, no. 15, at 5; 4)
'Yuanye' youyou [Dragging out 'Yuanye'], SHoUDU JINGnJ xINXa BAO [CAPITAL ECONOMIC
INFoR MATION DAILY], Dec. 20, 1994, at 1; 5) During the course of writing this essay, Yuanye's
legal adviser, Professor Xu Bing of the Legal Research Institute of China's Academy of Social
Sciences, provided me a copy of the decision from the Shenzhen Intermediate People's court and
assisted me in proofing the chart.
1. Background and Procedural History.
A number of entities held shares of Yuanye Industrial's predeces-
sor, Yuanye Textile. Sixty percent of the common shares of Yuanye
Textile were held by two SOEs, 20% by foreign enterprises, and 20%
by two individuals. In the second half of 1988, the composition of the
holders and the shares of Yuanye Textile changed dramatically.
Runtao Corp., a private, Hong Kong registered company whose
majority shareholder was one Peng Jiandong, had obtained 83% of
the common shares of Yuanye Textile. Peng became the company's
Chairman of the Board, while the common stock held by the two
SOEs were converted into preferred stock. Overall, capital shares in
Yuanye Textile were increased in value from the RMB 1.5 million
yuan to 20 million.
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In 1990, Yuanye Textile changed its name to the Yuanye
Industrial Corporation Ltd. (Yuanye Industrial) and in February of
that year, made its first public offering of 2.45 million shares at a face
value of RMB 10 each. By December of 1990, Yuanye Industrial had
been approved for and was listed on the Shenzhen Securities
Exchange.
In 1990 and 1991, Yuanye Industrial borrowed RMB 400 million
in working capital from several local banks. Runtao guaranteed the
loans with the common shares of Yuanye Industrial which it held.'
In April of 1992, however, Yuanye defaulted on a 250 million loan,
prompting the Shenzhen Branch of the People's Bank, the administra-
tive organ in charge of listed companies, and of Yuanye Industrial's
creditors, to investigate Yuanye's financial condition. On June 20,
1992, the Shenzhen Branch declared that Runtao's ownership of the
Yuanye Industrial shares were illegal and ordered creditors that they
could not transfer the Yuanye Industrial shares they held as security.
However, the Shenzhen Branch did advise China Industrial and
Commercial Bank and several other creditor banks to file suit against
both companies.
2. Judicial Treatment. On June 23, 1992, several of Yuanye's
creditors did file suit in the Intermediate People's Court of Shenzhen
City (the trial court) to procure repayment of the loans. In their
complaint, the banks requested that the trial court declare Yuanye
and Runtao jointly and severally liable for repayment of the principal
amount of the loans, the interest due, and for fines related to
nonpayment. More significantly, the creditor banks asked that the
trial court declare void the agreement that Yuanye shares (allegedly
held illegally by Runtao) would be collateral, so that Runtao would
have to satisfy a judgement out of its own coffers.
In December of 1992, the trial court rendered a judgment in
favor of the creditor banks and held that both companies were jointly
and severally liable for the debt. The court also declared the
agreement as to the shares void."s In reaching its decision, the trial
165. Between 1990 and 1991 real estate investment in Shenzhen was at a high tide. After
Yuanye Industrial was established, it immediately invested in the Xingjian office building and
apartments. The construction costs caused Yuanye to face a serious capital shortage. Yuanye
Industrial applied to issue additional shares but was refused by the Shenzhen branch of the
People's Bank.
166. See the Civil Judgement No. Zhongfajing II 054 of the Middle-level People's Court of
the Shenzhen City.
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court held that because Runtao's ownership of Yuanye shares was
illegal, the loan agreement was void. However, the court held that
Runtao was still liable for Yuanye's debt. As to the issue of the
ownership of shares, the court reasoned that Runtao had not made a
lawful investment in Yuanye, and therefore had no transferable
interest in the company. Dissatisfied with the judgment, Runtao
appealed to the High People's Court of the Guangdong Province (the
appellate court).
On review, the appellate court in May 1993 reversed the findings
of the trial court and upheld the loan agreement and Runtao's
ownership of Yuanye's stock. In reaching the decision that the terms
of the loan agreement should be upheld, the appellate court began its
analysis by looking at the nature of the agreement. The court held
that the underlying loan contract was a bilateral, private agreement
between Yuanye and the banks, and given that it did not contravene
public interest or the interests of the third parties, was a legally
binding instrument.
With respect to the issue of Runtao's ownership of the stock and
their use as collateral for the loan, the appellate court held that the
Yuanye shares pledged to the banks had been acquired with the
approval with the local people's government (that is, the Shenzhen
Municipal Government) and its competent department in charge of
securities In light of such approval, the stock ownership was legal and
could be used as collateral for the mortgage.
As to whether the interests of Yuanye Industrial or its stockhold-
ers had been adversely affected by Runtao's actions during the
process of its acquisition of Yuanye stock, the appellate court made
no findings. Instead, it stated that it would not consider the issue
since the creditor banks lacked standing to bring such a suit. The
court went on to state that only Yuanye and its stockholders could
bring such a suit and that the appellees, the creditor banks, were not
directly interested in the question of the legality of Runtao's
possession of Yuanye stock. The appellate court stated further that
the authenticity of Runtao's investment or the legality of its sharehol-
dership were questions irrelevant to the case at bar, and should be
handled by the administrative authorities according to statutory
procedure.
While the appellate court ostensibly reversed the lower court's
decision in the body of the opinion, its final judgment failed to reflect
a reversal. In its final judgment, the appellate court gave Yuanye 30
days within which to pay off its debts. However, if Yuanye was
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unable to make repayment, the appellate court held that Runtao
would be liable for the remainder, which had to be paid off with
property other than the stocks pledged.167 Despite its reasoning to
the contrary, in its actual instructions the appellate court appears to
have upheld the trial court.
3. Critique of Judicial Treatment. In order to adequately
assess judicial treatment of this case, one must first consider whether
the court system was the proper forum for resolution of this conflict.
Yuanye was an extremely expensive case to litigate. According to
Yuanye's legal counsel, the fees indirectly or directly paid by the
plaintiffs and the defendants amounted to over RMB 10 million. This
expense was incurred despite the fact that the defendant, Runtao,
never denied its liability. Further, the final judgment was to some
degree, rendered ineffective by the eventual reorganization of
Yuanye. Given the expense, inadequacy of the judicial answer, and
availability of other methods of resolution, one must conclude that the
courts were not the appropriate body for answering the questions
raised by this litigation. In fact it is surprising that the courts
accepted this case for consideration at all.
After the People's Bank declared Runtao's possession of Yuanye
shares illegal and prohibited the transfer of those sharesthe relevant
question which should have been pursued by the plaintiff banks was
whether the mortgagee should be responsible for the debt with
property other than the shares, not whether the stock guarantee was
valid. However, the plaintiff banks chose to pursue the issue of
whether the shares legally held could be pledged, an issue already
decided by the administrative authorities and irrelevant to the central
issue of liability.
The banks could have chosen a more economical and convenient
way to protect their rights as creditors. For example, they might have
transferred the stock pledged to them. If the proceeds from the sale
of the collateral stock did not satisfy the liability, the banks could
have petitioned the people's court to declare Yuanye Industrial
bankrupt under article 199 of the Civil Procedure Law. Admittedly,
an involuntary declaration of bankruptcy would adversely affect the
value of Yuanye stock and thereby hurt its investors.
167. Some final comments on the Yuanye case, ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN
[SECURITIES MARKET WEEKLY], 1993, no. 20, at 16.
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Instead of allowing the creditors' banks to pursue such a remedy,
the People's Bank intervened in the situation. The People's Bank
adopted a number of restrictive measures, such as prohibiting the
further transfer of stock, suspending the listing of Yuanye Industrial,
and preventing the creditors from filing a petition for a declaration of
bankruptcy, to maintain the financial stability of Yuanye. While the
Bank's actions were beneficial to other investors, its actions pressured
the plaintiff/creditors (units directly under its administrative jurisdic-
tion) to fie a different action which ultimately failed to result in an
acceptable solution to the problem.
The People's Bank clearly realized the effect of its actions in
encouraging the creditors to take the action to court. It knew that its
administrative act depriving Runtao of its stock ownership would be
subject to judicial review and would thus force the court to decide the
validity of ownership. Forcing judicial determination of the issue
would relieve the Bank having to directly confront Yuanye in an
administrative hearing. Contrary to the Bank's expectations, however,
the appellate court held that an administrative and not judicial
hearing was the appropriate method to resolve the stock ownership
issue. It further held that the stock pledge contract was valid. This
decision came after the litigants and the courts had expended
considerable time and resources in deciding what should have been
obvious and rendered moot the Bank's goal.
4. Additional Issues raised by Yuanye. Despite the courts not
being the appropriate body for consideration of the legality of
Runtao's ownership of Yuanye stock, the case did raise a number of
interesting questions which were neither put forward by the parties
nor addressed by the court. These unraised issues provide an
excellent framework for analyzing the new Company Law, and as
such, warrant investigation.
QUESTION ONE: May administrative authorities interfere
with and declare void a private contract between two parties
in the absence of a petition for intervention by either party?
It is a generally accepted that an administrative agency, as a
government body, may take reasonable adverse actions against a
private party when it acts pursuant to the law and in the public's
interest. Because the purpose of such intervention is to protect the
public's interest, the agency is not constrained by the potential effect
on the party or whether there has been a petition for such action.
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This is not to suggest that the agency is free to do as it pleases; it is
subject to due process constraints, administrative reconsideration, and
judicial review.
However, when an administrative authority intervenes on its own
initiative in private civil affairs, the presumptive lawfulness of its
actions are not so clear. The actions of an agency in private affairs
not only violates the principal of self-determination in civil law, but
also creates a situation in which government action is being used
against one private party to the benefit of another private party,
rather than for the general public good.
The People's Bank's declaration that Runtao's ownership of
Yuanye stock was illegal exemplifies the danger of such intervention
in civil affairs. This administrative act was obviously intended to
favor the state shareholders. If Runtao's ownership was illegal, the
state, as the shareholder with the next largest amount of stock, would
take over Yuanye. This transfer would have occurred despite the fact
the state itself made no such petition for transfer of control.
To some extent, the appellate court precluded such a result. In
the opinion of the appellate court, unless Yuanye Industrial and its
shareholders challenged the legality of Runtao's ownership, the court
would not consider the issue. However and somewhat surprisingly,
the court also held that the issue could be considered by the
appropriate administrative agency under statutory procedure. The
decision by the court that the agency could consider the issue is
inappropriate. If the interested parties are the only ones with
standing to bring such an action before a court, then they should also
be the only parties able to bring such an action before an administra-
tive agency.
QUESTION Two: Should a third party guarantor of a
loan be forced to satisfy its liability with property other than
what was pledged, if for reasons not attributable to the
guarantor, the pledge fails?
Despite upholding the validity of the pledge of stock as collateral,
the appellate court required Runtao to repay the mortgage with other
property. Unfortunately, the appellate court failed to provide any
explanation for this decision.
The appellate court's judgement fails to address the obvious
distinction between acting as a third party pledger of property and
acting as a guarantor of a loan. The former is only liable for the loan
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to the extent of what he pledged, while the latter may be liable to the
extent of all of his property. When the People's Bank declared the
pledged property (the stock shares) illegally possessed, the relevant
question was whether Runtao, as the pledger, was liable for anything.
Both courts held that Runtao was liable for Yuanye's debts with
property other than the pledged stock. However, they reached this
decision on separate grounds. The trial court reasoned that Runtao
was liable because its mistake had made the pledge contract invalid,
and it had been the pledger. The appellate court reversed on the
issue of the pledge contract, but without explanation, still held Runtao
liable for the loan. Under either analysis, forcing Runtao to satisfy
Yuanye's debt with property other than the stock unjustly makes
Runtao bear Yuanye's liability without a showing that it created or
benefited from the debt and in absence of a legal responsibility to do
SO.
The issue of whether Runtao used its controlling shareholding
position to the detriment of Yuanye and its other shareholders was
not addressed by the courts. However, from the court record, it is
reasonable to infer that it did abuse its position. In any event, before
such abuse is proven or even alleged by the shareholders, the courts
should not have found Runtao liable for the loan in light of the
invalidity of the pledge right. Further, if the appellate court felt so
compelled to make an implicit finding of fault, it should explain why.
Litigation is an opportunity for a court to answer important social
issues, demonstrate the application of the law, and define appropriate
behavior. A judgment must be evaluated not only with regard to
whether the outcome is just, but also as to whether the reasoning
behind the outcome was properly based and adequately expressed.
In Yuanye, neither of these criteria was met.
B. The Case of Runtao v. Shenzhen Municipal People's Government:
the Saga Continues
1. Background and Complaints. In January of 1993, Yuanye
Industrial convened a special meeting of the Board of Directors. In
that meeting, the Board decided to apply to the Shenzhen Municipal
People's Government for restructuring of the company."
168. The legal basis for Yuanye Industrial's reorganization (zhongzheng) is chapter 4 of the
1986 "Guangdong Province Special Economic Zone Regulations for companies with foreign
elements" (Guangdongshengjingjitequ shewaigongsi tiaolO. See STocK ECONOMICS, supra note
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In March of 1993, the Shenzhen municipal government issued
Document No. 117. Document No. 117 established a board to
organize and implement the reorganization of Yuanye. The Leading
Group for Reorganization included directors of Yuanye, shareholder
representatives, lawyers, accountants and auditors. Municipal
government officials were appointed to supervise the group's
work.169
In evaluating the prospects for reorganization of Yuanye, the
group entered into negotiations with the China Investment Company
of Hong Kong and its head, Zheng Lielie, to transfer controlling
interest in the company. Though incorporated in Hong Kong, all of
the China Investment Corp.'s capital comes from the mainland. This
sparked considerable tension between officials in Hong Kong and
China.
In June of 1993, the Hong Kong Supreme Court issued an
injunction prohibiting China Investment Corp., Zheng Lielie, and his
representatives, from directly or indirectly transferring shares of
Runtao or Yuanye and from exerting influence on either company to
make a new public offering.70 On August 19, 1993, the Shenzhen
municipal government responded with Document No. 335, which
permitted China Investment Corp. to acquire Runtao's shares in
Yuanye.17 1
6 (now superseded by the Guangdong Provincial Company Regulations (Guangdong sheng
gongsi tiaoli), which took effect on August 1, 1993). Regarding reorganization, the former
regulations provide that "in order to escape financial difficulties that have repeatedly brought
it to the brink of bankruptcy and in order to recover production operations, a special economic
zone company with foreign elements may undergo reorganization." The members of the
reorganization small group are to be determined by either a meeting of the shareholders or by
a meeting of the board of directors. The government may assign a "supervisor" (jianduren) to
oversee the reorganization. The small group takes over all powers of the board of directors.
Professor Xu Bing (Yuanye Industrial's legal adviser) believed that Yuanye had, at that
time, the capacity to clear its debts and was not facing the risk of bankruptcy. Reorganization
was thus not required. Even if reorganization were necessary, according to the regulations the
small group had no authority to make decisions concerning questions of shareholders' rights.
When the majority shareholder has been deprived of the right to participate, no valid
shareholder decisions can be produced. Therefore, the application for "reorganization" did not
represent the true intent of Yuanye Industrial. See Yuanye.gongsi zifa gudong, dahui yinqi
zhengyi [Spontaneous Yuanye shareholders meeting arouses argument], ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG
ZHOUKAN [SECURTES MARKET WEEKLY], 1993, no. 35, at 12.
169. ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN [SEcuRrrms MARKET WEEKLY], 1993, no. 13, at
20.
170. RENMIN RIBAO [PEoPLE's DAILY], Aug. 31, 1993, at 7
171. After the final judgment, Runtao invited two influential men to serve as chairman of
the board and general manager, and commissioned them with full power to represent the
company in negotiations with the Shenzhen municipal government. It further transferred to the
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Document No. 335 was followed in September of 1993 with a
decision by the Reorganization Group to deprive Runtao of almost
all of its shares.' The Reorganization Group justified its decision
to deprive Runtao of its shares on a number of grounds: (1) The
group alleged that the RMB 2.7 million worth of Yuanye shares which
Runtao purchased in May of 1988 were "not approved and registered
with the relevant department of the Shenzhen Municipal People's
Government" and as such were an "unlawful investment" that should
be revoked;' (2) The group also claimed that additional shares
Runtao acquired by using its profits from the 2.7 million RMB of
shares "jeopardized the interest of the state capital, encroached upon
the state-owned assets and were thus illegal proceeds."'74 As such,
these shares should become state shares; (3) The group also found
that Yuanye had converted a fabricated capital appreciation into the
shares that had been issued to Runtao; (4) the group held that in
November of 1989, Runtao's holding of shares under four other
names was deceptive and that the shares should be transferred to the
Shenzhen Urban Construction Development Company; (5) finally, the
group determined that the remaining shares of Runtao be taken over
by the China Investment Corp., Ltd. After the restructuring, the
public held 49.27% of Yuanye Industrial's shares, China Investment
held 38.23%, and Shenzhen Urban Construction Development Co.,
held 12.5%. At a general meeting in September of 1993, the
shareholders of Yuanye affirmed these decisions of the Reorgani-
zation Group.
In response to these events, Runtao instituted a legal proceeding
against the Shenzhen Municipal Government in the Intermediate
People's Court of Shenzhen City. In its complaint, Runtao alleged
that the administration authorities had exceeded their power by
reviewing the lawfulness of actions between private parties, specifical-
ly, the transfer of shares.75
new general manager 9.18% of the Yuanye stock it held. Using the name of Runtao, the new
chairman, took all of the remaining Yuanye shares held by Runtao and transferred it to China
Investment Company, Ltd., a private company he established in Hong Kong. Runtao then
sought an injunction from the Hong Kong high court to enjoin this action.
172. Yuanye zhongzheng shunli shenqing fupai youwang [Yuanye's Reorganization Goes
Smoothly, Hope for Applying to Recover Business License], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO
[CHINA SEcunrrns DAILY], Aug. 29, 1993, at 1.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. In November 1993, the former chair of the Yuanye board of directors and now holder
of Australian citizenship, Peng Jiandong, was arrested in Macao and brought back to the
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2. The Legal Issues Raised. While Runtao has yet to be
addressed by the courts, it does raise a number of significant legal
issues. Apparently, the city of Shenzhen approached the appellate
court prior to its creation of the reorganization group seeking counsel
as to whether such actions were within the scope of its powers. This
collusion between the court and the city raises serious questions as to
the impartiality, fairness and equity in allowing the appellate court to
hear this case.
Prior to the appellate court's decision in Yuanye, the Shenzhen
municipal government approached the court about the legality of
actions it was contemplating. The Mayor of Shenzhen, Li Youwei
told the press in April of 1993:
[A]fter the trial of first instance by the Shenzhen Intermediate
Court, we asked the Higher People's Court of Guangdong Province
for instruction on the problem of adopting administrative measures
to restructure the Yuanye company and we got an affirmative
answer. And on March 30, we for a second time, exchanged
opinions with the leadership of the Higher People's Court of
Guangdong Province. In their opinion, the determination of
shareholdership had always been decided administratively by the
governmental organs. The solution of these problems used to be
regarded as administrative acts, so it is logical and reasonable to
solve them through administrative measures.'76
The accuracy of Mayor Li's comments to the press was borne out in
August when the Higher People's Court's issued a decision that
touched on a matter not raised by the parties and that exceeded the
scope of civil litigation: the authenticity of Runtao's investment and
the legality of its shareholding ought to be settled by the relevant
administrative authorities.
The contact between the mayor and the court is clearly question-
able. It runs counter to rule of law to allow an administrative agency
to consult a court which has jurisdiction over the disputes between the
administrative organ and a certain party prior to the agency taking
adverse actions against that party. This type of "advice seeking" is an
invitation to the court to participate in the administrative decision-
mainland. The Shenzhen municipal procurator accused Peng of "serious crimes of bribery and
embezzlement of public funds" (fan you yanzhongde tanwu zui he nayong gongkuan zui).
ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA SEcURITIEs DAILY], July 28,1994, at 1.
176. ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN 3AO [CHINA SECURITIES DAILY], April 4,1993, at 1.
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making process. Such participation renders judicial review useless.
The primary purpose of judicial review is to provide an independent
review of an agency's decision making process; if the court partici-
pates in the decision making process,, it will be reviewing its own
actions.
In administrative litigation,'" the only reasonable role for an
administrative agency is to be the defendant. It may only respond to
claims; it has no rightto bring suit itself If prior to an administrative
proceeding in which the agency is a defendant, the agency induces a
court to answer a question it should address only when the agency is
a defendant, the agency is effectively exercising a right that attaches
only to a plaintiff Such actions deprive the interested party of the
right of prosecution and of a fair trial. By rendering a legal opinion
to an interested party without first listening to the other party's side
of the case, the court has in essence forced the other party to make
its case after judgment has already been rendered. This "advice
seeking" also creates a dangerous judicial precedent. It encourages
administrative agencies facing litigation to open the door voluntarily
and encourage the courts to expand their authority into what should
be the administrative agency's area of jurisdiction. This encroachment
by the judiciary can only serve to jeopardize the independent exercise
of administrative power.
3. Other Legal Issues. The facts established in Yuanye might
reasonably lead one to believe that Runtao used its position as
controlling shareholder in Yuanye Industrial to encroach upon the
interests of its subsidiary and benefit its own financial position.
Runtao received an excessive return on its investment in Yuanye in
a relatively short period. Runtao initially invested RMB 3 million
into the company on August 27, 1988, when it first paid for its
subscription. Thirty-eight days later, on October 4, 1988, that
investment had appreciated eight times resulting in a profit of RMB
24.67 million. Runtao divided this profit into two parts: one part was
reinvested in Yuanye and the remainder was taken by Runtao to be
held in creditorship for Yuanye. Runtao maintained that the cash to
honor the creditorship would be immediately accessible and could
come from: (1) subscription funds for the company's newly offered
177. Articles 1, 2, 11,25, and 26 of The Administrative Litigation Law make it clear that in
administrative litigation, administrative agencies are defendants. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo
xingzheng susong fa [Administrative Litigation Law of the People's Republic of China], arts. 1,
2, 11, 25, 26, reprinted in COMPILATMON OF NEW LAWS, supra note 18, no.2, at 3.
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shares; (2) loans borrowed by the company from banks; and (3) the
company's own business income. Regardless of the source of the
funds, responsibility for the cash rested with Yuanye or its successors.
According to information published by the Leading Group for
Restructuring, in February of 1993, the net capital of Yuanye
Industrial was only RMB 15.41 million. The net value per share of
RMB 1 Yuanye stock had fallen to RMB 0.17. Since its association
with Runtao, Yuanye had lost RMB 85.3 million. Over this same
period, however, Runtao's creditorship of Yuanye amounted to more
than RMB 130 million, about 1.4 times the total value of Yuanye
shares. It is clear that the property of the subsidiary (Yuanye) had all
flowed into the parent company (Runtao).
Leaving aside the issue of whether Yuanye can prove that
Runtao illegally appropriated its property, the question remains as to
whether Yuanye can bring suit against Runtao and its controlling
shareholder, Peng Jiandong, as the Chairman of Yuanye's Board of
Directors.
Article 49 of the Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic
of China provides that legal persons shall be represented by their
legal representatives in litigation. 8 However, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the term "legal person representative" to mean the
chairman of the board of directors.19 This interpretation leads to
an anomalous result in this situation; it means that Peng Jiandong
would have to file suit against himself In effect, it will be impossible
for the board of directors to sue the chairman in this situation.
As the law currently stands, where a company cannot sue the
chairman of its board, the shareholders have no means by which they
can protect their own interests. There are no provisions for the filing
of a derivative suit under either the Civil Procedure Law or the new
Companies Law. While the appellate court correctly held that the
minority shareholders in Yuanye should be able challenge the legality
of Runtao's ownership, it remains to be seen whether they will be
able to proceed with such a suit.
178. COMPILATION OF NEW LAWS, supra note 18, 1990, no. 2, at 3. For an English version,
see Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing Committee of the NPC, THE LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBiC OF CHINA voI.4 (1990-92) at 194.
179. ZUIGAO RENMIN FAYUAN GONGBAO [BULLETIN OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT],
1992, no. 3, at 13.
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VI. THE COMPANY LAW AND THE EXISTING LEGAL
FRAMEWORK
A. Draft of the Company Law
In April of 1985, under the leadership of the now defunct State
Economic Commission, work began on drafting the Regulations on
Limited Liability Companies (Youxian zeren gongsi tiaoli) and the
Regulations on Joint-Stock Companies (Gufen youxian gongsi tiaoli).
In October 1987, the two draft regulations were submitted to the
State Council for deliberation.
In April 1990, deputies at the Third Meeting of the Seventh
National People's Congress requested enactment of a Company Law.
In response, the Legislative Bureau under the State Council and the
SCRES revised and supplemented the earlier regulations and that
same year submitted a draft limited liability Company Law (Youxian
zeren gongsi fa) to the State Council in 1990."8 However, because
joint-stock companies had become a sensitive ideological issue,
legislative work on the subject came to a temporary halt. To maintain
the momentum and avoid a political battle, the legislature decided to
direct efforts toward passing the Limited Liability Company with the
hope that it would be able to use that experience to enact a more
unified and comprehensive Company Law when the political climate
was more favorable.
By August of 1992 the ideological mood had changed sufficiently
for, the Standing Committee of the NPC to decide that the Limited
Liability Company Law and the Joint-Stock Company Law should be
combined into one Company Law. The Standing Committee also
decided that the Legislative Affairs Commission and not the
Legislative Bureau of the State Council should oversee the drafting
of the new law, and In February of 1993 the Legislative Affairs
Commission presented its draft of the New Company Law to the
Standing Meeting of the NPC for discussion. Revisions and further
discussion took place between the two groups through December of
that year, when the Standing Committee approved submission of the
final version to the National People's Congress. In April 1994, the
NPC approved the law.
180. Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui gongbao [Bulletin of the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress] no. 5, at 21.
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B. Conflict Between the Company Law and the Existing Legal
Framework
The drafters of the Company Law faced a dilemma. On the one
hand they could not indiscriminately replicate the existing legal
framework which revolved around administrative permits, was
increasingly subject to criticism of its administrative arbitrariness, and
was based on anachronistic rules and regulations. For example, China
was no longer satisfied with conducting its reform on the matrix of a
planned economy. It wanted to develop a socialist market economy.
Yet, on the other hand, legislators could not suddenly change the
order established by administrative authority: for example, the quota
controls for issuing and listing stocks and the permits for promoting
a joint-stock company. Unless more reasonable, more feasibly
systematized rules replace it, an established system will not disappear
overnight after promulgation of a new law. Therefore the Company
Law can only serve as a link between the past and future legal
frameworks, abandoning some of the current framework's rules and
preserving others. Yet because of the way it was drafted, the
Company Law will inevitably generate more transitional problems
than other legislation.
In the past, the NPC enacted laws that included veritable "blank
check" (kongbai zhipiao) grants of power to administrative authori-
ties. For example, laws provided that the State Council or one of its
departments might "formulate implementing measures in accordance
with the present law," or a law might affirm a certain ministry of
commission as "the department in charge" of implementing that
law.18 But the Company Law made no such authorization to the
State Council or its departments. It permitted the latter to exercise
their administrative legislative power only regarding matters expressly
stipulated in the Company Law. Previously, laws enacted by the NPC
could peacefully coexist with the laws and regulations already in
effect. Administrative authorities would not face the pressure of
amending or invalidating extant administrative regulations and rules
because the administrative agency which would be charged with
implementing a new law would also have drafted that law. The law
181. See, e.g., The Customs Law, art. 60, reprinted in 3 THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 23 (1990); Law on Technology Contracts, art. 54, id. at 39; Law on
Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People, art. 67, id. at 155; Law on Chinese-Foreign
Contractual Joint Ventures, art. 27, id. at 164.
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would have been submitted to the Legislative Affairs Commission,
which, after some minor revisions, would have submitted the draft to
the NPC Standing Committee for a vote.
However, the new Company Law was drafted independently by
the Legislative Affairs Commission for the express purpose of
supplanting the Standards Opinion and the Opinion on Standards for
Limited Liability. Companies. , The legislators not only made little
effort to adapt the new law to the existing rules and regulations, they
also wrote provisions aimed at changing the status quo ante.
In at least five aspects, the Company Law imposed varying
degrees of limitations on the power of administrative agencies.
Article 8, paragraph 2 of the Company Law states that application for
the registration of companies do not require the prior permission of
an administrative agency except as otherwise provided for by the laws
or administrative regulations."8 The abolition of the administrative
permit power is a breakthrough for corporatization. Since national-
ization in the 1950s, China adhered to a system of pre-registration
examination and approval. This requirement placed substantial power
in the hands of administrative agencies. Whether an applicant
business engaged in a certain trade could be started and the manner
in which it could be run were subject to the exclusive approval of the
"competent department in charge of the trade." The applicant could
apply to the bureau for industry and commerce for registration only
if it had procured "gateway" approval from the competent agency.
China's move to a market economy has, contrary to expectations,
aggravated rather than reduced agencies' examination and approval
power as new industries have appeared and existing ones have
segmented. The scope of regulated activity has increased as agencies
try to establish an examination and approval imperium in any new
areas which might be profitable.
This permit power may be curtailed by the implicit ultra vires
(yuequan wuxiao) principle contained in article 8 of the Company
Law. That is, the power of the administrative agencies originates
from the laws enacted by the NPC and the administrative regulations
formulated by the State Council. Acts exceeding the scope of this
delegated authority in the form of either administrative rules or
decisions are presumptively void. Thus, under the Company Law the
permit power may now be delegated to an agency only through
182. Zhonghua renin gongheguo gongsifa [Company Law of China], art. 8, reprinted in
CHINA'S COMPANY LAW: THE NEW LEGISLATION 10 (Guiguo Wang trans., 1994).
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specific regulations issued by the State Council and any attempt to
claim a permit power without specific authorization has no legal basis.
A caveat must added to this analysis. Article 77 of the law also
provides that "the establishment of a joint-stock company shall be
subject to the approval of a department authorized by the State
Council or of a people's government at the provincial level." This
language indicates that the changes in the permit may apply only to
limited liability companies and may be illusory with regard to joint-
stock companies in that the prior approval requirement still exists. As
far as the joint-stock company is concerned the authority structures
formed after the promulgation of the Standards Opinion are
unaffected the enactment of the Company Law. Enterprises
belonging to the central government are still subject to the examina-
tion and approval of the corresponding ministries and commissions,
and the enterprises belonging to local governments are still subject to
the examination and approval of the local governments. For joint-
stock companies, the change is no more than a redistribution of the
examination and approval powers among the "competent departments
in charge of the trades" and the other governmental organs.
Since the 1980s, one of the fundamental causes of economic
disorder in China has been the involvement of government officials
and agencies in trade and business. Between 1984 and 1993 the
Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council have issued
fifteen documents prohibiting such involvement and ordering agencies
and officials to "unhook" (tuikou) themselves from the companies
they had set up. However, as evidenced by their repeated promulga-
tion, such proscriptions have been utterly ineffectual.
Article 58 of the new law admirably attempts to solve this conflict
of interest problem by prohibiting government officials from serving
concurrently as directors, supervisors or managers of companies, but
it leaves unanswered practical questions of enforcement. What
happens if a government official violates the law and serves concur-
rently as a senior manager in a company. Based on Article 58 does
an interested party have standing to sue? And are government
functionaries who served concurrently as high ranking officers of a
state monopoly exempt from Article 58's controls?
Another problem addressed by the new law is the quota controls
on the issuance of stock. However, the effect of the new law in this
area seems identical to the old regime. While the law neither affirms
nor negates quota controls, articles 85 and 139 do provide that the
offering of new shares by a company shall be subject to the approval
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of the department in charge of securities under the State Council.
Thus, issuance approval and quota controls still fall within the
discretionary power of the relevant agency.
Perhaps the most important distinction between the Company
Law and the existing legal framework is the deregulation of share
transfers. Article 143 states simply that all shares are transferable and
makes no mention of the previous classification system. Under article
144, it appears that the door seems to have been opened for an OCT
market as listing of shares in securities exchanges is no longer the
only channel for transfer of stock. And although no companies have
yet issued unsigned shares (wu jiming gupiao, that is shares with no
signature), this more conveniently transferred form of shares is likely
to be increasingly used since article 145 allows such shares to be
exchanged on any legally established exchange. Significantly, the new
law contains no limitations on the proportion of shares which may be
held by employees nor does it authorize an agency to create such
restrictions. This suggests that such matters will be governed by
individual companies' articles of association rather than by public law.
Of course, the effectiveness these provisions depends on how soon an
OCT market is established and whether the forthcoming securities law
departs in significant ways from the Company Law.
Because of the substantial approval power vested in government
agencies, the Company Law creates administrative and criminal
sanctions for dereliction of duty in the examination and approval
process. While dereliction of government duty was already criminaliz-
ed under the penal code,' 83 and no one has yet been sanctioned for
dereliction of duty in granting approval to a company that fall short
of the legal requirements for incorporation or share listing, the
Company Law's general provisions were intended as reminder of the
consequences of dereliction.' 4 To make the consequences even
more explicit, the Standing Committee of the NPC, on February 28,
1995 passed a resolution that added to the Criminal Law a group
provisions spelling out tough sanctions for criminal violations of the
Company Law. The provisions deal with corporate fraud as well as
183. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingfa [The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of
China], arts. 185, 187, 192, esp. 187 reprinted in ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO PALO
oUANSHU [COLLECTION OF THE LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA]. J. Cohen and
T. Gelatt, trans., "The Criminal law of the People's Republic of China," 73 J.CRIM. L at 138.
184. Zhonghua rennin gongheguo gongsifa [Company Law of China], arts. 220, 221,
reprinted in CHINA'S COMPANY LAW: THE NEW LEGISLATION, supra note 181, at 54.
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abuse of the approval power and impose on convicted government
officials sentences up to five years of hard labor."s
C. Compatibility of the Company Law with the Existing Legal
Framework
Despite the changes discussed above, the Company Law seems
to have strengthened the administrative permit system in two key
respects.
Previously, issuing of shares to organizations and internal
employees, so-called directed or fixed channel offerings, were not
subject to quota controls or to the approval of the CSRC. Although
this type of shares can almost never be listed or traded on the
exchanges, people still enthusiastically subscribed for them, enabling
the issuing companies to raise large amounts of capital. Thus, when
issuing and listing of shares was restricted, enterprises entered the
capital markets under the guise of directed offerings. Probably
because of worries about the fraud, insider trading and disorder
associated with directed offerings, the Company Law proscribed such
offerings. Therefore, with the exception of "promoter establishment"
(faqi sheli), in which the promoter buys out all the shares, the State
Council's subordinate department in charge of securities (guowuyuan
zhengquan guanli bumen), namely the CSRC, must approve the
establishment of any joint-stock company.
Article 151 of the Company Law provides that the listing of
shares shall be subject to the approval of the State Council or the
department in charge of securities under the State Council. This
provision categorically affirms the permit power of administrative
agencies to approve the listing of shares and actually extends the
scope of such power beyond that enumerated in the Regulations on
Issuing and Trading which did not expressly provide the approval
right over listing applications.
Under the prior statutory framework, a joint-stock company in
Shanghai and Shenzhen which wished to make a public offering within
the prescribed quotas was only required to receive approval from the
local government under special provisions which granted these local
185. Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuan hui guanyu zhengzhi weifan gongsifa
de fanzuide jueding [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
Concerning Penalties for Breaking the Company Law] reprinted in RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S
DAILY], March 2, 1995 at 2. Notably, article 8, par. 2 imposes sanctions not only on the directly
responsible agency but also on any supervising agency that forced its subordinate to violate the
rules.
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governments more autonomy in carrying out corporatization. The
company was not subject to examination by the CSRC nor did it
require the final approval of the Securities Policy Committee.
However, article 151 of the new law limits the authority of the local
governments in Shanghai and Shenzhen to approve incorporations of
companies and to manage their securities market. Article 151
unequivocally states that without exception, all shares will be subject
to the approval of the department in charge of securities under the
State Council.
D. Criticism of the Company Law
The new Company Law has been the target of much criticism
since its enactment. In this section I respond to a number of critiques
that appeared in the spring of 1994 in a leading securities market
journal."s  As I demonstrate here, much of the criticism fails to
realize the contribution this legislation makes toward the development
of Chinese corporate law.
Opponents of the new law allege that by lifting the Standards
Opinion's prohibition on individuals and private enterprises initiating
joint-stock companies, 'the new law encourages deceptive trade
practices. This criticism fails in two respects. First, the conclusion
that individuals and private enterprises tend to be more deceptive is
not supported by any evidence. Second, assuming that individuals
and private companies are likely to engage in such deceptive acts, at
least their actions are more likely to be exposed to legal sanctions.
Unlike state-enterprises, private bodies are not as immunized against
prosecution by multi-threaded ties to government organizations.
Finally, no law will be able to completely insulate investors from
deceptive trade practices; law exists on the premise that violations will
occur. The role of the law is to determine the limits of legal activity
and then to provide judicial remedy for violations.
Critics also allege that the new law totally negates companies
established under by directed offerings under the provisions of the
Standards Opinion and completely nullifies the market for the
circulation and transfer of legal person shares.
According to article 8, initial offerings other than those solely to
promoter must be made to the general public. Thus, the critics are
correct in positing that article 8 is a prohibition on the ability of a
company to make a directed offering. However, the prohibition will
186. ZHENGQUAN SHICHANG ZHOUKAN [SECURITIES MARKET WEEKLY], 1994, Number 4.
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not be applied retroactively; under article 229, companies which
existed legally prior to the law's enactment are not affected and stock
ownership can remain with the parties to whom the directed offering
was made.
Further, existence of a market in legal person shares is not an
issue that can be settled by a single Company. Law. Indeed the
transferability of legal person shares may actually be enhanced by the
Company Law. Once the quota system is abolished and legal person
shares are permitted to be listed and traded on existing exchanges as
well as a legalized OCT, the survival of trading centers specializing in
legal person shares will depend on the laws of the market. The
Company Law has not followed the provisions of the Standards
Opinion concerning directed offerings because the drafters of the
Company Law sought to anticipate change and to avoid using legal
forms to perpetuate an unstable state of affairs.
Finally, critics contend that article 58's prohibition on government
officials serving concurrently as companies' directors, managers, and
supervisors is a mistake, for when the government owns a significant
number of shares in a company, it is perfectly reasonable for
government officials to undertake such responsibilities.
The new law actually does not prohibit government organs in
charge of state shares in a company from nominating government
officials to the board. Rather, the prohibition is that once govern-
ment officials assume board responsibilities, they must relinquish their
status as officials and their positions in government organizations.
Otherwise, it is like having a referee participate in the game.
Of course, government officials' concurrent service as directors
and managers in state monopolies is an exception to the rule. Article
58 need not be applied to this circumstance, which constitutes no
threat to the public interest.
VII. CONCLUSION
A. Problems in Planning a Market
Over the last fifteen years, as the Chinese government's
enormous effort at reforming state enterprises through joint opera-
tion, contract lease, and other methods failed to produce significant
results, it shifted its emphasis to the experiment in corporatization.
At its earliest stage under the jurisdiction of localities, the experiment
was subjected to little limitation. The participants had a broad scope
of autonomy to explore, and their explorations gave birth to a myriad
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of proposals from which to choose. Not long after, the central
government's ministries and commissions began to use these early
structures as a model to unify the various experiments in corporatizat-
ion. This unification created a legal framework chiefly characterized
by control through permissions to start a company, permissions to
issue and list stock, and quotas on stock issues. Until now, this legal
framework has been used primarily not to create rules of behavior or
develop a socialist market economy; rather it has been used to extend
to the experiment in corporatization and the attendant securities
market the distinctively Chinese system of special permissions and to
insert a nascent, immature market into a highly centralized planned
economy.
The intention to bring the practice of corporatization into a
previously designed legal framework derives from the same assump-
tions that drove the establishment of the planned economy: the state
can replace individuals' decision making about their own affairs; the
information necessary for a nationwide economic plan could be
defined, gathered and processed; the social order must be maintained
even at the expense of restricting individual autonomy. On the one
hand, the means employed to regulated corporatization in the 1990s
is deeply rooted in an unchanged context of planned economy. On
the other hand, some provisions of foreign law are simply translated
without taking into considering the necessity, feasibility, and compati-
bility of such transplantation. The co-existence of indigenous
measures originally applied to the planned economy and exogenous
measures alien to the planned economy results in legal confusion and
unusually high transaction costs not needed by either a planned or
market economy.
One cannot overemphasize the importance of order in the
process of reform. If order were suddenly to be destroyed or there
were fundamentally no order, we would have neither social justice nor
economic efficiency. However, the question revealed by corporatizat-
ion is this: at a time when the intrinsic order is incompatible with the
direction of society and a new order must be established, can the
original rules, methods and operational mechanisms achieve this goal
of order? Can these rejected methods of the planned economy be
used to establish a market economy order? I think that the defects
exposed in the present legal framework are sufficient to cause us to
answer in the negative.
Under this legal framework, whether one considers it from the
perspective of their seriousness or from the perspective of the
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difficulty in resolving them, man-made problems are significantly
greater than those that can be attributed to the market economy
itself There are at least five major problems with the existing legal
framework:
(1) One day the gates will be opened and several billion
"directed placement" (dingxiang muji) shares which have
been deprived of their right to enter the market, will be
thrown into the market by the huge number of shareholders
anxious to transfer their stock. There will inevitably be a
sharp price drop. Investors will be unable to recover their
principal unless even more of society's savings enter the
stock exchange market once the gates are opened, or the
issuing market is temporarily closed. Either circumstance
will produce a huge waste of society's resources.1"
(2) After establishing an unstable, sporadically open securi-
ties market with barriers dividing the various types of shares
and stock issue quotas, to suddenly remove the barriers and
completely open the market could lead to disaster. In the
issuing market, after the government, securities dealers,
lawyers, accountants, and issuers have all distributed among
themselves the issuing income that is more than ten times
the face value of the shares and that comes largely from
individual shareholders, even more individual capital flows
into this narrow stock exchange market. It exerts itself to
keep stock prices propped up above the subscription cost so
that a profit can be earned when shares change hands. It
seems that the costs expended in the process of issuing can
be completely recovered in the exchange market. But in an
exchange market where the total amount of capital fluctu-
ates within a narrow range, individual shareholders can
realize a profit only if the large number of "frozen" shares
issued to and held by the state and legal persons are
excluded from the market by the barrier of listing permis-
187. In the first half of 1994 when the price of shares fell, the CSRC adopted measures to
slow the listing of new shares. At the beginning of the year, it announced that the release of
5.5 billion share issuing quota would be delayed. Then in August 1994, it announced "a
temporary halt in the issuance and listing of various types of new shares, including, shares in the
planned quota for 1994, shares remaining from the 1993 quota that had been authorized but not
yet issued, and enterprise shares with problems left over by history." ZHONGGUO ZUENGQUAN
BAO [CHINA SEcuRIrms DAILY], Aug. 2, 1994, at 1.
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sion. Any measures that would eliminate the barriers or
open the market would dilute the capital already in the
trading market and cause panic selling.
(3) Under the system of stock issue quotas, a large amount
of resources are wasted for no reason, ordinary order is
assaulted, and all written rules become meaningless.
(4) Permission to issue and list shares leads to repeated
arbitrary administrative decisions. Faced with mutually
contradictory ambiguous administrative rules and regula-
tions, parties are totally at a loss about what to do. It is not
so much the formation of rules as it is the formation of
unconstrained power.
(5) Given the complex, multi-stranded ties between the
government organs that possess the power to set the quotas
for issues and to permit the issuing and listing of stocks on
the one hand and the securities dealers, lawyers and accoun-
tants who receive special permission from those authorities
on the other hand, insider trading and market manipulation
may be ever more hidden and dangerous.
Concurrent with the experiment in corporatization, there seems
to be another experiment underway-taking all the government
functions under a planned economy and transplanting them into a tiny
market economy nursery. I do not intend to undervalue the role of
the government in the market, but I similarly believe that if the
government's interference exceeds reasonable limits, the problems it
creates will be far greater than the problems it resolves.
Recently we have seen the repeated occurrence of an inexplicable
phenomenon: strengthening administrative authority as a way to solve
problems originally caused by the abuse of administrative authority.
In the 1980s government organs' and government personnel's abuse
of their administrative powers to authorize permission and to allocate
resources created the disastrous consequences of official profiteering
(guandao), but the three "company rectifications" each successively
strengthened the government's power "to examine and permit"
(shenpi). The chaotic condition of the stock market was caused by ill-
considered measures of administrative management and loss of
control over conflicts of interest, yet the solution was to establish an
administrative organization with still more concentrated power.
The establishment of order certainly cannot be accomplished
without administrative power, but on the other hand without
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measures that effectively control administrative power, order can
certainly not be established.
The economist Han Zhiguo made the following comment on this
question of order.
In establishing a joint-stock company, one must go through the
process of examination and approval [shenpi] by the competent
administrative agency. From a certain perspective, the enterprise's
dependence on administrative power is greater and more serious
[than under the prior system]. It is only the form of dependency
and government agency that has changed .... Comparing the
traditional planning regulation under the old system to the power
held by competent government organs to approve a quota for share
issuance and to choose which enterprise may list, it is hard to say
which is worse, but regardless of how great entrepreneurs' skill or
contribution may be, standing before administrative authority they
must all bow their heads and acknowledge their vassalage [fushou
chengchen]. ... If one says that at present our nation's share
economy is not standard, then I think even more important than
the lack of standards in the forms and procedures of operation is
that the legal documents concerning the share economy not only
are not standard but are also suffused by an administrative color-
ation." s
B. Ownership and Control
Since the 1980s, those advocating the corporatization of SOEs
have essentially argued that the creation of joint-stock companies will
lead to the separation of ownership and control. Moreover, the
advocates for corporatization argue that the difficulties faced by SOEs
arise precisely because they have not separated ownership from
control. However, this point of view utterly lacks a factual basis and
is reasoning based purely on imagination. It is not so much raising a
theoretical question seriously as it is expressing a favorable mood
about corporatization.
Joint-stock companies do not necessarily lead to the separation
of the right of ownership and the right of control. Separation of
ownership and control occurs only when the shareholding is so
dispersed that there's no way to constitute either majority or minority
control, so dispersed that a single shareholder, either on its own or in
188. Han Zhiguo, Zhongguo fazhan gufenzhide lu gai zenme zou [How Should China Go
Along the Road to Developing a Share System], ZHONGGUO ZHENGQUAN BAO [CHINA
SEcuRrrms DAILY], Aug. 11, 1993, at 6.
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league with others, cannot influence the board of directors. Though
the beneficial owners of the company's property, shareholders have
lost any means of control and can only "vote with their feet"
(yongjiao qu toupiao). As the recipient of the owners' entrustment,
the directors and the managers acquire a sort of power without
property right-the right to control the company. Separating control
from ownership is not necessarily the path to efficiency and fairness;
rather the separation appears following the distribution of the share
right and ought to be a phenomenon increasingly subject to adjust-
ment by law. The problems thus produced-what duties do the
directors and managers have to shareholders? what sort of rules
should be followed when there is a conflict of interest between
directors, managers, and shareholders? when the directors and
managers injure the interests of shareholders, how can the sharehold-
er use the law to help them contend with the directors?-raise a
challenge to law based on traditional concepts of ownership. In
contemporary China, more and more evidence shows that the injury
caused to companies by directors' and managers' conflicts of interest
is no less serious than that caused by excessive government interfer-
ence. As the litigation concerning Yuanye and Runtao demonstrates,
under the current legal framework there is still neither a reliable
method for preventing this sort of problem nor a channel for
stockholders to obtain judicial relief
Whether or not the separation of ownership and control is
connected to efficiency is entirely contingent on the degree of
distribution of the right of ownership. Family owned companies
epitomize the unification of ownership and control. However, there
is no evidence to show that family companies are less efficient than
public ones. To the contrary, whether in the mainland in the 1930s
or in Hong Kong and Taiwan in the 1990s, the most successful
companies are family owned. From the end of the 1970s when
individual commercial and industrial households revived, private
enterprises without exception have unified ownership and control.
But unlike SOEs, they have not lost their vitality because of this
structure. The owner's hiring of a manager and the manager's control
of the owner's property are by their natures two utterly different
things. For, regardless of the breadth of authority granted to the
directors and managers, so long as the owner may dismiss and replace
directors and managers, the control is still entirely the owner's.
However, when a dispersed ownership united to the greatest degree
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still lacks the strength to change directors and managers, having
professional managers control a company is probably the best choice.
An analysis of shareholding and control in ten listed companies
shows that regardless of what path SOEs have taken to reorganize
into joint-stock companies, ownership and control have not been
separated. The unity of ownership and control is manifest in both
majority and minority control. If there has been any change at all, it
would be that after corporatization, the controlling shareholder not
only continues to have authority over its own property, it also has
authority over what may be the even greater property of other
shareholders. In a situation in which the state's shares may not be
transferred and the number of shareholding individuals is limited, the
way in which majority and minority shareholders relate to control of
the company is unwavering and the possibility of a takeover by
outside shareholders is completely eliminated. Moreover, the old
systematized internal rules and customs of enterprises will be
transferred to the body of the new share company. Consequently,
until the state shares are dispersed to a certain degree, corporatization
has no way of accomplishing a separation of right of ownership and
right of control.
The chief reason for the lack of vitality in state enterprises is the
excessive and willful administrative interference, a problem unrelated
to the right of ownership or control. When the government interferes
in enterprises, it has absolutely no need to use its ownership right as
a justification. Any activity that impinges on society's common
interest falls within the scope of the government's intervention. If the
government considers it necessary, it may interfere even more
seriously in an enterprise in which it has no ownership right: for
example, to nationalize a private enterprise, or to change a collective
enterprise into a state owned one. Thus, even a thorough separation
of the rights of ownership and control would not have a significant
effect on the problem of administrative interference.
C. Some Suggestions for Equity
It is beyond the author's capacity to propose a comprehensive
program to solve the existing problems. What follows are merely
some thoughts which may be of some benefit in shaping an agenda.
First, the road to organizing and starting a company ought to be
equally open to all individuals and organizations and not simply a
measure for the rescue of state enterprises. At present there have
been established on this road a number of barriers: the quota on
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issuing shares, permission for issuing, and permission to launch a
company-these ought all be eliminated. Only in this way can a
competitive environment be created.
Second, the Company Law ought to be an amalgam of voluntary
and mandatory norms. Freedom of contract ought to be a basic rule
that penetrates and suffuses the Company Law, subject to restriction
only under circumstances that impinge on the public interest.
Therefore in matters within the sphere of contract, the Company Law
only provides to the parties provisions from which they may choose
or provisions to, be used when a company's articles of association do
not have 'corresponding provisions. For matters that concern the
public interest, such as the veracity of stock prospectuses or the full
disclosure of material information, there ought to be stricter, more
concrete rules.
Third, the abuse of administrative power that is impeding China's
smooth and stable transition from a planned to a market economy
constitutes the most serious problem. From the "official profiteering"
(guandao) of the 1980s to the "moiphing companies" (fanpai
gongsi)' (literally, "turning over nameplate companies") of the
1990s, from the various noisome "assigned contributions" (tanpai)
imposed on the peasants to the barriers at every stage along the road
of state enterprise corporatization-all are related to the abuse of
administrative power. However, under the Administrative Litigation
Law, the victim of arbitrary administrative power cannot challenge the
rationality and constitutionality of a generally applied administrative
statute, no matter how unreasonable the statute may be. Moreover,
the court can review only whether an administrative decision against
a plaintiff is inconsistent with the relevant administrative statute,
which, in all probability, was drafted by the defendant itself.
Therefore we must establish new administrative litigation rules to
resolve this problem:
(1) we must subject the legality of administrative rules to
judicial review: When a person's rights and interests are
subjected to unreasonable limitation by administrative
regulations, that person ought to have the unarguable right
to challenge the legality of that rule, and to have a court
make a ruling. Moreover, the court's ruling should protect
189. This term refers to companies which were originally government organizations. By
"turning over the nameplate" (fanpai), the government organization becomes a company.
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not only the litigant's rights and interests, but also be
applied to anyone who might be harmed by being con-
strained by the regulations.
(2) We must subject the legality of administrative procedures
to judicial review. When an administrative organization
makes a decision that may disadvantage someone, those who
will be bound by that decision should have the right to be
heard ex ante. Decisions that violate this procedure,
regardless of the agency's reason, should be unenforceable.
The problem of administrative organs' and government
personnel's conflicts of interest should be controlled by the
legislature, the administrative supervisor, and judicial review.
Fourth, compared to the state holding shares, selling off state
assets is the way to corporatization with relatively lower transactional
costs. State assets will be directly metamorphosed in this process,
society's savings will flow into the nation's treasury, and the state, of
its own will, can distribute resources anew. On the other hand, if the
state holds shares, then it is subject to the limitation of not being able
to transfer its shares for a number of years. If a set of regulatory
methods for state shares is designed, and a relevant organ established,
it will lead to another round of organizational expansion. Moreover,
it can only be a one-time redistribution of the fragmented regulatory
power over state property.
Fifth, through the sale and corporatization of state enterprises
there should develop a system of social security. At the same time,
pension funds and unemployment insurance funds should be used to
stabilize the securities market. This may be one of the ways to make
a stable transition from a planned to a market economy. The experi-
ence of Eastern Europe and Russia has already shown that as a
market economy replaces a planned economy, ordinary workers pay
a heavy price for the change. At first, they had no choice but to
accept the "unit" arranged for them by the government and the work
arranged for them by the "unit." Now, owing to competition and
financial losses, the workers may lose not only their work but also the
retirement benefits they expected in exchange for a lifetime of work.
If an effective social security system is not established first, the hard
work of developing a market economy may suffer a setback or result
in widespread inequities.
Over the last several years the situation of the Chinese securities
market has repeatedly shown that every time excessive speculation is
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extinguished, it bubbles up again, gratuitously depleting society's
resources in a crazy, rising and falling wave of speculation. Under
these conditions, the securities market cannot rise to its role of
optimally allocating resources. If corporatization is accompanied by
concern with social fairness, the two aforementioned problems (that
is, the burden on workers and speculation) may be resolved, or least
may not develop to an uncontrollable stage. Below are some possible
directions to choose:
(1) Any company in the process of being transformed into
a share enterprise ought to take a portion of its property
equivalent to its staff's pensions and invest in a retirement
fund or make it into a long term liability to its staff
(2) Any company issuing stock ought to give its retirement
fund a preferred subscription right. Regardless of whether
the enterprise is issuing shares to sell assets or has already
listed and the shares are either frozen state shares or state
legal person shares which are allowed to be transferred, in
all cases a certain percentage of shares should be reserved
for subscription by the retirement fund. Pension fund
organizations may be based on staff categories, and estab-
lished at the central and local levels. Staff from a single
enterprise may participate in two or more pension funds to
guard against the risks of monopoly and corruption.
(3) Unemployment insurance should be developed as quickly
as possible. Insurance companies may establish specialized
unemployment insurance funds and on the basis of the size
of the fund decide the scope of its risk. Companies in the
developing unemployment insurance industry may have a
right of preferential subscription in regard to shares issues by
companies in the locale or in the industry of the insured.
Local governments may also take a portion of the revenue
generated by the sale of state-owned companies' assets and
use them to buy unemployment insurance for the staff of
companies which have long-term losses.
(4) At a relatively low issue or transfer price, provide shares
to lower income people. For example, farmers with annual
incomes of less than RMB 500 (approximately U.S. $60),
retirees with annual incomes of RMB 1200 (U.S. $150) or
less, the employed with incomes of RMIB 3000 (U.S. $375)
or less, should all be able to buy shares at relatively low
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prices. Banks might use the stocks these people are entitled
to buy as security and give them low interest loans while
securities companies ought to handle their stock transactions
either gratis or at low cost.

